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1- INTRODUCTION 
A high-technology society places a premium on its de­
mand for energy sources. Of the alternative available 
energy sources at the present time, nuclear power is one of 
the most efficient and economical sources. However, there 
is widespread concern (founded or unfounded) over the safety 
of nuclear power plants. Much of this concern surfaced as 
a result of the accident in March of 1979 at the Three Mile 
Island (TMI) generating station near Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania. This accident was the result of a complex set 
of interactions involving design deficiencies, equipment 
failure and human errors. 
Generally, human performance plays an important role in 
the reliability and safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs). 
In order to have a complete safety analysis of nuclear power 
plants, human reliability considerations are necessary. 
Several attempts aimed at analyzing the effects of human 
reliability on NPP system performance have been made in 
several research projects and safety studies. In particular, 
the extensive safety analysis work reported in WASH-1400 (1) 
utilized various human performance data sources and the 
judgment of technical experts (educated guesses) to provide 
human error rates. Those sources do not provide actual 
recorded data. To date, there has been no systematic program 
to collect human error rates data in operating NPPs. The 
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only formal record of errors in NPPs is in the Licensee 
Event Reports (LERs), which do not directly yield error 
rates in the sense of errors per opportunity for error. How­
ever, those reports could be used to determine the impact of 
human errors on the reliability or availability and safety 
of NPPs. 
In NPP operations, certain types of errors of opera­
tion, maintenance, and testing can result in the unavail­
ability of some safety-related system or component to perform 
its safety function for some period of time. This unavail­
ability will continue to prevail until someone discovers that 
the system or component is not operative, or until the system 
condition causes other changes to the plant that lead to the 
discovery of the unavailability of the system. In addition, 
other events can cause some engineered safety features (ESFs) 
to be unavailable and may eventually result in some other 
visible changes in the plant. 
In safety analysis, it is often necessary to incorporate 
human error probabilities into the estimation of component 
unavailabilities. This may be due to maintenance or cali­
bration errors that can cause one or more components/systems 
to be unavailable for some interval of time. In such cases, 
a component's/system's unavailability is a function of the 
probability of occurrence of some human events, the proba­
bility of recovery, and the average time that the component 
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is in a failed condition before being restored. The widely 
used definition of availability of a system or equipment is 
the probability that it is operating, or would operate 
satisfactorily if called upon, at any point in time. 
The objective of this research work is to assess quanti­
tatively human contribution to risk in light water reactors 
(LWRs). Based on WASH-1400 (1), high risk accident sequences 
are analyzed to select one of those sequences and identify 
those systems for which in-depth analysis of human contribu­
tions are needed. This analysis is utilized here to estimate 
the effects of significant human action during accident 
sequences and its resulting impact on LWR safety. The 
developed human error data banks, which were developed by 
the Nuclear Safety Research Group (NSRG) at Iowa State Uni­
versity, are utilized to estimate human error rates. 
Appropriate statistical methods are used to evaluate human 
error rates and the unavailability of some of the engineer­
ing safeguard systems (ESSs) of PWRs due to human errors. 
Sensitivity analysis of the estimated human error rates are 
performed to determine those errors which have impact on the 
overall system reliability. 
A review of the previous work in human reliability 
analysis and its application to nuclear power is presented 
in Section 2. Section 3 describes some of the performance-
shaping factors (PSFs) that affect human reliability in NPP 
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operations. The PSFs determine whether human performance 
is highly reliable, highly unreliable, or at some level in 
between. Human performance plays an important role in the 
safety of NPPs. Some safety aspects of NPPs are presented 
in Section 4. Section 5 presents the analysis of the 
selected accident sequence and description of those systems 
involved in the accident. Systems involved are the con­
tainment spray injection system (CSIS), the containment 
spray recirculation system (CSRS), the containment heat 
removal system (CHRS) and the sodium hydroxid addition 
system (SHAS). Since those systems have important involve­
ment, estimation of their unavailabilities due to human 
errors is presented in Section 6. Estimates of human 
error rates, based on the developed human error data bank, 
for valving errors, in the above systems are presented in 
Section 7. Section 8 presents quantitative evaluation of 
the systems involved in the sequence reliability and safety 
characteristics. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Safety engineering is the art of protection against 
potential hazards which may result from use or operation of 
a device, a system, or a process through design. This in­
volves the design of reliable protective and engineered 
safeguard systems, of adequate instrumentation and control, 
of proper accessibility to monitor and observe fluctuations 
in those parameters which are relevant to the integrity and 
safety of the system. The light water reactor safety study 
(WASH-1400) was commissioned to estimate the public risks that 
could result from the operation of commercial nuclear power 
plants (1) . The risks had to be estimated rather than 
measured, because there have been no nuclear accidents 
resulting in risk to the public. The methods used to develop 
the risk estimates were based on event tree and fault tree 
techniques, which were used to define potential accident 
paths and their likelihood of occurrence. 
It has been recognized that human factors play a very 
important role in the availability and reliability of nuclear 
power plants. For this reason, human reliability considera­
tions are necessary for a complete safety analysis of nuclear 
power plants. More than 60% of the reported occurrences in 
nuclear systems involve human factors (2). Human interac­
tion with the system is evident in routine plant operation, 
testing, and maintenance. Also, human interaction would be 
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required in the event of malfunctions in any part of the 
plant, including automatic systems. Human errors and 
other combinations of failures have significantly con­
tributed to the outcome of the TMI-accident (3). Also, 
the human element played a significant role in mitigat­
ing possible consequences of the Browns Ferry accident 
(4) . 
In WASH-1400, contributions due to human error have 
been included in the unavailability of various safety sys­
tems for both PWR and BWR. But the study comes short of 
incorporating adequate modeling of the interrelation between 
human reliability and the reliability of the systems. This 
shortcoming has no impact on the final result of this risk 
evaluation since uncertainties associated with the human 
errors data are covered by error bands (5, 6). The re­
sults in WASH-1400 indicated that system unavailabilities 
were importantly influenced by the human and his interac­
tions with design. These human interactions can be broadly 
categorized into two classes: (.1) errors committed prior 
to an initiating event (pre-accident), and (2) errors com­
mitted during or following an initiating event (post-acci­
dent) . In an early study done by Levine (7) on WASH-1400 
fault trees, estimates have been made of human error con­
tributions for most of the LWR systems and subsystems eval­
uated in WASH-1400. For almost one-half of the PWR systems 
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considered, human errors dominated system unavailability 
and represented from 50 to 95% of the contribution to 
failure. Further examination of those systems and sub­
system fault trees indicates that collectively, errors 
of a pre-accident nature outweighed those errors committed 
after an accident by a factor of two. 
So far, in the nuclear safety studies, data utilized 
on human error rates are obtained from sources other than 
the nuclear industry. A growing effort is now being de­
voted to analyzing the human error data in LWRs. The need 
for human factor analysis is related to the necessity to 
improve the system and, consequently, to avoid the unde-
sired and unscheduled shutdown and to avoid safety systems 
degradation or unavailability. Human reliability consider­
ations are necessary for a complete safety analysis of 
nuclear power plants. There is no doubt that evaluation 
of human error rates based on past experience of the nuclear 
industry will provide a data base for improving the relia­
bility and safety of nuclear power plants. 
Historically, human error rates have been treated in 
the same way as component failure rates for reliability 
considerations. Williams (8) suggested this approach and 
noted that the great difficulty in its implementation has 
been the unavailability of basic human error rate data on 
which human task reliabilities could be based. The "Bath 
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Tub" Shape Curve could be employed for representation of 
human error rates. The initial decrease in the failure 
rate is a result of the learning process. An intermediate 
period represents the constant error rate which is the use­
ful operator life. In this region, only chance failures 
are considered. The final period of increasing failure 
rate is due to combination of chance and aging errors. 
This model applies to a single human operator (9). Although 
reported data represent a group of people of different ages 
working under widely varied conditions and stresses at dif­
ferent plants, still human failures can be studied objec­
tively just as can any other component failure (10). 
For any task, human errors are best understood in terms 
of human variability which reflects all factors that may 
be operating at the time the actions are performed (10). 
The variability is a characteristic of human performance. 
The human variability can best be described as the pattern 
of errors in the completion of a given task. There are three 
basic types of variability: random variability, systematic 
variability and sporadic variability. Random variability 
indicates random errors which are generally due to improper 
selection of personnel. Systematic variability results in 
systematic errors. Most often, inadequate feedback leads 
to a systematic error. Sporadic errors can best be 
described as chance errors. Human errors leading to 
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catastrophic failures are less frequent than those leading to 
a delay in operation or a malfunction leading to a shutdown 
of the reactor. Forced outages of the plant lead to eco­
nomic loss due to reduction in plant availability. Many fac­
tors affect (or shape) human performance in a complex man-
machine system such as a nuclear power plant. Some of these 
factors are external to the person in the system, and some 
are internal. Those factors are called performance shaping 
factors (PSFs). Swain and Gultman (11) discuss several of 
the PSFs that influence the reliability of nuclear power 
plant personnel. The basic advantages of humans over 
machines are that humans can perform with higher qualities 
of perception, recognition and decision-making (5). These 
qualities are of great importance in operating nuclear power 
plants. In addition, examination of the nature of human 
interaction with the system may make it possible to provide 
uittaiis of reducing human errOra (12) . 
Swain (13, 14) developed THERP (Technique for Human 
Error Rate Prediction) to utilize the AIR DATA STORE in 
evaluating human error contributions to system degradation. 
The compilation of basic human error rate data was put forth 
by Altman and his colleagues at the American Institute for 
Research and was teirmed AIR DATA STORE (15) . The method 
utilizes probability tree theory to determine mission reli­
ability from individual tasks and their component 
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behaviors. Discrete error rates and operation times are 
used so that the model could be used to predict the proba­
bility of some events within a specified period of time. 
Several attempts have been made to determine the 
human factor contributions to human reliability and safety 
of nuclear power plants. Swain (16) has applied THERP to 
determine human factors contributions to the operational 
reliability of nuclear power plants. Rasmussen and his co­
workers utilized the general features of THERP in the final 
draft of WASH-1400 (1). Since no actuarial data base for 
human error rates in nuclear power plants exists, various 
human performance data sources have been used to provide 
them. The sources include the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority (UKAEA), the Danish AEC, and the Imperial Chemi­
cal Industries, Ltd. (ICI) of Great Britain. Those sources, 
although relevant, do not provide actual recorded data but 
rather provide estimates of human failure rates based on the 
judgment of technical experts. The above sources predict 
human performance data based on tasks similar to nuclear 
plant operation, maintenance, and testing tasks. Another 
source of human error rates is obtained from weapons pro­
duction, maintenance and testing tasks which are not entire­
ly similar to nuclear plant tasks. 
Emon and Becar (17) presented a method for system reli­
ability analysis developed by Kaman Sciences Corporation 
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known as Go. This technique was specifically utilized to 
evaluate the reliability of High Temperature Gas Cooled 
Reactor (HTGR) scram system including human interfaces. 
The Go code is a non-Monte Carlo method utilizing proba­
bility tree analysis. All possible operational modes are 
considered, rather than those producing a specific failure 
as in the fault tree analysis. The analysis is applied in 
detail to Fort St. Vrain (18, 19). The Go code was uti­
lized to estimate the effects of significant human action 
during accident sequences and its resulting impact to HTGR 
safety. Due to limited time, the study was directed on the 
Reheater Tube Leak accident. High stress, human error 
probabilities estimated in WASH-1400 were used with a 
slight modification to be compatible with HTGR operation. 
The result of this study indicated that probability of 
getting such scram is directly dependent on the amount of 
operator involvement assumed at the start of the accident. 
Although the human interface effects in the HTGR were found 
to have little impact on system safety, there could easily 
be a substantial impact on system availability. 
Husseiny et al. (20) have investigated human factor 
effects on Fort St. Vrain by analyzing occurrences data in 
the period from January 1974 to March 1975. Mean times 
between failures (MTBF) were calculated for both routine 
and vigilance tasks. 
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Sabri et al. (21) have developed a taxonomy of opera­
tion tasks and operator errors to classify human error 
data of nuclear power plants. The scheme is designed for 
sorting and storing of failure information in a data 
library for ease of retrieval by a reliability analysis 
code. It is suggested that continuous updating and smooth­
ing techniques be implemented to yield time-dependent 
operator performance data over the operating life of a 
given plant. Kalman Filter techniques were suggested to 
smooth the data. 
Husseiny et al. (22) developed a model to examine the 
influence of operator performance on reactor shutdown sys­
tem reliability. The model provides a tool to monitor the 
operator response in different operational tasks and also 
it allows the use of existing data on human response. 
Joos et al. (23) developed a computer program which is 
suitable for sorting and storing the failure information 
for PWRs and BWRs between June 1, 1973, and June 30, 1975, 
due to human errors. 
The Nuclear Safety Research Group (NSRG) developed a 
computer data management program for storage, handling and 
retrieval of information and compiled the data extracted 
from the Licensee Event Reports (LERs). An operator 
analysis statistical information system (OASIS) using an 
alphanumeric encoding scheme of LER records and a general 
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event classification system (GENCLASS) containing more 
detail description of events were presented. An analysis 
of the interrelationships between operator and human error 
rates and different operation parameters was conducted. 
Several statistical techniques for use in data smoothing 
and for interpretation of LER statistics were examined, 
and a linear recursive Kalman filter was obtained for data 
smoothing, prediction and updating of operator error rates 
(24) . 
Khericha et al. (25) reviewed nuclear power plant 
experience to determine causes, frequency, and duration 
of forced shutdowns of commercial nuclear power stations. 
Correlations were made among component failure rates, 
human factors, plant sizes, reactor types, and plant down­
time. 
Cho et al. (26) developed a computer system to retrieve 
historical and current data from LERs. The Weibull proba­
bility plotting method was applied to operator error data 
and it was concluded that this method is suitable for esti­
mating Weibull parameters for operator errors that have oc­
curred during operation. Three commercial nuclear power 
plants were used to evaluate the computer code and operator 
errors. 
Azarm et al. (27) constructed a model to be used in 
the prediction of future data for operator error rate for 
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two different types of LWRs (PWRs and BWRs) with respect 
to power rating and time. Static and dynamic models were 
estimated based on smoothing the data extracted from LERs. 
It was concluded that the learning process of BWRs is 
almost independent of power, but in PWRs the power of the 
reactor is one of the important factors affecting the 
learning process. 
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3. PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS 
This section describes some of the factors that affect 
human reliability in nuclear power plant (NPP) operations. 
The manner in which a human perceives, thinks about, and 
responds to the inputs he/she receives depends on what are 
called performance shaping factors (PSFs). The PSFs deter­
mine whether human performance will be highly reliable, high­
ly unreliable, or some level in between. Table 3.1 presents 
the PSFs that must be evaluated when performing a human reli­
ability analysis (28) . In general, PSFs are divided into 
three classes: (1) those outside the individual, the 
external PSFs; (2) those that are a part of the individual 
himself, the internal PSFs; and (3) stresses and stressors. 
3.1. External PSFs 
The external PSFs are those that define work situations 
of operators, technicians, maintenance personnel, engineers 
and others who keep the NPP performing reliably and safely. 
The external PSFs fall into three general categories: 
Situational Characteristics (SCs), Task and Equipment 
Characteristics (TECs), and Job and Task Instructions (JTIs). 
3.1.1. Situational characteristics (SCs) 
SCs include PSFs that are plant-wide in influence, or 
that cover many different jobs and tasks in the plant. 
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Table 3.1. Representative listing of factors that shape 
human performance 
External 
A. Situational B. Job and task C. Task and equipment 
characteristics characteristics characteristics 
1. Architectural 1. 
features 
2. Quality of 
environment : 2. 
a. Temperature 
b. Humidity 3. 
c. Air quality 
d. Noise and 4. 
vibration 5. 
e. Degree of 
general 
cleanliness 
3. Work hours/ 
work breaks 
4. Availability/ 
adequacy of 
special equip­
ment, tools and 
supplies 
5. Manning 
parameters 
6. Organizational 
structure (e.g., 
authority,-
responsibility, 
communication 
channels) 
7. Actions by super­
visors , coworkers, 
union representa­
tives, and regula­
tory personnel 
8. Rewards, recogni­
tion, benefits 
Procedures 1. 
required (writ­
er not written) 2. 
Written or oral 
communications 
Cautions and 
warnings 3. 
Work methods 
Plant policies 4. 
(shop practices) 
5. 
6 .  
7. 
8 .  
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Perceptual 
requirements 
Motor require­
ments (speed, 
strength, preci­
sion) 
Control-display 
relationships 
Anticipatory 
requirements 
Interpretation 
Decision-making 
Complexity (in­
formation load) 
Narrowness of task 
Frequency and 
repetitiveness 
Task criticality 
Long- and short-
term memory 
Calculational 
requirements 
Feedback (knowl­
edge of results) 
Continuity (dis­
crete vs. con­
tinuous) 
Team structure 
Man-machine inter­
face factors : 
Design of prime 
equipment, test 
equipment, manu­
facturing equip­
ment, job aids, 
tools, fixtures. 
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Table 3.1. Continued 
Stressors Internal 
A. Psychological B. Physiological Organismic 
stressors stressors factors 
1. Suddenness of 1. Duration of 1. Previous training 
onset stress 2. State of current 
2. Duration of 2. Fatigue practice of skill 
stress 3. Pain or dis­ 3. Personality and 
3. Task speed comfort intelligence 
4. Task load 4. Hunger or variables 
5. High jeopardy thirst 4. Motivation and 
risk 5. Temperature attitudes 
6. Threats (of extremes 5. Knowledge of re­
failure, loss 6. Radiation quired perform­
of job) 7. G-force ance standards 
7. Monotonous, extremes 6. Physical condi­
degrading or 8. Atmospheric tions 
meaningless work pressure 7. Attitudes based 
8. Long, uneventful extremes on influence of 
vigilance periods 9. Vibration family and other 
9. Conflicts of 10. Movement con­ outside persons 
motives about job striction or agencies 
performance 11. Lack of physi­ 8. Group identifi'-
10. Reinforcement cal exercise cation 
absent or nega­
tive 
11. Sensory depri­
vation 
12. Distractions 
(noise, glare, 
movement, flick­
er, color) 
13. Inconsistent 
cueing 
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3.1.1.1. Architectural features Architectural 
features refer to the general work area or areas, such as 
control room, room for equipment to be calibrated in, the 
room housing the turbines and generators. All these have 
certain architectural features that can affect human per­
formance either favorably or adversely. 
One familiar example in NPPs with both favorable and 
adverse impacts is the large control room housing the oper­
ating panels for two or three reactors. One positive 
aspect is the fact that, in an emergency, centralized con­
trol is facilitated and it is more likely that sufficient 
qualified personnel will be available right from the start 
of the emergency. A negative aspect is the generally high 
noise level, the large number of people present at times, 
and the possibility of confusion. 
3.1.1.2. Quality of working environment The next 
three situational characteristics in Table 3.1 (temperature, 
humidity, and air quality; noise and vibration; and degree 
of general cleanliness) refer to the quality of the environ­
ment surrounding the worker. NPPs generally provide a 
satisfactory environment, but there are exceptions regarding 
the noise level and the presence of an excessive number of 
people in control rooms. There are certain areas where 
a high noise level is to be expected and ear protectors 
should be worn. However, a high noise level cannot be 
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tolerated in the control room as it can cause irritation 
and fatigue, which may result in errors (29). 
A special problem for certain NPP tasks is that of 
protection against exposure to radioactivity, especially the 
need for certain maintenance tasks in a low-radiation en­
vironment that requires protective clothing to be worn. 
No detail study has been done to solve such a problem, but 
interviews with operating personnel indicate that the cloth­
ing is uncomfortable and that a primary motivation of 
personnel in "rad" environment is to get the job done as 
quickly as possible and get out (29). This motivation 
could reduce the level of human reliability. 
3.1.1.3. Work hours and scheduling of work breaks 
There have been many studies of human performance as a func­
tion of work hours and scheduling of work breaks. Most of 
the studies are relevant to production jobs or other work 
where the work rate is paced by the job. Much of the work 
in NPPs is self-paced except in response to unusual situa­
tions, in which case the workers are fully aroused and in­
volved. The usual findings regarding work-breaks are not 
applicable, since most of the NPP operators, technicians, 
and other personnel are performing their duties (autonomous­
ly) , and their efficiency is not likely to be improved by 
rigid schedules of rest periods. However, there is an 
important question about the impact of work hours that are 
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longer than normal. This type of schedule occurs fairly 
often, as when somebody stays on duty at the end of his 
shift to fill in for someone in the next shift, or during 
plant shutdown and startup operations that require the 
presence of certain key personnel throughout (30). 
The following are some suggestions recommended for 
scheduling work hours beyond the normal work time (31); 
(1) Under no circumstances shall one work in a NPP 
for over 16 straight hours. 
(2) There shall be at least a 12-hour break between 
work periods for any individual. 
(3) No one shall work more than 60 hours a week. 
(4) No one shall work more than 100 hours in any two 
consecutive weeks. 
(5) Ensure that working an extra shift will not mean 
that one has been without sleep for 24 hours. 
3.1.1.4. Avai1 abi1ity/adequacy of special equipment/ 
tools and supplies The effect of the availability or 
adequacy of special equipment and tools and of supplies on 
job performance is often ignored in the industry, in general. 
Generally, it appears that these items are located and man­
aged in a way to suit tool-crib attendants rather than the 
people who will use them on the job. This reversal of 
priorities can adversely affect job performance. For 
example, if much effort is required to obtain certain tools, 
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the worker will tend to make do with what he has, often 
to the detriment of his work quality. 
3.1.1.5. Manning parameters The manning parameters 
refer to how many and what kinds of people are used to per­
form which types of jobs. The experience of people who 
develop manning tables for military organizations, especial­
ly for technical jobs, indicates that unless manning is 
based on a thorough task analysis of all the tasks to be 
performed, there will be inadequacies in manning (32). 
Jobs tend to be defined in conventional terms rather than 
in terms of looking at the population of tasks and then 
deriving the jobs from a careful analysis of task demands. 
In NPPs, there is a natural tendency to carry over manning 
practices from fossil fuel power plants. While much of 
this carryover is probably relevant, no systematic study of 
NPP manning that determines to what extent NPPs have differ­
ent manning needs has been performed (32). It is good to 
mention here that there are two differences between the U.S. 
and European practices: (1) in the type of people assigned 
to control room functions, and (2) the Swedish practice of 
having two separate job titles for operating personnel. 
3.1.1.6. Organizational structure and action by others 
A plant's organizational structure and actions by supervisors, 
coworkers, union representatives, and regulatory personnel 
often fall into the sociological realm. Some of these 
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actions have technical impact. Probably the most important 
area is administrative control of the status of safety 
systems and components (33). 
When components or systems are removed from their 
normal operating status for maintenance or other purpose, 
proper restoration procedures may not be carried out, or 
certain necessary safety components or systems may not be 
available when needed because of oversights or other errors. 
In NPPs considerable reliance is placed on human interven­
tion to avoid this kind of problem. Thus, the kind of 
administration control in a plant is very important. If the 
administration control is tight and the supervisors insist 
on rigid adherence to the control, the likelihood is small 
that some valve will be left in the wrong position. 
Also, actions by regulatory personnel will have a large 
effect on plant personnel performance and practice. 
3.1.1.7. Rewards, récognition, an . J Vs ^  mm XÎ m Am «AAASA J. UO 
PSPs have at least an indirect influence on the performance 
of technical jobs. Numerous industrial and social psy­
chology books and research papers discuss the importance of 
these factors. 
3.1.2. Task and equipment characteristics 
The task and equipment characteristics are PSFs that 
are specific to a given task. In order to perform a task 
analysis, these factors are needed. The following sections 
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describe in general terms the task and equipment PSFs listed 
in Table 3.1. 
3.1.2.1. Perceptual requirements The perceptual 
requirements in a task are determined by the task and equip­
ment features that convey information to the personnel. 
Almost all of the perceptual requirements placed on the 
personnel are visual—reading meters, charts, labels, etc. 
Auditory requirements are minor, requiring only the ability 
to hear and recognize various alarms. The crucial require­
ments on the PSFs for displays are that they reliably convey 
the essential information to the user, and that the display 
attracts his attention (if prompt response is required). 
3.1.2.2. Motor requirements Motor requirements 
refer to control, adjustment, connecting, or other actions, 
normally performed with hands or feet. Speed of movement 
is rarely a problem in NPPs, although the strength required 
to operate a conLrol device can be a problem in some main­
tenance tasks. High precision of motor response is not a 
problem in NPPs, except for certain operations performed 
during refueling and rod manipulations. Most of the human 
factors problems in the design of controls in NPPs are 
related to the use of unnecessarily large control handles 
and to the poor location and labeling of controls (34). 
3.1.2.3. Control-display relationships The rela­
tionships between controls and displays refer to the 
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compatibility of displayed information with the required 
movement of controls. Certain displays lead to certain 
expectancies as to how a control should be moved. If the 
displays and their associated controls violate these expec­
tancies, the probability of human error will be very high, 
especially under stress (35). 
3.1.2.4. Anticipatory and interpretation requirements 
Anticipatory requirements refer to tasks in which a person 
has to be alert for some signal while performing another 
activity that also requires attention. Humans have definite 
limitations in this area. The human is essentially a single-
channel mechanism; that is, he/she can pay attention to only 
one thing at any instant in time. With practice, he can 
rapidly switch his attention among several stimuli, and it 
may appear that he/she is attending to several things simul­
taneously. Still, at any given moment, he/she is attending 
to just one stimulus. 
Interpretation requirements in NPPs are related to situ­
ations in which the present information requires some mental 
processing. This means that the course of action implied by 
the information is not obvious, and interpretation of the 
data is required. The more interpretation that is required, 
the longer the response time and the greater the probability 
of error. 
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3.1.2.5. Decision-making and complexity The need 
to make decisions in a job can help keep the job interest­
ing and challenging. Without any requirement for decision­
making, most people become bored. Therefore, the best 
designed jobs and tasks include the need for a person to 
use his decision-making ability. Problems for human reli­
ability arise when the information presented to the decision­
maker does not adequately support the kinds of decisions he 
needs to make (34). 
The complexity of a job is a function of the amount of 
information the worker must process and the amount of ab­
stract reasoning or visualization required. Obviously, 
errors will be frequent if the job is too complex. Tasks 
in an NPP ordinarily are well within the capabilities of the 
workers. The experienced operators understand the work of 
the plant, and they process information at a self-determined 
pace. However, in some planLs the emergency procedures 
(such as those for LOCAs) introduce complexities that exceed 
the capabilities even of highly skilled operators. 
3.1.2.6. Frequency and repetitiveness The frequency 
and repetitiveness of human actions are PSFs that have a 
dual relationship to human performance. Although the ability 
to perform reliably increases with the frequency and 
repetitiveness of a task. Highly repetitive tasks become 
boring and few workers will do their best on such jobs. The 
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optimal tradeoff between reliability and boredom in the 
design of jobs remains unsolved in many industries, includ­
ing NPPs. Some calibration tasks, for example, involve so 
much repetition that it is a tribute to the patience of the 
technicians that so few errors are made. 
3.1.2.7. Task criticality The criticality of a 
task as perceived by plant personnel will affect how much 
attention they devote to the task. This is true during 
time of stress or fatigue when one does not have the time 
or the ability (energy) to perform all tasks. A person at 
work will naturally care more about those tasks that are 
considered most critical to the job. A person's perception 
of what is critical is influenced by instruction from their 
supervisor and by the "old hands" with whom he/she works. 
3.1.2.8. Memory and calculational requirements 
These requirements can often degrade human performance. 
Although long-term memory for facts is not one of man's ouL-
standing capabilities, he does have a good capacity for 
remembering principles, strategies, and other rules and 
their applications. 
Short-term memory is notoriously unreliable, yet many 
jobs place unrealistic demands for short-term memory on the 
personnel. Short-term memory is less reliable than long-
term memory because it lacks the long learning time and re­
hearsal associated with the latter. 
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The performance of even simple arithmetic accounts for 
many errors in technical work. This is in part because 
short-term memory is often involved, especially in the 
performance of mental arithmetic involving more than two 
single-digit numbers. 
3.1.2.9. Feedback Feedback, a term borrowed from 
engineering technology, refers to the knowledge of results 
that a person receives about the status or adequacy of his 
outputs. Without the feedback loop shown in Fig. 3.1, a 
worker operates as an open-loop system and cannot perform 
complicated activities reliably (36). 
3.1.2.10. Continuity The term continuity refers 
to the extent to which each task element is a discrete step, 
e.g., typical calibration or maintenance procedures or non-
discrete (i.e., continuous) (36). Continuous tasks involve 
some sort of tracking activity in which the operator moni-
Lors some continuously changing situation and takes appropri­
ate control action. In NPPs, rod control during startup or 
shutdown is an example of a continuous task. The operator's 
control actions associated with such tasks can be either 
continuous (as in a rod control) or discrete (as in stopping 
a pump when the water level reaches some point). 
3.1.2.11. Team structure This term refers to the 
combinations of people performing work that must be done by 
two or more persons. The most important point concerned 
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Figure 3.1. Human operator in a feedback system 
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here is the technical aspects of people working in teams. 
The major technical aspects has to do with the recovery 
factors made possible by having one person in a position 
to observe another's work either during or after completion 
of the work. 
3.1.2.12. Man-machine interface factors This term 
covers all points of contact between human and hardware. 
It includes test equipment, handling equipment, tools, etc. 
More discussion of this term is given in Swain (37). 
3.1.3. Job and task instruction 
The PSP job and task instructions include the written 
or nonwritten procedures followed in performing the work, 
written or oral communications, cautions and warnings, work 
methods, and plant policies. Although all of these PSFs 
are important for reliable human performance, this discus­
sion will be directed mainly towards written procedures and 
work methods. 
One of the most important work methods is the correct 
use of written procedures, especially checklists. If any 
task is performed without step-by-step reference to written 
procedures, errors of omission are much more likely. If a 
checklist is used improperly, as when someone first inspects 
several items of equipment for proper status and then checks 
the checklist items all at once, errors of omission are 
again very likely. 
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It is recognized that well-written procedures and good 
work methods can often compensate for less-than-adequate 
human engineering of equipment. Yet, the written instruc­
tions in NPPs do not conform to established principles of 
good writing; they are more typical of military maintenance 
procedures of approximately 20 years ago (38). 
Written procedures that are difficult to read, diffi­
cult to locate, or inconvenient to use are seldom used. At 
some plants, emergency procedures are not easily distinguish­
able from the other procedures; and, once located, a specific 
emergency procedure within the procedures manual is difficult 
to find because there are no tabs or other indexing methods 
to assist the operator. Finally, the format and content of 
the typical NPP procedures are not easy to use. One of the 
most serious problems with NPP emergency procedures is that 
there are too many instructions that are not safety-relevant. 
Much of this safety-irrelevant information concerns the re­
duction of monetary loss (38). 
3.2. Stressors 
Stress can be psychological, physiological, or both. 
Sometimes it is not possible to differentiate between the 
two. A stressor can be defined as any external or internal 
force that causes bodily or mental tension. One may recog­
nize that stress appears to arise whenever there is a 
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departure from optimum conditions which the organism is un­
able, or not easily able, to correct (39). 
3.2.1. Psychological stress 
Table 3.1 lists some psychological stressors. Some of 
these are clearly undesirable, but many are acceptable or 
even desirable in some limited amount. 
Dealing with stress, or even getting people to agree 
on what stress is, is not an easy task. Fig. 3.2 provides 
a plot of stress level against performance effectiveness. 
The plot is not linear. With extremely high levels of 
stress, the performance of most people will deteriorate, 
especially if the onset of the stressor is sudden and the 
stressing situation persists for long periods (40). 
The curve also indicates that at very low levels of 
stress, performance will not be optimum. There is not enough 
arousal to keep a person sufficiently alert to do a good job. 
The curve also shows that there is a level of stress at which 
performance is optimum. This level is difficult to define. 
It varies for different tasks and for different people. 
This means that the tasks assigned to NPP personnel should 
be neither too boring nor so demanding that serious human 
errors are inevitable. With good ergonomics in the design 
of plant man-machine interfaces and with properly skilled 
and practiced personnel, one has the best chance of avoiding 
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Figure 3.2. Hypothetical relationship of psychological stress and perform­
ance effectiveness (40) 
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the very high end of the stress curve. 
The low end of the stress curve has important implica­
tions for monitoring tasks. If a control room operator is 
not sufficiently aroused, he/she is less likely to detect 
deviations from normal until they result in some annunciated 
indications. As an example, if an operator's first indica­
tion of something untoward is an annunciated signal, he may 
not always be able to correct the situation on a timely 
basis. This is in part a design problem, but it is also a 
problem of ineffective monitoring that develops when the 
operator is not experiencing enough signals to maintain 
arousal or alertness. This relative lack of arousal is 
called the vigilance effect, as shown in Fig. 3.3 (41). 
In summary, the effect of psychological stress in NPPs 
is a serious problem. It can be addressed effectively 
through a combination of sound equipment design, frequent 
practice; and responsible supervision. 
3.2.2. Physiological stress 
Table 3.1 lists some physiological stressors. All of 
these stressors would be disruptive. The disruptive effects 
of fatigue, especially as they relate to working beyond a 
normal 8 hours, were addressed in Section 3.1.1. The 
special problem of working in a low radiation environment 
was also mentioned. 
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Figure 3.3. Vigilance effect for passive tasks with low 
signal rate (41) 
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Few of the other stressors constitute serious problems 
in NPP operations. However, discomfort can be a highly 
disruptive PSF for certain maintenance tasks. Errors, 
especially errors of omission, can be expected to increase 
if such discomfort is combined with temperature extremes. 
Movement constriction and lack of physical exercise is 
a problem primarily in the control room. However, it is 
common practice for operators to walk around frequently not 
only to monitor displays but probably just to get up and 
move around. Some designers of NPPs have misapplied this 
small problem of movement constriction and have argued that 
a standing operator is more effective than a seated one. 
3.3. Internal PSFs 
Table 3.1 lists some of the contributing factors of 
the individual in a man-machine system. Some of these PSFs 
are outside the control of supervision and management, but 
most are either the direct responsibility of the utility or 
can be influenced by utility policy. 
A number of reports talk about the training of NPP 
personnel. It was mentioned in WASH-1400 (1) that the level 
of training of NPP personnel was outstanding. But other 
reports stated that this judgment should be modified, and it 
is still believed that the training of NPP control room 
operator is good, but there is much room for improvement (42). 
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While there may be some reservations about the quality 
of training, there is a definite concern about the state 
of current practice on skill of safety-related task. Inter­
views with operating personnel indicate that they get very 
little practice in coping with simulated emergencies (42). 
Their original training includes valuable practice on 
dynamic simulators, but once they are assigned to a utility, 
it is apparently assumed that what they learned on the 
simulator will remain with them unless they are retrained. 
Fig. 3.4 shows the general shape of the curve for loss 
of ability to cope with emergencies that occur in the absence 
of practice (the solid line) compared to the continuing 
improvement that takes place with periodic practice (the 
dotted line). The time intervals for periodic practice by 
NPP personnel would have to be determined empirically (43). 
An important part of the training could consist in 
large part of talk-through of emergencies and other abnormal 
events. No doubt that the operator's ability to respond 
properly under highly stressful conditions could be modi­
fied if talk-through of these tasks were practiced frequent­
ly (43). 
Although personality and intelligence variables obvi­
ously influence human reliability in NPP, these variables 
are not as important as are other PSFs, especially those 
related to practice of skills. 
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The motivation and attitudes of the individual in an 
NPP obviously have considerable influence on how well he 
performs. It is known that a well-human-engineered work 
situation plays an important role in operator acceptance of 
an enthusiasm for his work. Thus, application of sound human 
factors practices to NPP design and work operations would 
have a substantial effect on operator motivation and atti­
tudes . 
3.4. PSFs and its Effect on Human Reliability 
In summary, many factors affect or shape human perform­
ance in a complex man-machine system such as an NPP. Some 
of these factors are external to the person involved and 
some are internal. The general work environment influences 
human reliability, especially equipment design and written or 
oral work procedures. The individual himself brings to the 
job certain skills, motivations, and expectations that influ­
ence his performance for better or worse. Finally, psycho­
logical or physiological stresses can arise to the extent 
that there is some mismatch between the demands of the work 
situation and the individuals capabilities. 
To perform a human reliability analysis, an analyst 
must understand those PSFs that are most relevant and influ­
ential in the jobs studied. An example will be given here 
to show how PSFs affect human error probability and conse­
quently the human reliability. This example is demonstrated 
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in Table 3.2 for experienced personnel (EP) and Table 3.3 
for novices (11). Novices are considered to be NPP person­
nel with less than 6 months experience in the job category 
for which they are qualified. The tabulated HEPs are given 
in Appendix B. 
Table 3.2. HEP per demand and uncertainty bounds for the 4 
levels of stress for experienced personnel (EP) 
Stress level HEP Uncertainty bounds 
a. Very low 2 X tabulated HEPs 2 X tabulated values 
b. Optimum Tabulated HEPs Tabulated values 
c. Moderately high; 
1. Step-by-step 2 X tabulated HEPs 2 X tabulated values 
tasks for optimum 
2. Dynamic tasks 5 X tabulated HEPs 5 X tabulated values 
for optimum 
d. Very high .25 .03 to .75 
Table 3.3. HEP per demand and uncertainty bounds for the 4 
levels of stress for novices 
Stress level HEP Uncertainty bounds 
a. Very low Same as EP Same as EP 
b. Optimum: 
1. Step-by-step Same as EP Same as EP 
tasks 
2. Dynamic tasks 2 X HEPs for EP 2 X values for EP 
c. Moderately high: 
1. Step-by-step 2 X HEPs for EP 2 X values for EP 
tasks 
2. Dynamic tasks 2 X HEPs for EP 2 X values for EP 
d. Very high Same as EP Same as EP 
As it was mentioned earlier. this section presents an 
example to show how PSFs affect human error probability 
40 
This example is concerned with an operator of a NPP who 
fails to initiate the task of changing or restoring valves. 
Using the data given in Appendix B (Table B.2), the HEP for 
this task is 0.001. Using the information given in Tables 
3.2 and 3.3, the HEP for this task for levels of stress is 
summarized in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
Table 3.4. HEP per demand for an EP fail to change or re-
store a valve for the 4 levels of stress 
Uncer- Uncer-
Stress level HEP tainty tainty 
lower upper 
bound bound 
a. Very low 0. 001 X 2 = 0. 002 0. 001 0. 004 
b. Optimum 0. 001 X 1 = 0. 001 0. 001 0. 001 
c. Moderately high 
1. Step-by-step 0. 001 X 2 = 0. 002 0. 001 0. 004 
tasks 
2. Dynamic tasks 0. 001 X 5 = 0. 005 0. 001 0. 025 
d. Very high 0.250 0. 030 0. 750 
Table 3.5. HEP per demand for novices fail to change or 
restore a valve for the 4 levels of stress 
Stress level HEP 
Uncer­
tainty 
lower 
bound 
uncer­
tainty 
upper 
bound 
a. Very low 0. 001 X 2 = 0 .002 0. 001 0. 004 
b. Optimum 
1. Step-by-step 0. 001 X 1 = 0 .001 0. 001 0. 001 
tasks 
2. Dynamic 0. 001 X 2 = 0 .002 0. 002 0. 002 
c. Moderately high 
1. Step-by-step 0. 002 X 2 = 0 .004 0. 002 0. 008 
tasks 
2. Dynamic tasks 0. 005 X 2 = 0 .010 0. 002 0. 050 
d. Very high 0.250 0. 030 0. 750 
41 
4. SAFETY ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (PWR) 
4.1. Introduction 
Nuclear power plant safety features differ from those 
in conventional power plants since nuclear plants may poten­
tially release radioactivity to the environment in case of 
an accident. While very large amounts of radioactivity are 
generated by the fission process, the bulk of the radio­
nuclides remains in the fuel as long as the fuel is ade­
quately cooled and the integrity of the fuel elements is 
protected. For large amounts of radioactivity to be re­
leased, the fuel must be severely overheated, leading to 
essentially clad damage. Based on this fact, various path­
ways that have the potential for large release of radio­
activity to the environment have been recognized (1). 
Attempting to prevent such accidents and to mitigate their 
potential consequences has been the primary objective of 
nuclear power plant safety. 
The safety approach for nuclear power plants has often 
been described as consisting of the following three levels of 
safety (44): 
(1) the design for safety in normal operation, provid­
ing tolerances for system malfunctions; 
(2) the assumption that incidents will nonetheless 
occur and the inclusion of safety systems in the 
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facility to minimize damage and protect the pub­
lic; and 
(3) the provisions of additional safety systems to 
protect the public based on the analysis of very 
unlikely accidents. 
The safety design approach has also been described as 
involving the use of physical barriers (fuel, fuel cladding, 
coolant system, containment building) to attempt to prevent 
the release of radioactivity to the environment. Some of 
these safety aspects will be given and discussed in relation 
to the pressurized water reactor (PWR). The reason for do­
ing so is to give an idea about the nature of NPP accidents 
and how to mitigate their potential consequences. 
4.2. PWR System Description 
The PWR was one of the first types of power reactors 
developed commercially in the United States. This type of 
reactor has also become standard on nuclear-powered sub­
marines. PWRs operate at a pressure of 2250 psia and have 
steam generator heat exchangers outside the reactor vessel. 
At this pressure, water can be heated to about 650°F with­
out boiling. In the steam generators, the high pressure 
reactor coolant water circulates through tubes whose outer 
surface is in contact with a second stream of water return­
ing from the turbine condenser. The latter water stream is 
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at a considerably lower pressure and temperature than the 
former, and heat transferred from the hot water inside the 
tubes causes the water of the secondary side to boil and 
produce steam for the turbine. 
The primary coolant pumps circulate the water through 
the primary coolant system, that is, between the reactor and 
the steam generator as is shown in Figure 4.1. Because the 
pumps must operate at high temperatures and pressures, and 
because they do circulate water which is somewhat radio­
active, the stringent design and manufacturing criteria used 
for the other primary components must apply to the pump. 
PWR steam supply systems are equipped with pressurizers 
to maintain required primary coolant pressure during steady-
state operation, to limit pressure changes caused by coolant 
thermal expansion and contraction as plant loads change, and 
to prevent coolant pressure from exceeding the design pres­
sure of the entire primary system. 
The primary system of the PWR contains a large amount 
of radioactive material, mostly in the fuel but partly in the 
coolant. A leak in a pipe could result in the release of 
considerable radioactive material to the surrounding, so the 
entire primary system must be installed in a special contain­
ment building capable of holding the material, as shown in 
Figure 4.2. Most present-day PWR containment buildings use 
either dry containment or ice condenser containment systems. 
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Figure 4.2. Typical PWR containment (46) 
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In ice condenser containment, the cooling duties of the emer­
gency containment air recirculation system are taken over by 
the ice bank. The ice is berated ice and functions both as a 
neutron poison and an iodine scavenger. Because of the ice 
cooling capacity, it limits the peak accident pressure in the 
structure and hence the emergency power requirements after an 
accident are reduced in the order of 70-80% (47) . 
4.3. The Nature of Nuclear Power Plant Accidents 
NPP accidents can potentially release significant 
amounts of radioactivity to the environment. All the places 
in which fuel is located in a NPP and the amount of radio­
activity in each location are identifiable. The largest 
amount of radioactivity resides in the reactor core, as is 
shown in Table 4.1. A smaller, but still large eiraount of 
radioactivity, is located in the spent fuel storage pool at 
the time refueling of the reactor is completed. In both 
these locations, the fuel is subjected to heating due to 
absorption of energy from the decay of radioactive materials. 
Overheating of fuel occurs only if the heat being 
generated in the fuel exceeds the rate at which it is being 
removed. This type of heat imbalance in the fuel in the 
reactor core can occur only in the following ways: 
(1) The occurrence of a loss of coolant event will 
allow the fuel to overheat unless emergency cool­
ing water is supplied to the core. This item 
Table 4.1. Typical radioactivity inventory for a 1000 MWe nuclear power reactor 
(1) 
Total inventory (curies) Fraction of core inventory 
Fuel Gap Total Fuel Gap Total 
Core^ 8.0 X 10^ 1.4 X 
00 
o
 
rH C
O 
X 10® 9.8 X H
 
o
 H
 
1.8 X 10 2 1 
Spent fuel 
storage pool 
(max.)b 1.3 X 10® 1.3 X 10^ 1.3 X 10® 1.6 X loT^ 1.6 X 10-3 1.6 X 10-1 
Spent fuel 
storage pool 
(avg.)C 3.6 X 10® 3.8 X 10® 3.6 X 10® 4.5 X 10-2 4.8 X 10-4 4.5 X 10-2 
Shipping cask^ 2.2 X 10? 3.1 X 10^ 2.2 X 10^ 2.7 X 10"^ 3.8 X 10-5 2.7 X 10-3 
Refueling® 2.2 X 10? 2 X 10 = 2.2 X 107 2.7 X 10-3 2.5 X 10-5 2.7 X 10-3 
Waste gas 
storage tank — — 9.3 X 10* — — 1.2 X 10-5 
Liquid waste 
storage tank — — 9.5 X 10^ — — 1.2 X 10-8 
^Core inventory based on activity 1/2 hour after shutdown. 
^Inventory of 2/3 core loading; 1/3 core with three-day decay and 1/3 core 
with 150 day decay. 
^Inventory of 1/2 core loading; 1/6 core with 150 day decay and 1/3 core with 
60 day decay. 
"Inventory based on 7 PWR or 17 BWR fuel assemblies with 150 day decay. 
^Inventory for one fuel assembly with three day decay. 
48 
identifies a class of accidents, called loss of 
coolant accidents (LOCAs), in which a rupture in 
the reactor coolant system (RCS) would lead to 
loss of normal coolant. 
(2) Overheating of fuel can result from transient 
events that cause the reactor power to increase 
beyond the heat removal capacity of the reactor 
cooling system. This item identifies a class of 
events called transients. A nuclear plant in­
cludes various electrical safety circuits and a 
system for rapid termination of the fission 
process to attempt to protect against damaging 
transients. 
4.3.1. Loss of coolant accidents 
A LOCA would result whenever the RCS experiences a 
break or opening large enough so that the coolant inventory 
in the system could not be maintained by the normally operat­
ing make-up system. NPP include many engineered safety 
features (ESFs) that are provided to mitigate the conse­
quences of such an event. If the ESFs were to operate as 
designed, the reactor core would be adequately cooled and 
only small consequences would result. However, the poten­
tial consequences could be much larger if ESF failures were 
to result in overheating of the reactor core. 
There are a number of ways in which a LOCA may be 
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initiated. The most significant LOCA initiating events in 
the reactor safety study would be the following (45): 
(a) Large pipe breaks (6 inches to approximately 3 
feet equivalent diameter) which is defined as a 
large LOCA. 
(b) Small to intermediate pipe breaks (2 inches to 6 
inches equivalent diameter) which is defined as a 
small LOCA (S^). 
(c) Small pipe breaks (0.5 inches to 2 inches equiva­
lent diameter) which is defined as a small LOCA 
(Sg) . 
The course of events following a LOCA initiating event 
is strongly influenced by the degree of successful opera­
tion of the various ESFs. The ESF functions are illustrated 
in Fig. 4.3. The ways in which failures of these functions 
influence the outcome of LOCAs are discussed briefly below: 
(a) The reactor trip (RT) fiipction is to Stop the fis­
sion process and terminate core power generation 
and is accomplished by rapid insertion of the re­
actor control rods. The action is initiated auto­
matically by electrical signals generated if any 
of a number of key operating variables reaches a 
preset level. 
(b) The emergency core cooling (ECC) function is to 
cool the core, thereby keeping the release of 
Rapid tftutdown of 
reactor to limit 
core htat production. 
Prtvantion of 
diipcrul of 
'*d*oaetivity to 
anvironmtnt 
Ramerai of rad»> 
activity from 
contammant 
ECC 
Watar 
cn 
o 
Cold 
Water 
ECC: 
Cora cooling to 
prevent relais of 
radioactivity from 
fuel. PAHR: 
Removal of heat 
from containment 
to prevent over 
prenuri^ ation. 
Figure 4.3. Functions of the engineered safety features (ESFs) of the light 
water reactors (LWRs) 
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radioactivity from the fuel into the containment 
at low levels. ECC involves a number of systems 
that deliver a supply of emergency coolant to the 
reactor core. These systems are shown in Figs. 
4.4 and 4.5. A PWR plant includes high pressure 
systems primarily for coping with small LOCAs and 
low pressure systems primarily for large LOCAs. 
(c) The post accident radioactivity removal (PARR) 
function is to remove radioactivity released from 
the core to the containment. In a PWR, this func­
tion is performed by systems that spray water into 
the containment atmosphere. These systems are 
shown in Fig. 4.6. The water spray, which in­
cludes a chemical additive for increasing iodine 
removal, washes radioactivity out of the contain­
ment atmosphere. 
(d) The post accident heat removal (PAHR) function is 
to remove decay heat from within the containment, 
thereby preventing overpressurization of the con­
tainment. PAHR is performed by systems that 
transfer heat from heated water within the contain­
ment to cold water outside the containment. These 
systems are shown in Fig. 4.7. In a PWR, the con­
tainment water that flows through the primary side 
of the heat exchanger is taken from the reactor 
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ECl 
Borated water is furnished to cool 
the core by three systems; 
1) accumulators, 
2) the Low Pressure Injection 
System (LPIS), and 
3) the High Pressure Injection 
System (HPIS). 
RWST 
water ACC 
-c? 
HP I s 
Figure 4 . 4 .  P W R  emergency core cooling system (1) 
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ECR 
The core is cooled by heat being trans­
ferred to containment by two systems: 
1) the Low Pressure Recirculation 
System (LPRS), and 
2) the High Pressure Recirculation 
System (HPRS). Both systems, 
using injection pumps aligned to 
a recirculation mode, pump water 
from a containment sump into the 
core. 
HPR 
LPR 
rC7 
Heat and 
s.w. into containment 
Sump 
Figure 4.5. Emergency core recirculation systems (1) 
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PARR 
Radioactivity is collected from the 
containment atmosphere by; 
1) the Containment Spray injection 
System (CSIS), 
2) the Containment Spray Recirculation 
System (CSRS), and 
3) Sodium Hydroxide Addition (SHA) to 
spray water. 
CSI 
NmOH RWST 
CSR 
Figure 4.6. PWR post accident radioactivity removal system 
(1) 
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PAHR 
Heat is removed from containment by 
heat exchangers that involve two systems: 
1) the Containment Spray Recirculation 
System (CSRS), and 
2) the Containment Heat Removal System 
(CHRS). 
Gravity-fed 
coo 1 an t 
CSHx 
CHR Valve: 
To river 
CSR 
Sump 
Figure 4.7. PWR post accident heat removal systems (1) 
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building sump. This is a particularly important 
function, since failure to perform this function 
can lead to overpressure failure of the contain­
ment and related failure of ECC systems. 
(3) The containment integrity (CI) function is to pre­
vent radioactivity within the containment from be­
ing dispersed into the environment. 
4.4. Reactor Transients 
The term reactor transient applies to any significant 
deviation from the normal operating value of any reactor 
operating parameter. Transient events can be assumed to 
include all those situations which could lead to fuel heat 
imbalances. When viewed in this way, transients cover the 
reactor in its shutdown condition as well as in its operat­
ing condition. The shutdown condition is important because 
many transient conditions result in shutdown of the reactor 
and decay heat removal systems are needed to prevent fuel-
heat imbalance due to core decay heat. 
Transients may occur as a consequence of an operator 
error or the malfunction or failure of equipment. Many 
transients are handled by the reactor control system, which 
would return the reactor to its normal condition. Others 
would be beyond the capability of the reactor control system 
and require reactor shutdown by the reactor protection 
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system in order to avoid reactor damage. 
In any safety analysis study, each potential transient 
is assessed to fall into either one of the two general 
categories, anticipated (likely) transients and unantici­
pated (unlikely) transients. Transients that have been 
found to be important to risk assessment are those that 
involve the loss of offsite power and loss of the plant 
heat removal systems. 
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5. SgC ACCIDENT SEQUENCE AND ITS HUMAN CONTRIBUTION 
TO RISK IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
5.1. Introduction 
As mentioned in Section 1, a number of accident se­
quences that provide the highest contribution to risk have 
been analyzed. These accident sequences were selected for 
more in-depth analysis related to human contribution to 
risk. One of those accident sequences is SgC, which is de­
fined as a small LOCA and core meltdown after containment 
failure. A complete analysis and description of this se­
quence will be given in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 gives a 
complete description of those systems and subsystems which 
are found to have direct or indirect involvement in this 
accident sequence based on the analysis done in Section 
5.2. Based on this analysis also, the human actions that 
can affect the initiation, progress and termination of the 
sequence will be identified. 
5.2. S2C Accident Sequence Description 
This accident sequence is one of interest because it was 
found to make a significant contribution to the probability 
of a core melt and to potentially large releases of radio­
active materials. This potential sequence is initiated by 
a small LOCA (Sg)• During the course of the sequence, 
failure of the containment spray injection system (CSIS) can 
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occur. Because of an identified dependency, failure of CSIS 
could result in the failure of both the containment spray 
recirculation system (CSRS) and the containment heat removal 
system (CHRS). 
This could cause the containment to fail in an over­
pressure mode after several hours. During this interval, 
the emergency core cooling injection (ECIS) and recirculation 
(ECRS) systems are assumed to have been successfully operat­
ing to cool the core. On containment failure (at a pressure 
of approximately 100 psia), the coolant residing in the con­
tainment, which is at an elevated temperature, would flash 
and cause the ECRS pumps to cavitate and fail. The core 
could then melt in a containment that has already failed. 
Investigation of potential system-to-system dependencies 
arising from various small-LOCA locations revealed that if 
the small LOCA (Sg) occurred, for example, in the region of 
the reactor vessel cavity, there would not be adequate 
pathway for the spilled coolant to flow between the cavity 
region and the containment "sump" used by the CSRS. Since the 
CSRS pumps would be automatically actuated after the LOCA 
occurrences, they could fail shortly after they were started 
if the supply of water in the sump was inadequate. Thus, 
it appears that successful operation of the CSRS could occur 
only if the CSIS were to operate and thus provide a supply 
of water to the sump. The following important points should 
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be drawn from the previous description; 
(a) A failure of the CSIS prevents the addition of 
large quantities of borated water to the contain­
ment. Since only a small portion of the reactor 
coolant system inventory leaks to the sump, suf­
ficient elevation head is not available and LPRS 
pump cavitation will occur. 
(b) Failure of the CSIS and the CSRS prevents spray 
operation, eliminating the need for the SHAS. 
(c) Failure of the CSRS prevents delivery of sump 
water to the CHRS head exchange; therefore, opera­
tion of the CHRS has no effect. 
According to this analysis, the following systems and 
subsystems were found to have direct or indirect involve­
ment in this accident sequence: 
(a) Containment spray injection system (CSIS). 
(b) Containment spray recirculation system (CSRS). 
(c) Containment heat removal system (CHRS). 
(d) Sodium hydroxide addition system (SHAS). 
5.3. SgC Accident Sequence Systems Description 
5.3.1. CSIS description and function 
The CSIS delivers cold water containing boron through 
spray heads to the containment volume from the refueling 
water storage tank (RWST) during a loss of coolant accident 
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(LOCA). The principal function of the CSIS is to reduce the 
pressure in containment and also to provide the preferred 
path for delivery of sodium hydroxide to the containment 
atmosphere for initial fission product removal. 
The CSIS consists of two essentially identical spray 
subsystems each capable of delivering 3200 GPM of water from 
the RWST to the containment atmosphere through 360° spray 
headers. Each spray header has 368 equally spaced nozzles 
located in the containment. Both subsystems take suction 
from a weir in the 350,000 gallon RWST. The weir is provided 
so that the sodium hydroxide solution delivered to the RWST 
can be preferentially extracted by the CSIS. 
Fig. 5.1 is a simplified flow diagram of the CSIS. The 
valve positions shown in Fig. 5.1 are those for normal plant 
operation. In order to operate both subsystems of the CSIS, 
valves Vg and Vg and or Vg must be opened and pumps 
and P2 must be started. In the event of a LOCA, this would 
normally be done by a signal from the consequence limiting 
control system (CLCS). It should be noted that valves and 
Vg also receive a CLCS signal to prevent those valves from 
being closed during the CSIS operation or to open them should 
they have been inadvertently closed. 
The CSIS is designed on the following basis: 
(a) Either spray subsystems SI or S2 will provide suf­
ficient spray to the containment atmosphere. 
A. 
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Figure 5.1. CSIS simplified flow diagram 
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(b) The CSIS is required to function only until the 
water supply in the RWST is exhausted. 
Because the failure mode important to this analysis is 
a common mode failure, a brief discussion will be presented 
on this subject. Several different common mode possibili­
ties were investigated. It was estimated that the largest 
contributions would arise from two faults, both of which re­
sult from human errors. The first fault is a common mode 
failure of the CLCS due to miscalibration of several sensors 
that in effect prevent the proper CLCS signal from reaching 
the CSIS in the event of LOCA. The second common mode fail­
ure analyzed was the possibility that both the CSIS pump flow 
recirculation valves and Vgg were left open after the 
monthly pump test due to operator error. Another possible 
fault is leaving manual valves and closed after 
maintenance. 
5.3.2. CSRS description and function 
The CSRS provides coolant for recirculation of the con­
tainment pump water through the heat exchangers of the CHRS 
to spray headers inside containment for the purpose of pres­
sure control, fission product removal, and long-term energy 
removal in the event of a LOCA. 
Fig. 5.2 is a simplified flow diagram of the CSRS and 
as can be seen from this figure, all stop valves in the flow 
path from the containment sump to the nozzle headers are 
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Figure 5.2. CSRS simplified flow diagram (1) 
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normally open. Thus, water can be delivered from the con­
tainment sump to the nozzles by turning on pumps ^1B' 
^2A' ^ 2B* 
The following are some of the design features of the 
CSRS system: 
(1) All four pump subsystems obtain their suction 
water from the containment sump. 
(2) One inside pump and one outside pump receive 
their electrical power from the same emergency 
bus while the other pair of pump motors receive 
their power from another emergency bus. 
(3) The CSRS is initially aligned for recirculation 
through all four headers. 
5.3.3. CHRS description and function 
The CHRS function is to cool containment sump water be­
ing recirculated through the CSRS. The CSRS is automati­
cally started following a LOCA and in conjunction with CHRS 
provides heat removal from the containment. 
Fig. 5.3 is a simplified flow diagram of the CHRS. The 
CHRS is designed on the following basis: 
(1) Two of the four heat exchangers are required for 
the first 24 hours following an accident, and only 
one heat exchanger is required after that period. 
(2) Sufficient cooling water flow to all four heat 
exchangers can be obtained through either of two 
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Figure 5.3. CHRS simplified flow diagram (1) 
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lines from the intake canal and through any one of 
the four MOV-SW-103 valves provided that normally 
open valves MOV-SW-106A and SW-106B are open. 
(3) The air vents have manual valves which are normal­
ly open. 
(4) The loss of off-site power results in each of the 
four condenser lines on unit 2 having only one 
valve each with power available for closing the 
valve. 
5.3.4. SHAS description and function 
Sodium hydroxide is automatically added to the refueling 
water storage tank (RWST) by the SHAS. When an accident 
causes pressure conditions in the containment to exceed a 
preset level, the SHAS provides an active solution for radio­
activity removal by the CSIS and CSRS. 
Fig. 5.4 is a simplified SHAS flow diagram, and it is 
designed on the following basis : 
(1) Manual stop valves Vg, Vg, and Vg are normally 
open. 
(2) Motor operated stop valves and are normally 
closed. 
(3) Vg and are opened automatically by the Conse­
quence Limiting Control System (CLCS) issuing an 
electrical signal to the control circuits of the 
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Figure 5.4. SHAS simplified flow diagram (1) 
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two valves when the LOCA occurs. 
When LOCA occurs, the NaOH solution of 20% con­
centration contained in the 3670 gallon chemical 
addition tank is free to flow into the 350,000 
gallon RWST under the influence of a gravity 
driving head until the water level becomes the 
same in both tanks and therefore NaOH solution 
is added to the RWST. 
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6. ESTIMATION OF UNAVAILABILITY OF THOSE SYSTEMS 
INVOLVED IN SgC ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 
6.1. Introduction 
To date there has been no systematic program to collect 
human error probabilities (HEPs) or human error rates in 
operating NPPs. The only formal record of errors in NPPs 
are the Licensee Event Reports (LERs), which can be used 
to derive HEP. 
Since those systems and subsystems described in Section 
5 have important involvement in the SgC sequence, the con­
tribution of human errors to their unavailabilities will be 
calculated and presented in Section 6.2.3. The calculation 
of these unavailabilities is done by utilizing the method 
described in Section 6.2.2 and the results will be compared 
with those found in WASH-1400. Discussion and comparison 
of the results are presented in Section 6.2.4. 
6.2. Method of Calculation 
6.2.1. Distribution of human performance 
All human performance displays variability within the 
same individual and among individuals. Generally, intra-
individual variability is small compared with the varia­
bility among different persons. Moreover, it is diffi­
cult to predict in advance an individual's variability. 
Here the concern is with inter-individual variability, i.e., 
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the variability among properly trained and experienced 
operating personnel. 
Despite variability among people, managerial influences 
in most technical jobs tend tr restrict variability under 
normal operating conditions. If a person consistently per­
forms far below the average for his group, he usually will 
be reassigned, retrained for the job in question, or termi­
nated (48). If he performs consistently, he usually will 
be promoted or transferred to a more challenging and 
responsible position. 
When statistical data are collected from experiments of 
human performance, different probability distributions occur. 
Normal, lognormal, Weibull, Gamma, exponential, or other 
distribution may, depending on the data, closely fit the 
empirical distributions (48). 
Most human traits and abilities do not conform to the 
Gaussian (normal) distribution. The only human distribu­
tions which are truly normal are those which pertain to the 
linear measurements of people, such as stature, lengths of 
extremities, the various diameters of the skull, and certain 
of their ratios like the cephalic index (49). 
It is recognized that the distribution of the logarithms 
of HEPs for NPP tasks is often normal or approximately so. 
This could be stated in another way; the HEPs are lognormally 
distributed (50). 
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There are a number of studies that support the use of a 
lognormal distribution for performance of skilled people. 
In one study (51), an analysis of human performance data 
revealed lognormal type distributions for simple tasks and 
slightly skewed distributions approaching the normal for 
more complicated tasks. The parameters of the applicable 
lognormal distribution are speculative. Fig. 6.1 shows that 
for most NPP tasks, a lognormal probability density function 
(pdf) with a standard deviation of 0.42 would provide a suit­
able fit. The experimental measurements are also given (51). 
Although one would like to have data clearly showing 
the distributions of human performance for various NPP tasks, 
there is ample evidence that the outcome of human relia­
bility analyses are relatively insensitive to assumptions 
about such distributions (52). In some cases, this insensi-
tivity may result from a well-designed system which has so 
many recovery factors that the effect of any one human error 
on the system is not substantial. For computational conveni­
ence, one might wish to assume the same distribution curve 
for human failure as the one used for equipment failure. 
6.2.2. Availability theory 
Availability may be defined as the time fraction during 
which a component or a system is operational. The availa­
bility allows for failure; that is, it accounts for loss of 
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function completely and for subsequent repairs. In contrast 
to reliability, availability does not depend on time as a 
parameter since long-term availability is a time invariant. 
The availability, Q, can be estimated using the formula 
Ci uptime _ "^ a -, .. 
^ uptime + downtime ' 
If n failures occur in a total time T, then the total 
"down" time or "dead" time, T^, associated with a total time, 
T, is 
= n (6.2) 
where is a fixed time duration which represents the re­
pair time or its equivalent. The total time in which the 
component is available or the "up" time, T^, is 
Tg = T - nXj, • (6.3) 
Substituting equations 6.2 and 6.3 into equation 6.1 yields 
Ù = . (6.4) 
For the limiting case (T-»») , the availability is 
Q = lim ^=, E:2Ir (6.5) 
T 
I - ^ • <«•«) 
The second term on the right side is the "fractional dead 
time" or "unavailability", q; that is. 
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IlTj-
q = — (6.7) 
or without the limiting case, the unavailability is 
nTr 
q = -^ • (6.8) 
When failure occurs by chance, the number of failures n 
may be written as 
n = XT^ (6.9) 
where X is the failure rate (failure/hour) for a component 
or a system. 
Since is the actual test or operation time, combining 
equations 6.3 and 6.9 gives 
Substituting this quantity into equations 6.6 and 6.8 yields 
Q = rAr; ' %.,,, 
and 
9 = 1 + XT • (6-12) 
XXj. 
r 
When Xt^ << 1 equations 6.11 and 6.12 may be written as 
and 
Q = 1 - XTj. (6.13) 
q = Xt^ . (6.14) 
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The results given in equation 6.13 could be derived by 
using the general expression for the reliability which is 
given by 
rT 
Q - ^  Q R(t) dt (6.15) 
where R(t) is the reliability of the system or the component. 
The results given in equation 6.14 could be used to 
calculate the unavailability of a system or a component by 
k n o w i n g  i t s  f a i l u r e  r a t e  ( X )  a n d  r e p a i r  t i m e  ( T ) .  
Using equation 6.1, the unavailability can be written 
as 
- " ^ " Ta +\ " Ta + (^.16) 
This expression for unavailability is appropriate where 
the probability of being in a failed state is independent 
of time. 
To evaluate the human error contribution to component 
or system unavailability, the same unavailability equations 
that are used in reliability theory for component and system 
failure occurrences can be used (human error simply being 
a particulate cause of failure). 
Consider a human action that is performed periodically 
with an average time, T, occurring between actions. Assume 
that on any action there is a probability, P, that a human 
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error will occur and not be corrected. Also, assume that 
the average downtime given an error is T^. Then, using 
equation 6.16, we have 
q = ^  . (6.17) 
- T 
To calculate the unavailability q from equation 6.17, 
we need P, T^, and T. The probability, P, is obtained from 
any available sources of human error probabilities. The 
quantities, T^ and T, are obtained from knowledge of plant 
operation. 
6.2.3. Unavailability estimations 
As stated previously, in order to calculate the un­
availability of various components and systems of NPP due 
to the human, error rates must be calculated. 
One needs to define the different types of error 
rates which can be calculated, specifically the error 
rate per hour and error rate per act (X^). The error 
rate per hour is estimated by taking the ratio of the 
number of errors F divided by the population exposure 
time T 
= § (6.18) 
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where 
= the error rate, 
F = the number of errors observed in the LERs during 
the time t, and 
T = Pet (6.19) 
where 
P = number of nuclear power plants (covered by LERs), 
c = number of components in a given system which is 
under consideration, and 
t = LER time period. 
If the system under consideration has different numbers 
of components that are susceptible to the error or if the 
LER observation times on the plants are different, then 
equation 6.19 would be replaced by the more general equation 
T  =  I  C  t  ( 6 . 2 0 )  
K+1 
where 
Cj^  = number of components in the system in plant k and 
t^ = observed time for plant k. 
If one wanted the component error rate regardless of the 
system, then T = PCt. Here C is the number of components 
in the plant regardless of the system. 
In general, for a component error rate, equation 6.19 
will be used to calculate T and the number of errors F 
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in the components will be counted. In addition to component 
error rates, one also has to define system error rates and 
plant error rates. For the system error rates, we have 
F = number of applicable errors in the system (i.e., 
on any component in the system), and 
T = Pt . (6.21) 
If there is more than one system of the given type in 
the plant, then 
T = MPt (6.22) 
M = number of systems per plant. 
For the plant error rate per hour, we have the same T 
as given by equation 6.21, but now 
F = number of applicable errors on any system in the plant. 
In general, error rates may be ranked with regard to 
usefulness as follows: (a) component error rates are the 
most useful for safety analysis, (b) then system error rates, 
and (c) finally plant error rates which generally are so 
gross as to be of limited use. 
The 90% confidence bounds on are (53); 
c ^ 0.05,2F . f X 0.95,2(2F+1) 
X h  2 F  -  ^ h  -  ^ h 2 F  ( G ' 2 3 )  
where F is the number of the reported errors. 
The unavailability point estimate and 90% confidence 
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can be computed using the following relationships : 
^ = 360 A per demand (6.24) 
where 
X = failure (error) rate per hour and 
= average repair time in hours 
and the 90 percent confidence limits on g are (53): 
^ 2 2 
2Xo.05,2F demand <a< 2 Xo.95,2(F+l) demand. (6.25) 
Experience in reviewing the failure data shows that the 
average repair time (t^,) is approximately two weeks. 
There were a total of 529 reported operator events (Ap­
pendix A); 210 of these were from PWRs and 209 from BWRs 
(24). This study will analyze only those events reported 
from all PWR facilities. The data analyzed are from the per­
iod of January 1, 1976, through January 1, 1978. This ac­
counted for 100.76 reactor years of operation. This section 
will present the calculaLion of the unavailabilities of those 
systems involved in the SgC accident sequence described in 
Section 5.3. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 describe the operational 
errors analyzed based on information reported in the LERs 
for the CSIS, CSRS, CHRS and SHAS. The notation used is 
explained in Appendix A. From the above analysis, one can 
note the following: 
(1) PWR reactor years surveyed = 100.76 years 
(2) T = population exposure time in consideration 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Ta] 
No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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Analyzed operator errors reported in the LERs 
for the CSIS and the CSRS 
System Component Failure mode 
code code code 
SB (CSIS) vx 2AL 15 
SA (CSIS) vo 2CL 21 
SB (CSIS) vo 2CL 39 
SF (CSIS) vo IVF 43 
SB (CSIS) vo IVF 45 
SB (CSIS) VM ICL 62 
SB (CSIS) 00 5MD 71 
SB (CSIS) VM 20P 154 
SA (CSIS) PM IFB 245 
SB (CSIS) VM lOP 264 
SB (CSIS) CB IVF 40 
SF (CSIS) CB IVF 44 
SB (CSIS) CB 3FP 57 
SH (CSIS) CB 4CM 66 
SH (CSIS) 00 IRV 67 
SB (CSIS) 00 ICH 72 
SB (CSIS) CB OP 171 
SB (CSIS) 00 IFB 182 
SC (CSRS) VX ICL 243 
Analyzed operator errors reported in the LERs 
for the CHRS and the SHAS 
System Component Failure mode 
code code code 
SA (SHAS) VX ICL 31 
SF (SHAS) VM ICL 132 
SF (SHAS) VO 4 CM 65 
SB (CHRS) TX 5MD 520 
SH (CHRS) PM 4CM 66 
SH (CHRS) XX 4CM 67 
SB (CHRS) VO lOP 333 
SB (CHRS) VM 3CL 339 
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= 100.76 years 
= 100.76 years x 8760 ^  = 8.827 x 10 hrs. 
6.2.3.1. CSIS unavailability estimation Using Table 
6.1, 
F = # of human errors in this period of time =18 
N = # of CSIS = 1. 
Using equation 6.18, the human error rate which led to 
unavailability of the CSIS is 
A. = I = ——E = 2.0 X 10"5 hr"l . 
h T 8.827 X 10% X 1 
Using equation 6.23, the 90% confidence bounds on are 
1.04 X 10 ^ per hour < < 2.49 x 10 ^ per hour. 
Using equation 6.24, the CSIS point estimate unavail­
ability is 
q = 360 = 7.34 x 10 ^ per demand 
and 90% confidence bounds on q are 
— 3 - T 3.75 X 10 per demand < q < 8.96 x 10 per demand. 
6.2.3.2. CSRS unavai1ability Using Table 6.1, 
F = # of human errors in this period of time = 1 
N = # of CSRS = 1. 
Using equation 6.18, the human error rate which led 
to unavailability of the CSRS is 
Â. = ^ E = 1.13 X 10"^ hr~^ 
^ T 8.827 X 105 X 1 
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Using equation 6.23, the 90% confidence bounds on A^^are 
4.0 X 10~^ - \i- 3.4 X 10 ® per hour . 
Using equation 6.24, the CSRS point estimate unavail­
ability is 
^ = 360 4.08 X 10 ^ per demand 
and 90% confidence bound on g are 
^ 3 1.45 X 10 per demand ^ 3 - 1.22 % lo per demand. 
6.2.3.3. CHRS unavailability Using Table 6.2, 
F = # of human errors in this period of time = 5 
N = # of CHRS = 1. 
Using equation 6.18, the human error rate which led 
to unavailability of the CHRS is 
A, = ^ = 5.66 X 10~® hr~^ 
" ^ 8.827 X 10^ X 1 
Using equation 6,23; the 90% confidence bounds on >^ars 
2.96 X 10~^ ^ X, ^  1.04 X 10 ^ per hour . 
n 
Using equation 6.24, the CHRS point estimate unavail­
ability is 
2 = 360 2.04 X 10 ^ per demand 
and 90% confidence bounds on g are 
1.07 X 10 ^ per demand ^ 2 - 3.73 x 10 ^ per demand. 
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6.2.3.4. SHAS unavailability Using Table 6.2, 
F = # of human errors in this period of time = 3 
N = # of SHAS = 1. 
Using equation 6.18, the human error rate which led 
to unavailability of the SHAS is 
A ,  =  ^  =  — =  =  3 . 4 x l 0 ^ h r ^  
" T 8.827 X 10^ X 1 
Using equation 6.23, the 90% confidence bounds on are 
1.55 X 10 ^ per hour 5 5 7.13 x 10 ^ per hour. 
Using equation 6.24, the SHAS point estimate unavail­
ability is 
3 = 360 = 1.22 X 10 ^ per demand 
and 90% confidence bounds on g are 
—4 , —3 
5.58 X 10 per demand - ^ 2.57 x 10 per demand. 
6.2.4. Discussion of the results 
The LER records at all PWR facilities operating between 
the period of January 1, 1976, through January 1, 1978, were 
reviewed to extract human related data relevant to the fail­
ure of those systems described in Section 5.3. The extracted 
data were used to calculate failure rates and unavailabili­
ties of the systems involved in the SgC accident sequence. 
The unavailabilities are summarized in Table 6.3. The 
Table 6.3. SgC accident sequence systems unavailabilities 
Unavailability (per demand) Unavailability (per demand) 
System 
Upper Median Lower Upper Median Lower 
8. • 3 • 3 3 3 • 3 3 Containment 96x10 7. 34x10" 3. 75x10" 7 . 8x10 2. 4x10 1. Oxlo" 
spray 
injection 
Containment 1. 22x10" 
3 
4. 08x10" •4 1. 45x10" 
4 9 . 0x10 4 1. OxlO" 4 2. 5x10" 5 
spray 
recirculation 
Containment 3. 73x10" 3 2. 04x10" 3 1. 07x10" 3 3 .0x10" 
4 8. 5x10" 5 3. OxlO" 5 
heat removal 
Sodium 2. 57x10" 3 1. 23xl0" 
3 
5. 58xl0" 4 1 .1x10" 
2 5. 9x10 3 3. 6x10 3 
hydroxide 
addition 
^Using LER data (Section 6.2.3 of this report). 
^From WASH-1400/ Appendix II, Table II 1-2. 
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results are compared with the values given in WASH-1400 
(1), Appendix II, Table II 1-2. As can be seen by inspec­
tion of Table 6.3, the unavailability of the CHRS as esti­
mated in WASH-1400 is lower than the values obtained by 
use of LER records. The unavailabilities of the CSIS, the 
CHRS, and the SHAS as estimated using LERs agree within a 
factor of 5 or less with those values obtained using WASH-
1400. 
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7. OPERATOR ERROR RATES ESTIMATION 
7.1. Introduction 
As it was indicated in Section 6.1, there is no pro­
gram to collect human error rates in NPPs. The only record 
of errors in NPPs is in the LERs, which may be used to com­
pute human error rates. In this section, operator error 
rates are estimated based on LER data for failure modes in­
volving valves in analyzed PWR's subsystems described and 
presented in Section 5.3. A comparison is made between 
estimates obtained here and the values used in WASH-1400 (1) 
and those predicted in NUREG/CR-1278 by Swain (11). 
The reason for the selection of this particular compo­
nent failure (valve) is that, as can be noticed from the anal­
ysis of collected data (24), the most frequent operator error 
mode involves valves (mispositioning, inadvertent actuation, 
misalignment, etc.). This is illustrated in Tables 7.1, 
7.2, and 7.3. 
Human performance shaping factors (PSF) are believed 
to affect the human error rate estimates. Human PSF were 
presented in Section 3. However, in this study the effects 
of PSF on error rate estimates will not be addressed. 
7.2. Operator Error Rate Estimates 
The operator error rates (hourly or per demand) may be 
calculated based on the frequency counts provided in 
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Table 7.1. Frequent operator failure modes (24) 
Percent of Percent 
total component of total 
Component Failure mode occurrences operator 
BWR PWR Total errors 
Valve Left in wrong 41 41 41 13 
position 
Misalignment 29 15 20 6 
Inadvertent 12 9 10 3 
actuation 
Improper 8 7 7 2 
operation 
Monitor/ Did not check/test 38 24 31 2 
detector Did not monitor 24 24 24 2 
Left in/out of 14 10 12 1 
service 
Control rod/ Did not check/test 30 6 20 2 
control Procedure 26 12 20 2 
Rod drive/ Exceeds limits 0 26 15 1 
Control rod Improper sequence 9 6 8 1 
group 
Pump Improper operation 21 48 41 3 
Did not start/stop 23 10 15 1 
Procedure 15 10 12 1 
Did not check/test 8 14 12 1 
Switch Left in wrong 15 57 32 2 
position 
Mispositioning 35 14 26 2 
Inadvertent 25 n / IS 1 X 
actuation 
Breaker Inadvertent 33 26 28 1 
actuation 
Deenergization 17 26 24 
Did not check/teSt 33 11 16 
Tank Exceeds limits 50 30 33 
Did not monitor 25 15 17 
Alarm No response 75 67 70 
Diesel Did not check/test 25 60 44 
generator Disregarded 25 20 22 0 
Bus Deenergization 67 40 50 1 
Did not check/test 0 40 25 0 
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Table 7.2. Systems affected by operator "errors) (opera­
tor errors recorded from January 1972 through 
December 19, 1977) (24) 
System/component 
involved 
Number of 
events 
BWR PWR 
(100 (77 
plant- plant-
year) year) 
Total 
Percent 
of 
total 
operation 
errors 
Emergency Core Cooling 37 
Injection System (ECCIS) 
Waste Processing 34 
System (WPS) 
Instrumentation and 34 
Monitoring System (IMS) 
Reactor Power Control 23 
System (RPCS) 
Secondary Non-Nuclear 10 
Systems (SMS) 
Reactor Protection 20 
System (NPS) 
Auxiliary Electric 15 
Power System (ALPS) 
Main Reactor Coolant 10 
System (RCS) 
Auxiliary Systems for 4 
Normal Operation (ASNO) 
Other Containment 12 
Systems (CS) 
Containment Spray and 1 
Recirculation Systems 
(SCRC) 
Emergency Cooling 11 
Recirculation System 
(ICRS) 
Total (Systems) 211 310 
74 
35 
27 
32 
30 
16 
19 
20 
23 
13 
21 
111 
(48 valves) 
69 
(38 valves) 
61 
55 
(29 control 
rod drive) 
40 
36 
34 7 
30 6 
27 
25 
22 
0 11 
(10 Torus) 
21 
13 
12 
11 
8 
7 
5 
5 
4 
521 100 
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Table 7.3. Components affected by operator "errors" (opera­
tor errors recorded from January 1972 through 
December 19, 1977) (24) 
——— Number of 
events 
BWR PWR Percent of 
System/component (100 (77 Total total 
involved plant- plant- operator 
year) year) errors 
Valve 59 104 163 31 
Monitor/detector 21 21 42 8 
Control rod/Control 
rod drive/Control 
rod group 
23 17 40 8 
Pump 13 21 34 7 
Switch 20 14 34 7 
Breaker 6 19 25 5 
Tank 4 20 24 5 
Alarm 4 6 10 2 
Diesel generator 4 5 9 2 
Bus 3 5 8 2 
Total components 157 232 389 76 
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Appendix A. 
As presented in Section 6, the human error rate 
is defined as (24); 
Xjj (M,S,C) = 
I N^T. 
hourly (7.1) 
where 
demand (7.2) 
f^ = Number of events related to failure mode "M" with 
component "C" in system "S" in the ith plant. 
= Population of component "C" in the system "S" 
in the ith plant. 
Tj^ = Critical hours of the ith plant during which "f^" 
events occurred. 
= Total number of demands on system "S" in the ith 
plant. 
For the 90% confidence bounds on 
L = lower limit = 
^0.5,2Zf^ 
2 I fi 
H 
^0.95, [2Zfj^+2] 
U = upper limit = . 
(7.3) 
2 I fi 
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7.3. Valve Mispositioning of Those Systems and Sub­
systems Involved in SgC Accident Sequence 
Tables 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 provide the frequency count of 
events involving mispositioning of valves in the CSIS, the 
CSRS, the SHAS and the CHRS• Tables 7.7 through 7.10 pro­
vide the valve population and the critical hour data for 
the above systems and subsystems. 
7.3.1. Human error rates estimated for CSIS 
7.3.1.1. CSIS valve mispositioning failure rate calcu­
lation Failure rates for valve mispositioning (clustering 
of all failure modes that lead to valves being mispositioned 
in the CSIS) may be calculated from the above tables (Tables 
7.4 and 7.7). The critical hours are extracted from Appendix 
A. The hourly failure rate of valves due to operator error 
is given by (using equation 7.1), 
where 
M = mispositioning 
S = CSIS (code SA, SB) 
C = valve (code VM, VP, VX) 
^ f. = number of events related to failure mode "M" = 8 
Ag(M,S,u) 
i 
^ N.T. = 1.008 X 10^ hours 
X (M,S,C) = ? = 7.94 X 10 
1.008 X lO' 
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Table 7.4. Frequency count 
ing of valves in 
of events 
the CSIS 
involving misposition-
and the CSRS 
Failure 
mode 
code 
Failure mode Component 
code ID.No. 
Event 
count 
2AL^ Misalignment VX 15 1 
2CL Did not close/ 
left open 
VO 21, 39 2 
IVF Did not verify VO 43, 45 2 
ICL Did not close/ 
left open 
VM 62 1 
20P Did not open/ 
left closed 
VM 154 1 
lOP Did not open/ 
left closed 
VM 264 1 
Total 8 
ICL^ Did not close/ 
left open 
VX 243 1 
®For CSIS. 
^For CSRS. 
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Table 7.5. Frequency count of events involving misposition-
ing of valves in SHAS 
Failure 
mode 
code 
Failure mode Component 
code ID. No. 
Event 
count 
ICL Did not close/ 
left open 
VX 31 1 
ICL Did not close/ 
left open 
VM 132 1 
4CM Communication vo 65 1 
Total 3 
Table 7.6. Frequency count 
ing of valves in 
of events involving misposition-
CHRS 
Failure 
mode 
code 
Failure mode Component 
code ID. No. 
Event 
count 
lOP Did not open/ 
left closed 
VO 333 1 
3CL Inadvertent 
closing 
VM 339 1 
Total 2 
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Table 7.7. Valve population, critical hours for all PWR 
plants for CSIS (period from January 1, 1972, 
to January 1, 1978) 
Critical Population of 
Plant hours CSIS valves T. x N. 
# (Ti) (Ni) ^ 
1  4 0 , 0 0 0  1 1  4 . 4 0 1  X  1 0 5  
2  2 2 , 0 1 0  1 1  2 . 4 2 1  X  1 0 5  
3  8 , 9 8 2  1 1  9 . 8 8  X  1 0 *  
4  2 7 , 3 6 8  1 1  3 . 0 1  X  1 0 5  
5  3 7 , 6 9 5  1 1  4 . 1 4 6  X  1 0 5  
6  1 4 , 7 4 8  1 1  1 . 6 2 2  X  1 0 5  
7  2 5 , 0 2 3  1 1  2 . 7 5 3  X  1 0 ^  
8  2 2 , 4 1 3  1 1  2 . 4 6 5  X  1 0 5  
9  2 , 8 4 5  1 1  3 . 1 3 0  X  1 0 4  
1 0  9 , 2 6 6  1 1  1 . 0 1 9  X  1 0 ^  
1 1  3 3 , 4 1 1  1 1  3 . 6 7 5  X  1 0 5  
1 2  2 6 , 6 8 2  1 1  2 . 9 3 5  X  1 0 5  
1 3  2 3 , 9 0 9  1 1  2 . 6 3  X  1 0 5  
1 4  1 0 , 9 5 0  1 1  1 . 2 0 5  X  1 0 5  
1 5  3 4 , 3 8 8  1 1  3 . 7 8 3  X  1 0 5  
1 6  2 1 , 3 7 7  1 1  2 , 3 5 1  X  1 0 5  
1 7  3 3 , 9 2 2  1 1  3 . 7 3 1  X  1 0 ^  
1 8  4 3 , 6 0 4  1 1  4 . 7 9 6  X  1 0 5  
1 9  4 1 , 7 0 3  1 1  4 . 5 8 7  X  1 0 5  
2 0  2 8 , 7 9 5  1 1  3 . 1 6 7  X  1 0 5  
2 1  2 9 , 5 3 4  1 1  3 . 2 4 9  X  1 0 5  
2 2  1 8 , 1 3 8  1 1  1 . 9 9 5  X  1 0 ^  
2 3  4 1 , 8 6 4  1 1  4 . 6 0 5  X  1 0 5  
2 4  2 6 , 5 1 6  1 1  2 . 9 1 7  X 1 0 %  
2 5  2 7 , 5 5 7  1 1  3 . 0 3 1  X 1 0 5  
2 6  2 4 , 1 6 7  1 1  2 . 6 5 8  X  1 0 5  
2 7  6 , 3 5 3  1 1  6 . 9 8 8  X lO"^ 
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Table 7.7. (Continued) 
Plant 
# 
Critical 
hours 
(Ti) 
Population of 
CSIS valves 
(Ni) 
Ti X 
^i 
28 20,988 11 2.309 X 10^ 
29 6,065 11 6.672 X 10'^ 
30 1,729 11 1.902 X 10^ 
31 19,473 11 2.142 X 105 
32 6,448 11 7.093 X 10^ 
33 42,928 11 4.722 X 10^ 
34 24,012 11 2.641 X 10^ 
35 545 11 5.995 X 10^ 
36 28,896 11 3.179 X 105 
37 37,182 11 4.09 X 105 
38 44,756 11 4.923 X 105 
Total 
7 
Ti X Ni = 1.008 X 10 hours 
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To express as a human error probability (HEP, dimen-
sionless) to be compared with those values predicted in 
NUREG/CR-1278 (11), is multiplied by the duration in 
hours. The duration time is defined as the time between 
event initiation and detection. Experience in reviewing 
human related events shows that this time has a wide varia­
bility. It ranges between one minute and one month in all 
systems considered. Based on a one week time interval, 
HEP = 7.937 10"7 (hr"l) x 168 (hr) = 1.333 x lO"^ . 
Using equation 6.3, the 90% confidence bound on is 
4.659 X 10"^ < Xy < 1.305 x 10~® hr"^ . 
Using equation 6.24, the point estimate unavailability is 
/V -4 
2 = 2.857 X 10 per demand 
and the 90% confidence bounds on ^  are 
1.677 X 10 ^ - 2 ^  4.698 4.698 x 10 ^  per demand. 
7.3.1.2. Failure rate calculation of CSIS valve being 
left closed or open The failure rate for valves left 
closed or open in the CSIS may be calculated using Tables 
7.4 and 7.7. Using equation 7.1, the hourly failure rate 
of valves left closed due to operator error is given by 
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X j j  ( M ^ , S , C )  =  — i  
I 'i 
I 
where 
= valve left closed 
S = CSIS (code SA, SB) 
C = valve (code VM) 
using Tables 7.4 and 7.7 
I fi = 2 
i ^ 
1 N.T. = 1.008 X 10^ hours 
1 ^ ^  
X (M ,S,C) = =• = 2.0 X 10"7 hr'l 
" ^ 1.008 X lO' 
(HEP)j^ = Ajj X duration time = 3.33 x 10 ^ . 
The 90% confidence bound on X is 
8.0 X 10~^ < X.. < 4.7 X 10 ^ hr ^ 
n -
and the 90% confidence bounds on (HEP)j^^ are 
1.36 X 10"5 < (HEP)m^ < 7.9 X 10~^- . 
Using equation 7.1, the hourly failure rate of valve left 
closed due to operator error is given by 
? 4 
Xj j{M2,S,C) = -i-I Hi?! 
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where 
= valve left open 
S = CSIS (code SA, SB) 
C = valve (code VO, VM) 
using Tables 7.4 and 7.7 
I 3 
1 NjT. = 1.008 X 10 ^ hours 
i 1 1 
A„(M ,S,C) = = = 3.0 X 10"7 hr'l 
" 1.008 X lO' 
(HEP)M = X X duration time = 5 x 10 ^ . 
2 " 
The 90% confidence bounds on are 
1 . 4  X  1 0 " 7  <  A „  <  6 . 3  X  1 0 " 7  h r ' l  
n 
and the 90% confidence bounds on (HEP)j^^ are 
2.28 X lO"^ < (HEP). ^ 1.05 x 10~^ . 
^2 
7.3.2. Human error rates estimated for CSRS 
Failure rate for valve left closed (which is the only 
event reported by LERs) in the CSRS may be calculated by us­
ing Tables 7.4 and 7.8. The critical hours are extracted 
from Appendix A. 
The hourly failure rate of valves due to operator error 
is given by I f. 
A„(M,S,C) = 
1 
H" ' ' ' I N.T. 
1 
# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
2 0  
21 
2 2  
23 
24 
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Valve population, critical hours for all PWRs 
plants, CSRS (period from January 1, 1972, to 
January 1, 1978) 
Critical Population of 
hours CSIS valves T. x N. 
(T^) (N^) 
4 0 , 0 0 0  2 . 8  X  1 0 ^  
2 2 , 0 1 0  1 . 5 4  X  1 0 ^  
8 , 9 8 2  6 . 2 8 7  X  1 0 ^  
2 7 , 3 6 8  1 . 9 1 6  X  1 0 ^  
3 7 , 6 9 5  2 . 6 3 9  X  1 0 5  
1 4 , 7 4 8  1 . 0 3 2  X  1 0 ^  
2 5 , 0 3 2  1 . 7 5 2  X  1 0 ^  
2 2 , 4 1 3  1 . 5 6 9  X  1 0 5  
2 , 8 4 5  1 . 9 9 2  X  1 0 4  
9 , 2 6 6  6 . 4 8 6  X  1 0 4  
3 3 , 4 1 1  2 . 3 3 9  X  1 0 ^  
2 6 , 6 8 2  1 . 8 6 8  X  1 0 ^  
2 3 , 9 0 9  1 . 6 7 4  X  1 0 ^  
1 0 , 9 5 0  7 . 6 6 5  X  1 0 ^  
3 4 , 3 8 8  2 . 4 0 7  X  1 0 ^  
2 1 , 3 7 7  1 . 4 9 6  X  1 0 5  
3 3 , 9 2 2  2 . 3 7 5  X  1 0 ^  
4 3 , 6 0 4  3 . 0 5 2  X  1 0 ^  
4 1 , 7 0 3  2 . 9 1 9  X  1 0 ^  
2 8 , 7 9 5  2 . 0 1 6  X  1 0 ^  
2 9 , 5 3 4  2 . 0 6 7  X  1 0 ^  
1 8 , 1 3 8  1 . 2 7 0  X  1 0 ^  
4 1 , 8 6 4  2 . 9 3  X  1 0 5  
2 6 , 5 1 6  1 . 8 5 6  X  1 0 ^  
2 7 , 5 5 7  1 . 9 2 9  X  1 0 ^  
2 4 , 1 6 7  1 . 6 9 2  X  1 0 5  
# 
27 
28  
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
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(Continued) 
Critical Population of 
hours CSIS valves T. x N. 
(T^) (N^) ^ 1 
6,353 4.447 X 10^ 
20,988 1.469 X 105 
6,065 4.246 X 10^ 
1,729 1.210 X lo"^ 
19,473 1.363 X 10^ 
6,448 4.514 X 
o
 
1—1 
42,928 3.005 X 10^ 
24,012 1.681 X 10^ 
545 3.815 X 10^ 
28,896 2.023 X 105 
37,182 2.603 X 10^ 
44,756 3.133 X 10^ 
EU X = 6.414 X 10^ hours 
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where 
M = left closed 
S = CSRS (Code SC) 
C = valve (code VX) 
I fi = 1 
and 
I N.T. = 6.414 X 10^ hours 
1 ^ ^  
A„ (M,S,C) = ^ = 1.5 X lO"^ hr~^ 
" 6.414 X 10^ 
HEP = 2.62 X 10~^ 
The 90% confidence bounds on are 
5 . 5  X 1 0 " ®  <  X g  <  4 . 7  X 1 0 " 7  hr'l . 
Using equation 6.23, the point estimate unavailability is 
g = 5.61 X 10 per demand 
and the 90% confidence bounds on q are 
2.0 X 10 1'82 X 10 * per demand. 
7.3.3. Human error rates estimated for SHAS 
7.3.3.1. SHAS valve mispositioning failure rate calcu­
lation The failure rate for valve mispositioning (cluster­
ing of all failure modes that lead to valves being 
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mispositioned) in the SHAS may be calculated by usina the 
information given in Tables 7.5 and 7.9. The critical hours 
are extracted from Appendix A. 
The hourly failure rate of valves due to operator error 
is given by ^ ^ 
X„ (M,S,C) = ^  
Ï N.T, 
where ^ 
M = mispositioning 
S = SHAS (code SH) 
C = valve (code VX, VM, VO) 
pi = 3 
I N^T^ = 5.279 X 10® hours 
A„(M,S,C) = ^ = 5.7 X 10"7 hr"^ 
" 5.279 X 10 
HEP = 9.55 X 10"^ . 
The 90% confidence bounds on are 
2.6 X 10~^ < A* < 1.2 X 10"* hr"l . 
n 
Using equation 6.24, the point estimate unavailability g 
-4 is 2.05 X 10 . The 90% confidence bounds cn g are 
9.32 X 10 ^ < ^<4.3 X10 ^ per demand. 
7.3.3.2. Failure rate calculations of SHAS valve being 
left open The failure rate for a valve left open in the 
# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20  
21 
2 2  
23 
24 
25 
26  
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Valve population critical hours for all PWRs 
plants, SHAS (period from January 1, 1972, to 
January 1, 1978) 
Critical Population of 
hours SHAS valves T. x N. 
(T.) (N.) ^ 
4 0 , 0 0 0  6  2 . 4  X  1 0 ^  
2 2 , 0 1 0  6  1 . 3 2 1  X  1 0 ^  
8 , 9 8 2  6  5 . 3 8 9  X  1 0 ^  
2 7 , 3 6 8  6  1 . 6 4 2  X  1 0 ^  
3 7 , 6 9 5  6  2 . 2 6 2  X  1 0 ^  
1 4 , 7 4 8  6  8 . 8 4 9  X  1 0 *  
2 5 , 0 2 3  6  1 . 5 0 1  X  1 0 ^  
2 2 , 4 1 3  6  1 . 3 4 5  X  1 0 ^  
2 , 8 4 5  6  1 . 7 0 7  X  1 0 *  
9 , 2 6 6  6  5 . 5 6 0  X  1 0 ^  
3 3 , 4 1 1  6  2 . 0 0 5  X  1 0 ^  
2 6 , 6 8 2  6  1 . 6 0 1  X 1 0 ^  
2 3 , 9 0 9  6  1 . 4 3 5  X 1 0 ^  
1 0 , 9 5 0  6  6 . 5 7  X  1 0 ^  
3 4 , 3 8 8  6  2 . 0 6 3  X 1 0 ^  
2 1 , 3 7 7  6  1 . 2 8 3  X  1 0 ^  
3 3 , 9 2 2  6  1 . 0 3 5  X 1 0 ^  
4 3 , 6 0 4  6  2 . 6 1 6  X 1 0 ^  
4 1 , 7 0 3  6  2 . 5 0 2  X 1 0 ^  
2 8 , 7 9 5  6  1 . 7 2 8  X  1 0 ^  
2 9 , 5 3 4  6  1 . 7 7 2  X 1 0 ^  
1 8 , 1 3 8  6  1 . 0 8 8  X 1 0 ^  
4 1 , 8 6 4  6  2 . 5 1 2  X 1 0 ^  
2 6 , 5 1 6  6  1 . 5 9 1  X 1 0 5  
2 7 , 5 7 7  6  1 . 6 5 5  X 1 0 ^  
2 4 , 1 6 7  6  1 . 4 5 0  X 1 0 ^  
# 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
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(Continued) 
Critical Population of 
hours SHAS valves x 
(T^) (N^) 1 1 
6,353 6 3.812 X 104 
20,988 6 1.259 X 10^ 
6,065 6 3.639 X 104 
1,729 6 1.037 X 10^ 
19,473 6 1.168 X 10^ 
6,448 6 2.869 X 10^ 
42,928 6 2.576 X 10^ 
24,012 6 1.441 X 10^ 
545 6 3.27 X 10^ 
28,896 6 1.734 X 10^ 
37,182 6 1.631 X 10^ 
44,756 6 2.685 X 10^ 
X — 5,279 X 10 hours 
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SHAS may be calculated by using the information given in 
Tables 7.5 and 7.9 and equation 7.1 
(""'S'Ci = yW 
i l l  
where 
M* = valve left open 
S = SHAS (code SH) 
C = valve (VX, VM) 
Mi = 2 
Ï ^i^i ~ 5.279 X 10^ hours 
X (M*,S,C) = = 3.8 X 10"^ hr"^ 
" 5.279 X 106 
HEP = 6.37 X 10"5 ^ 
The 90% confidence bounds on are 
1 = 5 X 10"7 < Ajj < 9.0 X 10"7 per ho; 
and 
g: = 1.37 X 10 ^ per demand 
the 90% confidence bounds on £ are 
5.58 X 10 S 2 - 3.24 X 10 ^ per demand. 
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7.3.4. Human error rates estimated for CHRS 
7.3.4.1. CHRS valve mispositioning failure rate calcu­
lation The failure rate for valve mispositioning (cluster­
ing of all failure modes that lead to valves being misposi­
tioning in the CHRS) may be calculated by using Tables 7.6 
and 7.10. The critical hours are extracted from Appendix A. 
The hourly failure rate of valves due to operator error 
is given by 
À„(M,S,C) = TA y N.T. 4 1 X 
where 
M = mispositioning 
S = CHRS (code SB) 
C = valve (code VO, VM) 
I h' 
I = 2.203 X 10^ hours 
Ajj(M,S,C) = 2 ^03 X 10 ^ = 9.0 X 10 ® hr ^ 
HEP = 1.53 X 10~^ 
The 90% confidence bounds on X„ are 
XI 
5.0 X 10"® < Ay < 2.1 X 10"7 hr'l 
The point estimate on £ is 
# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22  
23 
24 
25 
26 
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Valve population, critical hours for all PWRs 
plants, CHRS (period from January 1, 1972, to 
January 1, 1978) 
Critical Population of 
hours CHRS valves T. x N. 
(Ti) (NU) ^ 
40,000 24 9.6 X 10^ 
22,010 24 5.282 X 10^ 
8,982 24 2.156 X 10^ 
27,368 24 6.568 X 10^ 
37,695 24 9.047 X 10^ 
14,748 24 3.540 X 10^ 
25,023 24 6.006 X 10^ 
22,413 24 5.379 X 10^ 
2,845 24 6.828 X 10* 
9,266 24 2.224 X 10^ 
33,411 24 8.019 X 10^ 
26,682 24 6.404 X 10^ 
23,909 24 5.738 X 10^ 
10,950 24 2.628 X 10^ 
34,388 24 8.253 X 10^ 
21,377 24 5.130 X 10^ 
33,922 24 8.141 X 10^ 
43,604 24 1.046 X 10^ 
41,703 24 1.001 X 10^ 
28,795 24 6.911 X 10^ 
29,534 24 7.088 X 10^ 
18,138 24 4.353 X 10^ 
41,864 24 1.005 X 10® 
26,516 24 6.364 X 10^ 
27,557 24 6.614 X 10^ 
6,353 24 1.525 X 10^ 
20,988 24 5.037 X 10^ 
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Table 7.10. (Continued) 
Plant 
# 
Critical 
hours 
(T^) 
Population of 
CHRS valves 
(Ni) 
Ti X : N. 
28 6,065 24 1.456 X 10^ 
29 1,729 24 4.150 X 10^ 
30 19,473 24 4.674 X 10^ 
31 6,448 24 1.548 X 10^ 
32 42,928 24 1.03 X 10^ 
33 24,012 24 5.763 X 10^ 
34 545 24 1.308 
4 X 10 
35 28,896 24 6.935 X 10^ 
36 37,182 24 8.934 X 10^ 
37 44,756 24 1.074 X 10^ 
Total NiTi = 2.203 X 10^ hours 
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3 = 3.29 X 10~^ per demand 
and the 90% confidence bounds on q are 
1.8 X 10"^ < q < 7.75 X 10~^ per demand. 
7.3.4.2. CHRS valve left closed failure rate calcula­
tion Using Tables 6.6 and 6.10 the failure rate for 
valves left closed in the CHRS may be calculated. The fail­
ure rate for valves due to operator error is given by 
pi 
(M,,S,C) = wi 
i NiTi 
where 
= valve left closed 
S = CHRS (SB) 
C = valve (Code VO) 
1 ^i^i ~ 2.0 3 X 10 hours 
(M, ,S,C) = = = 5.0 X 10"® hr"^ 
" ^ 2.03 X 10? 
(HEP)^ = 8.27 X 10"® . 
The 90% confidence bounds on are 
1.75 X 10"® < X„ < 1.5 X 10"7 hr"l 
fi 
The point estimate on £ is 
-5 
3 = 1.77 X 10 per demand 
Ill 
and the 90% confidence bounds on are 
6 . 3 x 1 0  ^  ^  q  <  5 . 3 2  X  1 0  ^  p e r  d e m a n d .  
Using the same calculation, the hourly failure rate and un­
availability due to inadvertent closing of valves in the 
CHRS due to operator error would be the same as above, i.e., 
(M2,S,C) = 5.0 X 10"® hr'l 
7.4. Comparison with Other Estimates of 
Human Error Probabilities 
Human error probabilities (HEP) based on reported 
(LER) data (Section 7.3) will be compared with rele­
vant estimates based on "expert estimates" reported in 
NUREG/CR-1278 and WASH-1400. 
Tables 7.11 through 7.13 summarize the human error 
probability estimates listed in NUREG/CR-1278 (11) coded under 
the categories used to collect the LER data given in Appen­
dix A. The tabled HEPs are given in more detail in Appendix 
B. The estimates in those tables deal with valve manipula­
tion errors in those systems described in Section 5.3. The 
number of reported events dealing with relevant human failure 
modes and the corresponding values of HEP are listed in 
Tables 7.14, 7.15 and 7.16. 
Based on the analysis given in Section 5, and since all 
failure modes given in Table 7.14 lead to mispositioning 
of valves due to human error, the estimated for 
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Table 7.11. Human error probabilities estimates from 
NUREG/CR-1278 for category #1 omission 
Failure mode 
Did not open (left closed) 
Did not close (left~ôpen) 
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Failure to carry out a specific 
oral instruction to change 
valve(s) 
Item(s) not written down by 
recipient 
One valve 
Two valves 
Three valves 
Four valves 
Five valves 
Item(s) written down by 
recipient failure to recall 
WRITTEN PROCEDURES 
Getting particular valve in 
sequence in: 
Short list (10 items) 
check off 
Short list, no check off 
Long list, check off 
Long list, no check off 
Misuse of the check off 
provision 
Plant procedures not followed, 
short cuts or personnel pref­
erences followed instead 
Omission of one item from a 
list of valves or set of tags 
when written procedure is 
prepared 
HEP (per Lower Upper 
demand) bound bound 
IxlO"^ 5xl0"^ 5x10"^ 
3xlO~^ 1. 5x10"^ 1. 5xl0~^ 
IxlO"^ 5x10"^ 5x10"^ 
3x10"^ 1. 5x10"^ 1. 5x10"^ 
IxlO"^ 5x10"^ 5x10"^ 
IxlO"^ 5x10"^ 5xl0~^ 
Ixio"^ IxlO"^ 5xl0~^ 
3x10"^ 8xlO"4 1x10"^ 
3x10"^ 8xlO"4 
_2 
1x10 
Ixio"^ Ixio"^ 
-2 
5x10 
5x10"^ IxlO"^ 9xl0~^ 
IxlO"^ 5xl0~^ 
- 2  5x10 
3x10"^ 1 .5x10"^ 1 .5x10"^ 
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Table 7.12. Human error probabilities estimates from 
NUREG/CR-1278 for category #2 incorrect 
commission 
Failure mode HEP (per demand) 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Improper open/close 
Reversal errors 
The operator changes a valve 
that had already been changed 
and 
tagged 
not tagged 
Erroneous conclusion of valve 
status 
Rising-stem valve, the valve 
sticks at 3/4 its full stroke 
and there are 
local position indicator 
no position indicator 
All other valves, if there are 
local position indicator 
no position indicator 
position indicator elsewhere 
Improper operation 
Failure to complete change of 
state of MOV (holding time to 
switch is not adequate) 
— 4 —5 — 3 
1x10 5x10 1x10 
-1 -2 -1 1x10 ^ 1x10 5x10 
5x10"^ 2x10"^ 2x10"^ 
-3 -4 -2 1x10 5x10 * 1x10 
1x10"^ 5xlO"4 1x10"^ 
-2 -3 -2 1x10 3x10 1x10 
2x10"^ 1x10"^ 1x10"^ 
-3 -3 — 2 
3x10 1x10 1x10 
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Table 7.13. Human error probabilities estimates from 
NUREG/CR-1278 for category #3 inadvertence 
Failure mode 
Inadvertent open/closure 
Manipulation of wrong valve 
(normal or remote actuated) 
where the intended valve is 
among similar appearing 
valves 
Manipulation of wrong MOV 
switch or circuit breaker 
where the intended item is 
among similar appearing ones 
Listing error of valves or 
set of tags when written 
procedure is prepared 
Tagging wrong MOV where the 
intended one is among 
similar ones 
HEP (per Lower Upper 
demand) bound bound 
5x10"^ 2x10"^ 2x10"^ 
3x10"^ lxlO"3 lxlO~^ 
3x10"^ 1.5x10"^ 1.5x10"^ 
5x10"^ 2x10"^ 2x10"^ 
Table 7.14. Reported events for CSIS 
Failure mode # of 
events 
HEP from 
Tables 7.11 
thru 7.13 
Remarks 
Did not close/open 3 lxlO"3 
Did not open/close 2 IxlO"^ 
Did not verify 2 lxlO"3 
Misalignment 1 5x10"^ 
Assuming there are 
short lists with 
check off (very 
conservative) 
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Table 7.15. Reported events for SHAS 
# of psr demand 
Failure mode from Tables Remarks 
events ,.11.7.13 
Did not close/open 2 10 Assuming there 
Communication 1 10 
are short lists 
with check off 
-3 
Table 7.16. Reported events for CHRS 
M f HEP per demand 
Failure mode from Tables Remarks 
events „ ,, „ ,^ /. ±j.- /. J. J 
Did not open/close 1 10 ^ Assuming there 
are short lists 
with check off 
Inadvertent closing 1 5 x 10 -3 
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mispositioning of valves in the CSIS is 
1 X 5 X 10~^ + 3 X lO"^ + 2 X 10~^ + 2 X lO"^ 
8 
= 1.5 X 10 ^ per demand. 
Assuming a recovery factor of 0.1 (failure of checker 
to discover the error), 
X = Ap X 0.1 
— 3 -4 
= 1 . 5 x 1 0  X  0 . 1  =  1 . 5  X  1 0  p e r  d e m a n d .  
This value is within a factor of two of the operator 
error probability of 2.857 x 10 ^ per demand based on the 
reported LER data for mispositioning of valves in the CSIS. 
Using Table 7.14, the estimated for a valve left 
closed (event reported by LER) in the CSRS is given by 
Ag = 1 X 10 ^ per demand 
and by assuming a recovery factor of O.-l (failure of checker 
to discover the error) 
X = Xp X 0.1 
-4 
= 10 per demand. 
This value is within a factor of two of the operator 
error probabilities of 5.6 x 10~^ per demand based on the 
reported LER data for the failure mode r "did not open a 
valve in the CSRS." 
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Since all the failure modes given in Table 7.15 lead 
to mispositioning of valves due to human error, then the 
estimated for mispositioning of valves in the SHAS is; 
Ag = 2 X 10^ + 10 ^ = 10-3 per demand . 
Again by assuming a recovery factor of 0.1 (failure of 
checker to discover the error), 
A = Ag X 0.1 
= 10"* per demand. 
This value is within a factor of two of the operator error 
probabilities of 2.0 x 10 ^ per demand based on the re­
ported LER data for, "mispositioning of valves in the SHAS." 
Since all the failure modes given in Table 7.16 lead 
to mispositioning of valves due to human error, then the 
estimated A^ for mispositioning of valves in CHRS is 
Ag = — ^2^ ^  — = 3 X 10 3 per demand. 
Again by assuming a recovery factor of 0.1 (failure of 
checker to discover the error) 
A = A^ X 0.1 
-4 
= 3 X 10 per demand. 
This value, which represents the unavailability of valves 
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due to mispositioning due to operator error, is within a 
factor of ten of the operator error probabilities of 3.268 x 
10 ^ per demand based on the reported LER data for, "misposi­
tioning of valves in the CHRS." 
7.5. Discussion of the Results 
Operator error rates are estimated here for the failure 
mode involving valving errors for those PWRS systems involved 
in the SgC accident sequence. The estimated operator error 
rates will be compared with relevant estimates based on "ex­
pert estimates" reported in NUREG/CR-1278 (11) and in WASH-
1400 (1). 
The estimated operator errors presented in Sections 7.3 
and 7.4 are summarized in Tables 7.17 and 7.18. As can be 
seen by inspection of Table 7.17 for the first four failure 
modes using LER data, the estimated operator error rates are 
approximately within a factor of 30 of those predicted using 
data from NUREG/CR-1278, but for the last two failure modes 
(valve left closed and valve inadvertently closed in CHRS) , 
the estimated operator error rates based on LER data are 
significantly lower than those estimated using NUREG/CR-1278 
data. As can be seen by inspection of the results given in 
Table 7.18, the HEPs estimates of the CSIS, CSRS and CHRS 
using LERs are within a factor of 10 or less of those pre­
dicted using data from WASH-1400 and NUREG/CR-1278, but for 
the SHAS using LERs data, the HEPs estimates are within a 
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factor of 30 or less of those predicted using data from the 
other two sources. 
It must be noticed that the estimates given here are 
based on the reactor years surveyed (January 1972 to January 
1978) which doesn't cover all LER data. Therefore, more 
precise error rate estimates could be obtained by consider­
ing a larger sample of LER data which covers all reactor-
years of experience up to date. 
Table 7.17. Operator error rates estimates comparison 
Operator error Operator error 
— 1  — 1  Failure mode rate (A) hr rate (X) hr 
Using LER data Using NUREG/CR-1728 
Valve left closed in CSIS 
^U 
= 4.7 X 10*7 
X-M = 2.0 X 10-7 
= 8.0 X 10-8 
Valve left open in CSIS ^U 6.3 X 10-7 
= 3.0 X 10-7 
= 
1.4 X 10-7 
Valve left closed in CSRS ^U 
— 4.7 X 10-7 
= 1.5 X 10-7 
5.5 X 10-8 
Valve left open in SHAS ^U 9.0 X 10-7 
= 3.8 X 10-7 
1.5 X 10-7 
^)u = 1. 03 X 10-5 
A)M 
= 6. 25 X 10-6 
= 3. 26 X 10-G 
A) U 1. 03 X 10-5 
6. 25 X 10-G 
= 3. 26 X 10-® 
A)u 1. 25 X 10-5 
X)jyj 4. 17 X 10-G 
1. 48 X 10-G 
X) u = 1. 25 X 10-5 
^)M = 4. 17 X 10-G 
Mr. 
= 1. 48 X 
VO 1 o
 
1—1 
Table 7.17. (Continued) 
Failure mode 
Operator error 
rate (A) hr"^ 
Using LER data 
Operator error 
rate (A) hr~^ 
Using NUREG/CR-1728 
Valve left closed in CHRS Ay = 1.5 X 10 
Am = 5.0 X 10 
Al = 1. 75 X 10 
-7 
- 8  
- 8  
(A)„ = 2.97 X 10 U 
(A)M 
(A)L 
= 1.25 X 10 
= 5.10 X 10 
-5 
-5 
— 6  
Valve inadvertently closed 
^U = 1.5 X 10 
= 5.0 X 10 
A, = 1.75 X10 
-7 
- 8  
- 8  
(A)y = 2.97 X 10 
(A)^ = 1.25 X 10 
(A)? = 5.10 X 10 
-5 
-5 
- 6  
Table 7.18. Human error probability (HEP) estimate for valve mispositioning in 
those systems involved in the S^C sequence 
System Operator error 
rate (hr~l) 
Using LER data WASH-1400^ NUREG/CR-1728 
HEP HEP HEP 
CSIS Xy = 1.31 X 10 ^ = 4.70 x 10 ^  = 7.8 x 10 ^ = 2.47 x 10 ^ 
Xj4 = 7.94 X 10-7 = 2.86 x 10-^ = 2.4 x IQ-^ = 1.50 x IQ-^ 
Al = 4.66 x 10-7 = 1.68 x IQ-^ q^ = 1.0 x 10-^ = 7.83 x 10"^ 
CSRS Ay = 4.7 X 10-7 
Ajjj = 1.56 X 10 7 
Al = 5.5 X 10-® 
SHAS A„ = 1.2 X lOT^ En = 4.3 x lO"^ g^ = 1.1 x 10-^ 
- 5.9 X 10 
% = 3.6 X 10-3 
2u = 1.82 X 10-4 3u = 9.0 X H
 
O
 1 lU
 
3u = 3. 00 X 10-4 
3M = 5.61 X 10-5 3M = 1.0 X 10-4 3M = 1. 00 X o
 1 
SL = 2.0 X 10-5 SL = 2.5 X 10-5 3L = 3. 55 X 10-5 
 10-6
= 5. 7 X 10-7 
II to
 
6 X 
1 o
 
rH 
3u  X 10-4
3M = 2. 05 X H
 
O
 1 
1 
A
 
2L = 9. 32 X 10-3 
% = 
3. 0 X 10-4 
3M = 1. 00 X 10-4 
= 
3. 55 X 10-5 
CHRS 
1—
i (N 
II 
X 10-7 
10-8 
10-8 
% = 7.75 X 10-5 % 
o
 
n
 
II 
X 10-4 % = 7.17 X 
^M 
= 9.0 X 3M = 3.27 X 10"5 3M = 8.5 X 10-5 3M = 3.00 X 
= 5.0 X % = 1.8 X 10"5 SL = 3.0 X 10-5 2L = 2.23 X 
)-4 
)-4 
v-4 
^From WASH-1400, Appendix II, Table II 1-2. 
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8. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF SYSTEMS INVOLVED 
IN SgC ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 
8.1. Introduction 
Nuclear reliability analysis is important since it is 
usually done for the purpose of safety assurance of NPPs. 
Quantitative nuclear reliability analysis is usually con­
cerned with: 
(a) Identifying the weaknesses and strengths of sys­
tem behavior with respect to a given system ob­
jective; 
(b) Pointing out the sensitivity of the system relia­
bility performance to maintenance, testing, human 
factors, and hardware quality; and 
(c) Determining relevant system reliability charac­
teristics such as the unavailability and the 
unreliability. 
The analysis presented in this chapter represents the first 
attempt at using calculated human error rates (Section 7) 
to analyze the fault trees of those systems involved in the 
S^C accident sequence. Two systems were selected for the 
purpose of this analysis. Those systems are the CSIS and 
the CHRS. Functions and descriptions of both systems are 
given in Section 5.3. Fault tree analyses are used in 
reactor reliability analysis. Description of fault tree 
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analysis and its applications is presented in Section 
8 . 2 .  
The constructed fault trees given in WASH-1400 (1) 
for the CSIS and CHRS will be reconstructed here in such 
a way that those failure modes which do not have related 
human events or actions, are grouped in a single component. 
Those reconstructed fault trees are presented in Sections 
8.3 and 8.4. The PREP and KITT codes are used to analyze 
those trees to determine the overall system unavailability. 
The description of the codes is presented in Section 8.3.2. 
The calculated human error rates presented in Chapter 7 
and component failure rates found in WASH-1400 (1) were 
used as input for the PREP codes . This is presented in 
Section 8.3.3. The KITT-1 results are presented in Section 
8.3.4. 
An identical analysis is presented in Section 8.4 for 
the CHRS fault, tree. 
8.2. Fault Tree Analysis and its Applications 
8.2.1. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis is a formalized deductive analysis 
technique that provides a systematic approach to investi­
gate the possible modes of occurrences of a defined system 
state or undesired event. In other words, a fault tree is 
a logical diagram of the sequences of events which lead 
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from one or more causal events upward to one consequence or 
resultant single failure. This failure is called the "Top 
Failure", "Final Failure", "System Failure" or "Top Event" A 
fault tree may be alternatively defined as a logical diagram 
which traces a top failure to basic failure causes (54). 
FTA consists of two major steps: (1) the construction 
of the fault tree, and (2) its evaluation. The evaluation 
of the fault tree can be qualitative (55), quantitative 
(55, 56), or both depending upon the scope and extensive-
ness of the analysis. 
The objectives of fault tree analysis are: (1) to de­
fine critical paths in the accident analysis, (2) to calcu­
late probabilities of failures leading to given consequences 
or of consequences occurring in the system from one or a 
number of different initiating faults, and (3) to specify 
safeguard systems to protect against damaging consequences 
for each failnre branch of the tree (55). 
8.2.2. Event symbols 
The symbols shown in Fig. 8.1 represent specific types 
of fault events in fault tree analysis (57). The rectangle 
defines an event that is the output of a logic gate. The 
logic gates for fault tree construction are the OR and 
the AND gates. The OR gate describes a situation where 
the output event will exist if one or more of the input 
events exist. The AND gate describes the logical operation 
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RECTANGLE 
(GATE EVENT) 
CIRCLE 
(PRIMARY 
FAILURE) 
DIAMOND 
(UNDEVELOPED 
EVENT) 
ZV 
TRANSFER "OUT" TRANSFER "IN" 
OUTPUT 
EVENT 
INPUT EVENT 
OR GATE 
OUTPUT 
EVENT 
7^ 
INPUT EVENTS 
AND GATE 
INHIBIT GATE 
(CONDITIONAL AND GATE) 
INPUT 
Figure 8.1. Specific types of fault events and fault event 
codes used in CSIS and CHRS fault trees analysis 
126 
X XX XXX X 
FAULT TYPE 
COMPONENT IDENTIFIER 
COMPONENT TYPE 
SYSTEM 
Figure 8.1 (Continued) 
Code System Code Component type Code Failure type 
Containment m Manual valve A Operator error 
Spray Injection (3V Motor operating valve B Short circuit 
(CSIS) LF Line filter C Inadvertently closes 
CL Clutch D Plugged 
ISM Electric motor E Disengages 
Containment PM Pump F No sufficient torque 
Limiting Control CV Check valve G Fail to start 
(CLCS) NZ Nozzles H Discontinues running 
:7C Train circuit I Fail to close 
Containment heat CB Circuit breaker J Fail to command 
removal cc Control circuit K No power 
(CHRS) TK Tank L Rupture 
Vent M Leakage 
hV Air vent N Off-site power 
HE Heat exchanger 0 Fail to read 
SN Sensor P Insufficient voltage 
BS Bus Q Inhibits flow 
CV Control value 
Figure 8.1 (Continued) 
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that requires the coexistence of all input events to produce 
the output event. The symbols for the logic gates are shown 
in Fig. 8.1. The circle defines a basic inherent failure of 
a system element when operated within its design specifica­
tions. It is, therefore, a primary failure. The diamond 
represents a failure other than a primary failure that is 
purposely not developed further. 
The inhibit gate is essentially a one-input AND gate that 
describes a causal relationship between one fault and another. 
The inhibit gate defines a situation where the coexistence of 
an input event and a conditional event is necessary for the 
output event to occur. Fig. 8.1 also shows a breakdown of the 
fault tree identification code and fault events codes which 
are used here for listing of failures on the trees. 
8.2.3. Application of fault trees 
After constructing the fault tree, an evaluation of the 
critical path is carried out. A critical path (mode failure) 
is the smallest set of primary failures such that if all 
these primary failures simultaneously exist, then the top 
failure exists. The mode failures of a fault tree can be 
obtained by a number of methods. A detailed description of 
the methods is given in references (56, 58). 
With knowledge of the failure modes of the fault tree, 
the evaluation can then proceed to a study of the probabil­
istic characteristics of the primary failures, mode failures. 
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and the top failure. 
In order to obtain this probability, the component 
behavior data in the form of failure rates A(t) and repair 
times vi(t) are required as inputs to the system models. 
On the other hand, for any reliability or fault tree study, 
the quantities A(t) and y(t), or their equivalent, must be 
known for every primary failure of the fault tree. If the 
primary failure is the failure of a component, then A(t) 
and ia{t) are termed the component failure rate and component 
repair rate, respectively. 
From X(t) and y(t), some probabilistic quantities may 
be obtained which quantify, or characterize, the particular 
primary failure. The probability Aft^/t) of the primary 
failure first occurring in time t to t+dt, given that it does 
not exist at* time t^^, is given by (59) 
•t 
A(t^,t)dt = exp[- A(t2)dt2]A(t)dt (8.1) 
tl 
where 
A(t)dt = the probability of the failure occurring in 
time t to t+dt, given the failure is not 
existing at time t . 
It is clear from equation 8.1 that the probability 
F(t^,t) that the primary failure doesn't occur from time t^ 
to t is simply 
F(t^,t) = exp[ Aftgidtg]; t^^t . (8.2) 
^1 
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In the context of the defined failure, the failure probabil­
ity is equivalent to unreliability 
With regard to repair, the probability that the primary 
failure is repaired at time t to t+dt, given that it exists 
at time t^, B(t^,t)dt, is given by (59) 
t 
B(t^,t)dt = exp[- pftgldtgjpftjdt; t^ ^  t (8.3) 
^1 
where 
y(t)dt = the probability of the failure being repaired 
in time t to t+dt given that the failure exists 
at time t. 
The quantity A(t^,t) and B(t^,t) are termed the first failure 
distribution and the repair distribution, respectively. The 
term F(t^,t) is called the nonfailure probability. 
There are two other primary failure characteristics, 
besides the above, which are essential for any reliability 
study or fault tree evaluation. The first characteristic 
is the primary failure intensity w(t), which is defined as 
w(t) = the expected number of times the primary 
failure occurs at time t per unit time. 
By using this definition, it is clear that the expected num­
ber of times the primary failure occurs in any interval from 
t^ to t, w(t^,t) is (59) 
w(t^,t) = I w(t2)dt2 . (8.4) 
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By assuming that (initial condition) at t=0 the primary 
failure does not exist, an equation for w(t) in terms of the 
data for the primary failure can be obtained, 
w(t) = A(0,t) + 
where 
ft ft 
dtgW^tg) J dtj^B(t2,t) A(tj^,t) (8. 5) 
A(0,t) is the contribution to w(t) from the first 
occurrence of the primary failure. 
The second primary failure characteristic of interest 
is the primary failure existence probability q(t). The 
probability of the primary failure not existing at time t 
is merely l-q(t). By using the definition of A(t) and 
w(t), it is clear that (59) 
w(t) = [1-q(t)]X(t), (8.6) 
or 
q(t) = 1 - . (8.7) 
It was stated previously that a mode failure or criti­
cal path is the smallest set of primary failures such that 
if all these primary failures exist at time t the mode 
failure (and top failure) exists at time t. 
Consider a particular mode failure that consists of n 
primary failures and let these constituent primary failures 
be designated with indices from 1 to n. Assume the primary 
failures are independent and that at t=0 they all do not 
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exist. The first characteristic obtained for the mode 
failure will be the mode failure existence probability, 
Q(t), defined as 
Q(t) = the probability that the mode failure 
exists at time t. 
Since the mode failure exists at time t and if and 
only if all its primary failures exist at time t, then 
n 
Q(t) = IT q. (t) , (8.8) 
a=l 3 
where (t) is the existence probability for the jth primary 
failure of the mode failure. The mode failure nonexistence 
probability, p(t), is then just l-Q(t) and is the proba­
bility of the mode failure not existing at time t; in terms 
of the constituent primary failures, p(t) is the proba­
bility of one or more of these primary failures not exist­
ing at time t. Equation 8.8 allows Q(t), or p(t), to be 
simply determined from the primary failure information. 
The existence probability Q(t) is of significance to 
the top failure to which the particular mode failure con­
tributes. If the mode failure exists at time t, then the 
top failure exists at time t. Examination of the Q(t) for 
all the mode failures (critical paths) of the fault tree 
will yield those critical mode failures by which the top 
failure is most likely to exist. 
133 
More detailed explanations for this and other mode 
failure characteristics and top failure information are 
given in reference (59) . 
8.3. CSIS Fault Tree "Insufficient Fluid Flow" 
8.3.1. CSIS fault tree description 
It is easy to understand the fault tree given in 
Fig. 8.2 by examining the simplified flow diagram 
of the CSIS which is given in Fig. 5.1. 
The top event is considered to be insufficient fluid 
flow to the CSIS and this will be due to one of the follow­
ing events (mode events in OR gate); 
(1) Failures common to both subsystems cause insuf­
ficient spray delivery. 
(2) Failures in subsystem A&B cause insufficient 
fluid flow. 
As shown in Fig. 8.2, one out of two events should take 
place in order for the top event to occur. 
It was assumed that each of the above mode events takes 
place due to failure of its particular components. To make 
the calculations tractable and to keep the significant 
events consistent with the resolution of the data available, 
the above fault tree is reduced before making any calcula­
tions. The reduced fault tree is shown in Fig. 8.3. The 
fault events code is given in Fig. 8.1. The events shown 
in Figs. 8.2 and 8.3 represent the following: 
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AND 
Insufficient fluid 
flow to CSIS 
nozzles in 
containment 
Failures common to 
both subsystems 
cause INSUF.spray 
delivery 
Failures in 
Subsystem A & B 
cause insufficient 
fluid flow 
Failure in containment 
spray subsystem B cause 
no discharge thru. B 
Failure in containment spray 
subsystem A cause no discharge 
thru.A 
Figure 8.2. CSIS fault tree 
RUST 
8" Vent 
Plugged 
ndetecte 
WST (1-CS-TK-l 
Leakage Rupture 
Failures in power 
or control circuits 
cause discharge MOVS 
to remain closed 
Power failures 
cause one discharge 
valve in each train 
to remain closed 
Control failures 
cause one discharge 
valve in each train 
to remain closed 
w in 
B) 
No 
*^480 V ^C" 
power 
(available toj 
LMCC lHI-2, 
power 
avai 
rcuit 
command 
pumps 
ves 
command 
pumps and 
val 
Figure 8.2. (Continued) 
Pumps and valves 
failure 
S 
tram 
circuit 
Figure 8.2. (Continued) 
OR 
Electrical circuit 
and control failure 
A14 
No power available 
to elec. circuit 
Pumps and valves 
failure 
rcui 
to comand 
Figure 8.2. (Continued) 
cirucit No power available 
1 failure to electrical circuit 
A14 
No" 
'^AC power 
available 
Ito pump motor 
circuit )reakei> 
0 12 
V DC 
available 
to pump 
cçntrçl 
1rcui• 
W 
Failure 
in cont 
circuit 
closes 
^ MOV ^ 
rOperator 
error. M' 
V4 left 
V closed J 
i 
Line 
filter in 
B suction 
\is pluggedy 
Figure 8.2. (Continued) 
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drive 
clutch 
disengages 
r Operator 
error. MV 
Vg left 
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motor 
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Pump 
1-CS-P-lB 
fails 
to start , 
/^ailur^ 
in elec. 
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X^tart/ 
-ai  
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Figure 8.2. (Continued) 
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OR 
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Spray 
system B 
nozzles 
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Check 
valve IB 
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|A10 
/ Pump 
! l-CS-p-lB\ 
discontinues 
\ running / 
Failure 
in cont. 
circuit 
closes 
V MOV . 
^ Motor N 
drive 
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Figure 8.2. (Continued) 
A7 A8 
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Motor fails 
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Xtorque/ 
inadvert­
ently 
V closes , 
Figure 8-2. (Continued) 
A12 All AlO 
Check 
Valve IB 
fails 
closed 
Spray 
system B 
nozzles 
plugged 
/ Pump \ 
f 1-CS-P-lB 
discontinuai 
\ running y 
in i 
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Insufficient fluid 
flow to CSIS nozzles 
in containment 
Top 
A13 B4 A16 B2 B3 B5 B1 
ATKICSL ATKICSM AVTOOOD ACCMIHK ACCMIJK BTC02BJ BTC02AJ 
Figure 8.3. The simplified fault tree of the CSIS 
AA 
AC 
6 cTS 
A2 A1 A5 
AOVOOOB AMV0V4A ALFOOSD 
A4 
AMV0V2A 
Figure 8.3. (Continued) 
U) 
Ô Ô 
A6 A3 
ACLOOOE AOVOCSC 
AF 
A2 Al 
AOVOOOB AMV0V4A ALFOOSD 
Figure 8.3. (Continued) 
Ô O 
A6 A3 
ACLOOOE AOVOCSC 
Al 3 Al 5 Al 4 
AD 
A8 A9 A7 AlO Ail Al 2 
BTC02BJ ACBOOOK ACCOOOK AELOOOF APMOOOG APMISSG APMICSH ACVOIAI ANZOOOD 
Figure 8.3. (Continued) 
Al 4 Al 5 Al 6 
ACBOOOK ACCOOOK BTC02AJ 
Al 2 Ail AlO 
AELOOOF APMOOOG APMISSG APMICSH ACVOIAI ANZOOOD 
Figure 8.3. (Continued) 
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Al = operator error. MV, V4 left closed = AMV0V4A; 
A2 = failure in containment circuitry closes MOV = AOVOOOB; 
A3 = MOV CS 100 A or B inadvertently closes = AOVOCSC; 
A4 = operator error. MV, V2 is left open = AMV0V2A; 
A5 = line filter in A or B suction is plugged = ALFOOSD; 
A6 = motor drive clutch disengages = ACLOOOE; 
A7 = electric motor fails to deliver sufficient torque = AELOOOF; 
A8 = failure in electrical controls cause pump not to 
start = APMOOOG; 
A9 = pump 1-SS-p-lB or lA fails to start = APMISSG; 
AlO = pump 1-CS-p-lB or lA discontinues running = APMICSH; 
All = check valve IB or lA fails to close = ACVOlAI; 
A12 = spray systems B or A nozzles plugged = ANZOOOD; 
A13 = CLCS train 2B circuit fails to command pumps and 
valves BTC02BJ; 
A14 = no 480V-AC power available to pump motor circuit 
breaker — ACBOOOK; 
A15 = no 125V-DC available to pump control circuits ACCOOOK; 
A16 = CLCS train 2A circuit fails to command pumps and 
valves = BTC02AJ; 
B1 = RWST (lCS-TK-1) rupture = ATKICSL; 
B2 = undetected RWST(lCS-TK-1) leakage = ATKICSL; 
B3 = RWST 8" vent plugged = AVTOOOD; 
B4 = no 4 80V-AC power available to MCC lH-2 = ACCMIHK; 
B5 = no 480V-AC power available to MCC lJl-2 = ACCMIJK. 
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8.3.2. PREP and KITT codes description 
The PREP code is designed to accept an input descrip­
tion of the system's fault trees, generate the appropriate 
logical equivalent, and obtain the system's minimal cut or 
path sets. A minimal cut set is the smallest set of system 
components which, when failed, will cause the system to 
fail. A minimal cut set is defined to be in the failed 
or nonfunctioning state if and only if all of its components 
are in the failed state and is defined to be in the non-
failed or functioning state if and only if at least one of 
its components is in the functioning state (58). 
These minimal cut sets (failure mode) or the minimal 
path sets (success modes) can then be used by the KITT codes 
to obtain reliability information about the system. The 
PREP code is composed of two sections : TREBIL reads the 
input and generates the logical equivalent of the fault 
tree, and MINSET obtains the minimal cut or path sets of 
the tree. Detailed description of the PREP code and its 
input data is given in Appendix C (60). 
After having obtained either the minimal cut sets or 
the minimal path sets, the fault tree is then evaluated by 
running the KITT code to obtain the probability character­
istics of the components. These probability characteristics 
include: (1) the probability of the failure existing at 
time t (the "unavailability"); (2) the probability of the 
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failure not occurring to the time t (the "reliability"); 
(3) the expected number of failures occurring to time t; 
(4) the failure rate at time t; and the failure intensity 
at time t (X). Detailed description of the KITT code and 
its input data are given in Appendix D (60). 
8.3.3. The PREP run for the CSIS fault tree 
The simplified fault tree shown in Fig. 8.3 represents 
the input to the PREP codes. Each primary event on the 
fault tree is assigned an arbitrary unique name. Each 
gate is then coded on an input card. This card gives the 
name of the gates and/or primary event attached to the gate. 
Besides the simplified fault tree, the input data necessary 
to use the PREP codes are the component failure rate 
(lambdas) and repair times (taus). 
The PREP codes were run three different times for three 
different cases. In the first case, WASH-1400 was used to 
estimate the values of the failure rate A and the repair 
time T. These values are listed in Table 8.1. The fault 
tree shown in Fig. 8.3 was analyzed using the PREP codes, 
and the results are shown in Fig. 8.4. 
In the second case, WASH-1400 was also used to estimate 
the values of the failure rate X and repair time T except 
for human-related events. For those human-related events, 
(CP-Al and CP-A4), the calculated human error rates using 
150 
Table 8.1. 
Component 
symbol 
Estimated values of the failure rates/error 
rates and the repair time/recovery time for the 
components in Fig. 8.3 using data from WASH-
1400 
Failure rates/ 
error rates (X) 
(hours~l) 
Repair time/ 
recovery time 
(hours) 
CP-Al 3 X 10-6 360 
CP-A2 0.0003 X 10-6 10 
CP-A3 0.25 X 10-6 360 
CP-A4 30 X 10-6 360 
CP-A5 0.3 X 10-6 400 
CP-A6 0.8 X 10-6 400 
CP-A7 0.03 X 10-6 360 
CP-A8 30 X 10-6 360 
CP-A9 30 X 10-6 360 
CP-AIO 30 X 10-6 360 
CP-All 28 X 10-6 300 
CP-A12 0.03 X 10-6 4400 
CP-Al3 0.75 X 10-6 400 
CP-A14 0.028 X 10-6 360 
CP-Al5 3.05 X 10-6 360 
CP-A16 13,0 X 10-6 360 
CP-Bl 0.0001 X 10-6 24 
CP-B2 0.0001 X 10*6 24 
CP-B3 0.0001 X 10-6 4400 
CP-B4 0.028 X 10-6 360 
CP-B5 0.028 X 10-6 360 
«JREBIL FALLT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
NUMBER OF GATES.NG 14 
COMBO STARTING VALUE.MIN 1 
COMBO ENDING VALUE.MAX 5 
CUT SET - PATH SET SWITCH.IDEXl 0 
M 
U1 
PRINT - PUNCH SWITCH.IDEX2 1 
MONTE CARLO STARTER.MCS 0 
NO. OF RANDCk NUMBERS TO REJECT.NREJEC 0 
NO. CF MONTE CARLO TRIALS.NTR 0 
MIXING PARAMETER SWITCH.IREN 0 
MONTE CARLO MIXING PARAMETER.TAA-- .0 
Figure 8.4. Output of PREP computations 
*TRE8IL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
THIS IS THE SUBROUTINE GENERATED BY TREBIL 
SUBROUTINE TREE 
LOGICAL TOP,A( 500)»X( 5001 
COMMON/TREES/A,X.TOP 
A( 1 ) = X( 1 ).AND.X( 2) 
A( 2) = X( 3).AN0.X( 4) 
A( 3) X( 5).0R.X( 6) .OR .X( 4) 
A( 4) = X( 7).0R.X( 8). OR .X( 9) .OR .X t 10) 
* .OR. X( 11).OR. X( 12) 
A( 5) = X( 13).0R.X( 14).OR .X( 15) .OR • Xt 16) 
* .OR . X( 17).OR. X( 16) 
A( 6) = X( 3).0R.X( 5).OR .X( 6) 
A( 7) = x c  7).0R.X( 8).OR .X( 9) .OR .Xt 10) 
* . OR •» X< 11).OR. X( 12) 
AC 8) = X( 13 ).OR.X( 14).OR .X( 15) .OR .Xt 16) 
* . OR •» X( 17).OR. XI 18) 
A( 9 )  A( 2 ) .OR.A( 1) 
A( 10) s A( 5).0R.A( 4). OR .A( 3) 
A( 11) s A( 8 ).0R.A( 7).OR .At 6) 
A( 12) s A( 9) 
* .OR.. X( 19).OR. X( 20) .OR. X( 21 ) 
A( 13) At 11).AND.A( 10) 
A( 14) = A( 13).OR.A* 12) 
TOP = A( 14% 
RETURN 
END 
Figure 8.4. (Continued) 
»W W4f *f W Wf4» WW w^v^ w w9 
aiREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM * 
v*C:)<:4*****004:*vv***4^ <:*:r*vC0**:!::^ :!:Aa6A&:&6&:&66±aa6aaaf:aAaaaaaaAAa AAA AAA A6AA AAA AAA^ TrAA ifwvv»«ifvywfw»"ywvifwwwvvyv"ww^ww*^«^ 
CSIS SAFTV ANALYSIS 
COMPONENT INDICES. NAMES. AND FAILURE RATES (PER HOUR) -
TREE INDEX COMPONENT NAME LAMBDA<FAILURE INTENSITY/HR.) TAU 
1 CP-B4 2.800000-08 3.600000 02 
z CP-B5 2.80000D-08 3.600000 02 
3 CP-A13 7.500000-07 4.OOOOOD 02 
4 CP-A16 1.300000-05 3.600000 02 
5 CP-A14 2 .80000D-OB 3.600000 02 
6 CP-A15 3.05000D-06 3.600000 02 
7 CP-A7 3:000000-06 3.60000D 02 
8 CP-A8 3.00000D-05 3.60000D 02 
9 CP-A9 3.000000-05 3.600000 02 
10 CP-AIO 3.000000-05 5.000000-01 
11 CP-All 2.8OOO0D-0S 3.000000 02 
12 CP-A12 3.000000-08 4.400000 03 
13 CP-Al 3.000000-06 3.60000D 02 
14 CP-A2 3.00000D-10 1.OOOOOD 01 
15 CP-A3 2.500000-07 3.60000D 02 
16 CP-A4 3.00000D-05 3.60000D 02 
17 CP-A5 3.000000-07 4.000000 02 
18 CP-A6 8.00000D-07 4.OOOOOD 02 
19 CP-Bl 1.000000-10 2.400000 01 
20 CP-B2. 1.OOOOOD-10 2.40000D 01 
21 CP-B3 l.OOOOOD-10 4.40000D 03 
Figure 8.4. (Continued) 
4TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
NAME TYPE INPUTS -
TOP OR 2 0 GT-A GT-B 
6T-A AND 2 0 GT-AA GT-AB 
GT - B  OR 1 3 GT-BA CP-Bl CP-B2 CP-B3 
GT-AA OR 9 0 GT-AC GT-AD GT-AE 
GT-AB OR 3 0 GT-AF GT-AG GT-AH 
GT-AC OR 0 6 CP-Al CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A4 CP-A5 CP-A6 
GT-AD OR 0 6 CP-A7 CP-A8 CP-A9 CP-AIO CP-All CP-A12 
GT-AE OR 0 3 CP-A13 CP-A14 CP-A15 
GT-AF OR 0 6 CP-Al CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A 4 CP-A5 CP-A6 
GT-AG OR 0 6 CP-A7 CP-AS CP-A9 CP-AlO CP-All CP-A12 
GT-AH OR 0 3 CP-A14 CP-A15 CP-A16 
GT-EA OR 2 0 GT-BB GT-BC 
GT-BB ANC 0 2 CP-A 1:1 CP-A16 
GT-EC AND 0 2 CP-B4 CP-B5 
END 0 0 
Figure 8.4. (Continued) 
<:TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
TREE INDEX GATE NAME INPUTS--
1 GT-BC AND CP-B4 CP-B5 
2 6T-BB AND CP-A13 CP-A16 
3 GT-AH OR CP-A14 CP-A15 CP-A16 
4 GT-AG OR CP-A7 CP-A8 CP-A9 CP-AIO CP-All 
5 GT-AF OR CP-Al CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A4 CP-A 5 
6 GT-AE OR CP-A13 CP-A14 CP-A15 
7 GT-AD OR CP-A7 CP-A8 CP-A9 CP-AlO CP-All 
8 GT-AC OR CP-Al CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A4 CP-A5 
9 GT-BA OR GT-BB GT-BC 
10 GT-AB OR GT-AF GT-AG GT-AH 
11 GT-AA OR GT-AC GT-AD GT-AE 
12 GT-B OR GT-BA CP-Bl CP-B2 CP-B3 
13 GT-A AND GT-AA GT-AB 
14 TOP OR GT-A GT-B 
CP-A12 
CP-A6 
CP-A12 
CP-A6 
Figure 8.4. (Continued) 
W 2^ sAS Sh sAî îftîflîlSiîfe tV *V #"# 
TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM* 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
TREE INDEX COMPONENT NAME NUMBER OF GATES INPUT GATES INPUT 
1 CP-B4 1 6T-BC 
2 CP-a5 1 GT-BC 
3 CP-A13 2 GT-BB GT-AE 
4 CP-A 16 2 GT-BB GT-AH 
5 CP-A 14 2 GT-AH GT-AE 
6 CP-A 15 2 GT-AH GT-AE 
7 CP-A7 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
8 CP-A 8 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
9 CP-A9 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
10 CP-A 10 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
11 CP-A 11 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
12 CP-A12 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
13 CP-Al 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
14 CP-A2 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
15 CP-A3 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
16 CP-A4 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
17 CP-AS 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
18 CP-A6 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
19 CP-E l 1 GT-B 
20 CP-EI2 1 GT-B 
21 CP-e3 1 GT-B 
Figure 8.4. (Continued) 
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LERs presented in Section 7.3. were used. These values are 
listed in Table 8.2. The fault tree shown in Fig. 8.3 was 
analyzed again using the PREP codes, and the results are 
shown in Fig. 8.5. 
Table 8.2. Estimated values of the failure rates/error 
rates and the repair time/recovery time for thç 
components in Fig. 8.3 using data extracted 
from LERs 
Component 
symbol 
Failure rates/ 
error rates (X) 
(hours"!) 
Repair time/ 
recovery time 
(hours) 
CP-Al 0.198 X 10-6 360 
CP-A2 0.0003 X 10-6 10 
CP-A3 0.25 X 10-6 360 
CP-A4 0.298 X 10-6 360 
CP-A5 0.3 X 10-6 360 
CP-A6 0.8 X lO"® 400 
CP-A7 0.03 X 10"® 360 
CP-A8 30 X 10-6 360 
CP-A9 30 X 10-6 360 
CP-AIO 30 X 10"® 360 
CP-Al1 28 X 10-6 300 
CP-A12 0.03 X 10-6 4400 
CP-Al3 0.75 X 10-6 400 
CP-A14 0.028 X 10-6 360 
CP-Al5 3.05 X 10-6 360 
CP-Al6 13.0 X 10-6 360 
CP-Bl 0.0001 X 10-6 24 
CP-B2 0.0001 X 10-6 24 
CP-B3 0.0001 X 10-6 4400 
CP-B4 0.028 X 10-6 360 
CP-B5 0.028 X 10-6 360 
*TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
NUMBER OF GATES,NG 14 
COMBO STARTING VALUE.MIN 1 
COMBO ENDING VALUE.MAX — 5 uî 
00 
CUT SET - PATH SET SWITCH. IDEXl 0 
PRINT - PUNCH SWITCH.IDEX2 1 
MONTE CARLO STARTER.MCS 0 
NO. OF RANDOM NUMBERS TO REJECT.NREJEC—--- 0 
NO. OF MONTE C ARLO TRIALS .NTR 0 
MIXING PARAMETIER SWITCH, IREN 0 
MONTE CARLO MIXING PARAMETER .TAA .0 
Figure 8.5. Output of PREP computations 
********************** 
«TREBIL FAtLT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
**************************************************************************< 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
NAME TYPE INPUTS— --
TOP OR 2 0 GT-A GT-B 
GT-A AND 2 0 GT-AA GT-AB 
GT-B OR 1 3 GT-BA CP-BL CP-B2 CP-B3 
GT-AA OR 3 0 GT-AC GT-AD GT-AE 
GT-AB OR 3 0 GT-AI- GT-AG GT-AH 
GT-AC OR 0 6 CP-A;I CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A4 CP-A5 CP -A6 
GT-AO OR 0 6 CP-A7 CP-A8 CP-A9 CP-AIO CP-All CP -A12 
GT-AE OR 0 3 CP-A-13 CP-A14 CP-A15 
GT-AF OR 0 6 CP-A JL CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A4 CP-A5 CP -A6 
GT-AG OR 0 6 CP-A7 CP-A8 CP-A9 CP-ALO CP-All CP -A12 
GT-AH OR 0 3 CP-A14 CP-A15 CP-A16 
GT-BA OR 2 0 GT-BB GT-BC 
GT-BB AND 0 2 CP-A13 CP-A16 
GT-BC AND 0 2 CP-B4 CP-B5 
END 0 0 
Figure 8.5. (Continued) 
*TREeiL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
THIÎi IS THE SUBROUTINE GENERATED BY TREBIL 
SLBRQtTliNE TREE 
LOGICAL TOP.A* 500).X( 500} 
COMMON/TREES/A,X,TOP 
A ( 1 > = X( 1 ) .ANO.X( 2) 
A( 2) = X( 3) .AND.XC 4) 
A( 31 = X( 5) .OR.X( 6) .OR.Xf 4) 
A( 4) = X{ 7) .OR.X( 8) .OR.X( 9) a 
•
 
•
 
.X{ 10) 
4 • OR • X( 11).0R. X( 12) 
A( 5) = X( 13) .OR.X( 14).0R.X( 15) .OR .X( 16) 
4 • OR • X< 17).OR. X( 18) 
A( 6) = X( 3 ) •OR.Xt 5).0R.X( 6) 
A( 7) = X( 7) .OR.X( 8) .0R.X( 9) .OR .X( 10) 
* # OR # X( 11 ).0R. X{ 12) 
A( 8 ) = X( 13) .OR.X( 14).0R.X( 15) .OR .X( 16) 
* .OR. X( 17).OR. X( 18) 
A( Ç} = AC 2 ) .OR.Ai 1) 
A( 10) = A{ 5 ) .OR.A( 4 ).0R.A( 3) 
A( 11) = A( 8) .OR.A( 7).0R.A( 6) 
A( 12) = A( 9) 
* .OR. X( 19) .OR. X( 20).OR .X( 21 ) 
A( 12) = A( 11 ) .AND.Ai 10) 
A( 14) = AI 13) .OR.A( 12) 
TCP = A ( 14 ) 
RETURN 
END 
Figure 8.5. (Continued) 
*TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTV ANALYSIS 
CCMPCNENT INDICES. NAMES. AND FAILURE RATES (PER HOUR) 
NDEX COMPONENT NAME LAMBDA(FAILURE INTENSITY/HR.) TAU 
1 CP-B4 2.800000-08 3.600000 02 
2 CP-B5 2.80000D-08 3.600000 02 
3 CP-A13 7.500000-07 4.000000 02 
<i CP-A16 1 .30000D-OS 3.600000 02 
5 CP-A14 2.80000D-08 3.600000 02 
6 CP-A15 3.05000D-06 3.600000 02 
7 CP-A7 3.00000D-08 3.600000 02 
8 CP-Afl 3.000000-05 3.600000 02 
9 CP-A9 3.000000-05 3.600000 02 
10 CP-AIO 3.00000D-05 5.000000-01 
11 CP-All 2.600000-05 3.000000 02 
12 CP-A12 3 .000000-08 4 .400000 03 
13 CP-Al 1 .960000-07 3.600000 02 
14 CP-A2 3.000000-10 1.000000 01 
15 CP-A3 2.500000-07 3.60000D 02 
16 CP-A4 2.980000-07 3.600000 02 
17 CP-A5 3.000000-07 4.000000 02 
IS CP-A6 6.000000-07 4.000000 02 
19 CP-Bl 1.000000-10 2.400000 01 
20 CP-B2 1 .000000-10 2.400000 01 
21 CP-B3 1 .000000-10 4.400000 03 
Figure 8.5. (Continued) 
*TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM * 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
TREE INDEX GATE NAME INPUTS — 
1 GT-BC AND CP-B4 CP-B5 
2 GT-BB AND CP-A13 CP-A16 
3 6T-AH OR CP-A14 CP-A15 CP-A16 
4 GT-AG OR CP-A7 CP-A8 CP-A9 CP-AIO CP-All CP-A12 
5 GT-AF OR CP-Al CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A 4 CP-A5 CP-A6 
6 GT-AE OR CP-A13 CP-A14 CP-A15 
7 GT-AD OR CP-A7 CP-AS CP-A9 CP-AlO CP-All CP-A12 
8 GT-AC OR CP-Al CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A4 CP-A5 CP-A6 
9 GT-BA OR GT-BB GT-BC 
10 GT-AB OR GT-AF GT-AG GT-AH 
11 GT-AA OR GT-AC GT-AD GT-AE 
12 GT-B OR GT-BA CP-Bl CP-B2 CP-B3 
13 GT-A AND GT-AA GT-AB 
14 TOP OR GT-A GT-B 
Figure 8.5. (Continued) 
TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM* 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
TREE INDEX COMPONENT NAME NUMBER OF GATES INPUT GATES INPUT 
1 (:P-B4 1 GT-8C 
2 CP-85 1 GT-8C 
3 CP-A13 2 GT-BB GT-AE 
4 CP-A 16 2 6T-B8 GT-AH 
5 CP-A14 2 GT-AH GT-AE 
6 CP-A 15 2 GT-AH GT-AE 
? CP-A7 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
8 CP-A8 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
9 CP-A9 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
10 CP-AIO 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
11 CP-AL1 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
12 CP-A 12 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
13 CP-AL 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
14 CP-A2 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
15 CP-A3 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
16 CP-A4 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
17 CP-A5 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
18 CP-A6 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
19 CP-BL 1 GT-B 
20 CP-8 2 1 GT-B 
21 CP-8 3 1 6T-B 
Figure 8.5. (Continued) 
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In the third case, WASH-1400 data were used to estimate 
the values of the failure rate X and the repair time T. For 
human events (CP-Al and CP-A4), the calculated human error 
rates using NUREG/CR-1278 presented in Section 7.4 were used. 
These values are listed in Table 8.3. The fault tree shown 
in Fig. 8.3 was analyzed again using the PREP codes, and the 
results are shown in Fig. 8.6. 
In the fourth case, WASH-1400 (1) and the LERs (Sec­
tion 7) were used to estimate the values of the failure 
(human) rate X and repair time T. In this case, sensitivity 
analysis was performed. The reason for doing this is to 
point out the sensitivity of the CSIS reliability perform­
ance to human errors. By examining the fault tree presented 
in Fig. 8.2, two human-related events were found. Those 
events are represented by CP-Al and CP-A4 in the fault tree. 
The sensitivity analysis was performed by following these 
sLeps: 
(a) Keeping CP-Al constant and slightly varying CP-
A4. This variation is presented in Table 
8.4. 
(b) Keeping CP-A4 constant and slightly varying 
CP-Al. This variation is illustrated in Table 
8.5. 
The fault tree shown in Fig. 8.3 was analyzed for 
each point; i.e., seven times for each step using the PREP 
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Table 8.3. Estimated values of the failure rates/error 
rates and the repair time/recovery time for the 
components in Fig. 8.3 using data from NUREG/ 
CR-1278 
Component 
symbol 
Failure rates/ 
e r r o r  r a t e s  ( A )  
(hours"!) 
Repair time/ 
recovery time 
(hours) 
CP-Al 6.25 X 10-G 360 
CP-A2 0.0003 X 10-G 10 
CP-A3 0.25 X 10-G 360 
CP-A4 6.25 X 10-G 360 
CP-A5 0.3 X 10-6 360 
CP-A6 0.8 X 10-G 400 
CP-A7 0.03 X 10-G 360 
CP-A8 30 X 10-G 360 
CP-A9 30 X 10-G 360 
CP-Al0 30 X 10-G 360 
CP-All 28 X 10-G 300 
CP-Al2 0.03 X 10-G 4400 
CP-Al3 6.75 X 10-G 400 
CP-Al4 0.028 X 10-G 360 
CP-A15 3.05 X 10-G 360 
CP-A16 13.0 X 10-* 360 
CP-Bl Û.0001 X 10"- 24 
CP-B2 0.0001 X 10-G 24 
CP-B3 0.0001 X 10-* 4400 
CP-B4 0.028 X 10-* 360 
CP-B5 0.028 X 10-G 360 
*TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTV ANALYSIS 
NUMBER OF GATES.N6 14 
COMBO STARTING VALUE,MIN 1 
COMBO ENDING VALUE.MAX 5 
CUT SET - PATH SET SWITCH.IDEX1-- 0 
(T> 
PRINT - PUNCH SWITCH.IDEX2 1 
MONTE CARLO STARTER.MCS- 0 
NO. OF RANDOM NUMBERS TO REJECT.NREJEC 0 
NO. OF MONTE CARLO TRIALS.NTR-— 0 
MIXING PARAMETER SWITCH.IREN O 
MONTE CARLO MIXING PARAMETER.TAA .0 
Figure 8.6. Output of PREP computations 
*TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTV ANALYSIS 
NAME TYPE INPUTS -
TOP OR 2 0 GT-A GT-B 
GT-A AND 2 0 GT-AA GT-AB 
GT-B OR 1 3 GT-BA CP-Bl CP-B2 CP-83 
GT-AA OR 3 0 GT-AC GT-AD GT-AE 
GT-A8 OR 3 0 GT-AF GT-AG GT-AH 
GT-AC OR 0 6 CP-Al CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A4 CP-A5 CP-A6 
GT-AO OR 0 6 CP-A7 CP-A8 CP-A9 CP-AIO CP-All CP-A12 
GT-AE OR 0 3 CP-A12I CP-A14 CP-A15 
GT-AF OR 0 6 CP-Al CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A4 CP-A5 CP-A6 
GT-AG OR 0 6 CP-A7 CP-A8 CP-A9 CP-AlO CP-All CP-A12 
GT-AH OR 0 3 CP-A14 CP-A16 CP-A16 
GT-BA OR 2 0 GT-BB GT-BC 
GT-BB AND 0 2 CP-A13 CP-A16 
GT-BC AND 0 2 CP-B4 CP-B5 
END 0 0 
Figure 8.6. (Continued) 
STREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
COMPONENT INDICES. NAMES. AND FAILURE RATES (PER HOUR) -
TREE INDEX COMPONENT NAMI: LAMBDA(FAILURE INTENSITY/HR.) TAU 
1 CP-B4 2.80000D-08 3.60000D 02 
2 CP-B5 2.800000-08 3.60000D 02 
3 CP-A13 7.500000-07 4.OOOOOD 02 
4 CP-A16 1.300000-05 3.600000 02 
5 CP-A14 2.800000-08 3.60000D 02 
6 CP-A15 3.05000D-06 3.60000D 02 
7 CP-A7 3.000000-06 3.60000D 02 
8 CP-A8 3.00000D-05 3.60000D 02 M 
9 CP-A9 3.00000D-05 3.60000D 02 
10 CP-AIO 3.00000D-0S 5.00000D-01 
11 CP-All 2.800000-05 3.000000 02 
12 CP-A12 3.000000-08 4.40000D 03 
13 CP-Al 6.25000D-06 3.60000D 02 
14 CP-A2 3.00000D-10 1.OOOOOD 01 
15 CP-A3 2.500000-07 3.60000D 02 
16 CP-A4 6.250000-06 3.60000D 02 
17 CP-A5 3.00000D-07 4.OOOOOD 02 
18 CP-A6 8.000000-07 4.000000 02 
19 CP-Bl l.OOOOOD-10 2.40000D 01 
20 CP-B2 I.OOOOOD-IO 2.40000D 01 
21 CP-83 I.OOOOOD-IO 4.40000D 03 
Figure 8.6. (Continued) 
STREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
I* V wvvwvw nf V* w V w 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
THIS IS THE SUBROUTINE GENERATED BY TREBIL 
SUBROUTINE TREE 
LOGICAL TOP.A( 500).X( 500) 
COMMON/TREES/A.X,TOP 
A( 1) — X( 1 ) •AND.X( 2) 
A( 2 )  - X( 3) .AND.X( 4) 
A( 3) = X( 5) .OR.X( 6).OR • X( 4) 
A( 4) = X( 7) .OR.X* 8) .OR .X( 9) .OR. Xf 10) 
• OR. X( 11).OR. X( 12) 
A( 5) = XI 13) .OR.X( 14).OR .X( 15) .OR. X( 16) 
* .OR. X( 17).OR. X( 18) 
A( 6) = X f  3) .OR.X( 5).OR .X( 6) 
A( 7) = X(f 7) .OR.X( 8) .OR .X( 9) .OR. X( 10) 
* .OR. X( 11).OR. X( 12) 
A( 8) = X([ 13) .OR.Xf 14).OR .X( 15) .OR. X( 16) 
* .OR. X( 17)„0R. X( 16) 
A( 9) = AC 2 ) .OR.A( 1) 
A( 10) = AC 5) .OR.AC 4).OR .A( 3) 
A( 11) = A I 8) •OR.A( 7).OR .A( 6) 
A( 12) = A( 9) 
* .OP. X( 19).OR. XC 20) .OR.X ( 21) 
A( 13) = A( 11 ) .ANO.A( 10) 
A( 14) = AI 13) .OR.A( 12) 
TOP = A( 14 ) 
RETURN 
END 
Figure 8.6. (Continued) 
******************************#*#***< 
STREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
INDEX GATE NAME INPUTS - -
1 GT-BC AND CP-B4 
2 GT-BB AND CP-A13 
3 GT-AH OR CP-A14 
4 GT-AG OR CP-A7 
5 GT-AF OR CP-Al 
6 GT-AE OR CP-A13 
7 GT-AD OR CP-A7 
8 GT-AC OR CP-Al 
9 GT-BA OR GT-BB 
10 GT-AB OR GT-AF 
11 GT-AA OR GT-AC 
12 GT-B OR GT-BA 
13 GT-A AND GT-AA 
14 TOP OR GT-A 
Figure 8.6. (Continued) 
CP-B5 
CP-A16 
CP-A15 CP-A16 
CP-A8 CP-A9 CP-AIO CP-All 
CP-A2 CP-A 3 CP-A4 CP-A5 
CP-A14 CP-A15 
CP-A8 CP-A9 CP-AlO CP-All 
CP-A2 CP-A3 CP-A4 CP-A5 
GT-BC 
GT-AG GT-AH 
GT-AD GT-AE 
CP-Bl CP-B2 CP-B3 
GT-AB 
GT-B 
CP-A 12 
CP-A6 
CP-A12 
CP-A6 
TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM* 
CSIS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
TREE INDEX COMPONENT NAME NUMBER OF GATES INPUT GATES INPUT 
1 CP-B4 1 GT-BC 
2 CP-B5 1 GT-8C 
3 CP-A13 2 GT-BB GT-AE 
4 CP-A16 2 GT-BB GT-AH 
5 CP-A14 2 GT-AH GT-AE 
6 CP-A15 2 GT-AH GT-AE 
7 CP-A7 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
8 CP-A8 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
9 CP-A9 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
10 CP-AIO 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
11 CP-All 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
12 CP-A12 2 GT-AG GT-AD 
13 CP-Al 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
14 CP-A2 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
15 CP-A3 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
16 CP-A4 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
17 CP-A5 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
18 CP-A6 2 GT-AF GT-AC 
19 CP-Bl 1 GT-B 
20 CP-B2 1 GT-B 
21 CP-B3 1 GT-B 
Figure 8.6. (Continued) 
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Table 8.4. Constant human error rates for a constant value 
of CP-Al and different values for CP-A4 
CP-A4 X 10~^ 0.001 0.01 1.0 10 100 1000 
CP-Al X 10-G 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 
codes. In this case, the results from PREP are not shown 
because the results are similar to cases 1 and 2. 
Table 8.5. Constant human error rates for a constant value 
of CP-A4 and different values for CP-Al 
CP-Al X 10"G 0.001 0.01 1.0 10 100 1000 
CP-A4 X 10~® 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.298 
8.4. KITT-1 Results for the CSIS Fault Tree 
8.4.1. Case 1: WASH-1400 
Having obtained the minimal cut sets from the PREPS, the 
KITT-1 code was then run to obtain the probability charac­
teristics associated with insufficient fluid flow to the 
CSIS fault tree. The results from the KITT-1 code include 
insufficient fluid flow to the CSIS system, differential and 
integral characteristics, the inhibit characteristics of 
every component, and the minimal cut sets characteristics. 
The terms and the results from KITT-1 are shown in Appendix 
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E. Some of the component inhibit characteristics resulting 
from the KITT-1 codes run are summarized in Table 8.6. 
Table 8.6. Some CSIS component characteristics resulted 
from KITT-1 code run using data from WASH-1400 
at operation time of 50 hours 
Co„t UnavaUaMU., ,0, 
1 1.01 X 10"^ 1.11 X 10"5 
3 3.0 X 10-4 3.37 X 10-4 
4 4.67 X 10-3 5.18 X 10-3 
6 1.09 X IQ-^ 1.21 X 10"3 
8 1.07 X 10-2 1.19 X 10-2 
10 1.5 X 10"^ 1.19 X 10-2 
11 8.34 X 10-3 1.11 X 10-2 
13 3.6 X 10-7 4.5 X 10-7 
14 3.0 X 10-9 1.2 X 10-7 
16 1.07 X 10-5 1.19 X 10-5 
17 1.19 X 10-4 1.35 X 10-4 
20 2.4 X 10-9 4.0 X 10-8 
The program output symbols are defined as follows: 
T = t, time (in hours); 
Q = c[(t) , the component failed probability; 
W = w(t), the component failure rate (per hour); 
L = the (input) component failure intensity (per hour); 
WSUM = the expected number of failure to time t; and 
FSUM = the probability of one or more failures to time t. 
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The characteristics of some of the minimal cut sets 
obtained from the KITT-1 codes run are summarized in Table 
8.7 where the program output symbols are defined as follows; 
T = t, time (in hours); 
Q = £(t), the minimal cut set failed probability; 
W = w(t), the minimal cut set failure rate (per hour); and 
L = A(t), the minimal cut set failure intensity (per hour). 
Table 8.7, 
Minimal 
cut set 
Some CSIS minimal cut set characteristics re­
sulted from KITT-1 code run using data from 
WASH-1400 at operation time of 50 hours 
Unavailability (Q) 
(per hour) 
Probability of one 
or more failure to 
1 1.01 X 10-5 1.12 X 10"5 
2 1.09 X 10-3 1.22 X 10-3 
4 1.07 X 10-2 1.19 X 10"^ 
6 1.5 X 10-5 1.19 X 10-2 
7 8.35 X 10-3 1.11 X io"2 
9 3.6 X 10-7 4.0 X 10-7 
10 3.0 X 10-9 1.12 X 10-7 
11 8.99 X 10"^ 1.00 X 10"* 
14 3.12 X loT* 3.6 X 10-4 
16 2.4 X 10-9 4.0 X 10-8 
IB 1.01 X 10-10 1.23 X 10-10 
19 1.4 X 10-G 1.54 X 10-6 
Some of the system differential and integral charac­
teristics resulted from the KITT-1 codes run are summarized 
in Table 8.8 and plotted in Figs. 8,7 and 8.8 where the 
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Table 8.8. CSIS differential characteristics resulting 
from KITT-1 code run using data from WASH-1400 
T(hours) Unavailability (Q) (per demand) 
Probability of one 
or more failure to 
time t (FSUM) 
o
 
o
 o
 
o
 
— — 
50.0 6.26 X 10-2 7.76 X 10-2 
100.0 1.25 X lo'i 1.55 X 10 
150.0 1.86 X lo'i 2.32 X 10" 
200.0 2.48 X 10"! 3.09 X 10" 
250.0 3.09 X 10"! 3.86 X 10" 
300.0 3.69 X io"i 4.63 X 10~ 
350.0 4.16 X 10"! 5.39 X 10" 
400.0 4.26 X 10"^ 6.15 X 10" 
500.0 4.25 X 10~^ 7.65 X lO" 
600.0 4.24 X 10"! 9.13 X 10" 
700.0 4.24 X 10"! 1.06 X 10" 
0 
750.0 4.24 X 10"-^ 1.13 X 10 
800.0 4.24 X 10"! 1.20 X 10° 
850.0 4.24 X 10"! 1.27 X 10° 
900.0 4.24 X lo'i 1.34 X 10° 
950.0 4.24 X 10"! 1.41 X 10° 
program output symbols are defined as follows (60); 
T = t, time (in hours) ; 
Q = the upper bound for Qq(1) where Qq(1) is the proba­
bility that the system is in its failed state at 
time t; 
W = the upper bound for Wq(t) (per hour) where Wq(t) 
is the expected number of failures the system will 
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csis shf. analysis 
due human ennors 
o~ 
TIME°°H0UR5 6.00 10.00 CxJO' I 
12.00 0.00 
Figure 8.7. CSIS unavailability based on data from WASH-
1400 
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Figure 8.8. The probability of one or more failures to time 
t for the CSIS based on data from WASH-1400 
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suffer per unit time at time t; 
L = the upper bound for A^ft) (per hour) where Agft) 
is the probability that the system will suffer a 
failure per unit time at time t given it is in its 
functioning state at time t; 
rt 
WSUM = the upper bound for 
ft 
Wfs(t')dt' is the expected number of failures the 0 u 
system will suffer during the time interval from 0 
W«(t')dt' where 
0 
to t; 
FSUM = the upper bound for 1 -[exp -
rt 
A-(t')dt'] where 0 u 
A (t')dt'] is 0 the probability that 
0 " 
1 - exp[-
the system will suffer one or more failures in the 
time interval from 0 to t. 
8.4.2. Case 2: LERs 
Having obtained the minimal cut sets from the PREPS, 
KITT-1 was then run to obtain the probability characteris­
tics associated with insufficient fluid flow to the CSIS 
fault tree. The results from KITT-1 are shown in Appendix E, 
Some of the components and system differential and inte­
gral characteristics resulting from the KITT-1 code run are 
summarized below in Tables 8.9 and 8,10 and plotted in Figs. 
8.9 and 8.10 where the program output symbols are defined 
as follows (60): 
T = t, time (in hours); 
or 1 
1 
3 
4 
6 
8 
10 
11 
13 
14 
16 
17 
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Some CSIS component characteristics resulting 
from KITT-1 code run using data from LERs at 
operation time t of 50 hours 
unavailability ,Q, 
'per hour) time t (FSUM) 
1—1 o
 
rH 
X 10-5 2.66 X 10-5 
2.99 X 10-5 7.12 X 10-4 
4.66 X 10-3 1.23 X 10-2 
1.1 X 10-3 2.89 X 10-3 
1.07 X 10-2 2.81 X 10-2 
1.5 X 10-4 2.81 X 10-2 
8.33 X 10-3 2.63 X 10-2 
7.13 X 10-5 1.88 X 10-4 
3.00 X 10-9 2.85 X 10-7 
1.07 X 10-4 2.83 X 10-4 
1.2 X 10-4 2.85 X 10-4 
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Table 8.10. 
T(hours) 
Some CSIS system characteristics resulting 
from KITT-code run using data extracted 
from LERs 
Unavailability (Q) 
(per demand) 
Probability of one 
or more failure to 
time t (FSUM) 
o
 
o
 O
 
o
 
— 
50.0 4.65 x 10-2 6.14 x 10-2 
100.0 9.26 x lO'^ 1.23 x lO"^ 
150.0 1.38 x IQ-^ 1.84 x 10"^ 
200.0 1.84 x 10"^ 2.45 x 10-1 
250.0 2.29 x 10"! 3.05 x 10-1 
300.0 2.75 x 10~^ 3.66 x 10-1 
350.0 3.06 x IQ-l 4.26 x 10-1 
400.0 3.12 x 10"^ 4.87 x 10-1 
450.0 3.12 x 10"^ 5.46 x 10-1 
500.0 3.12 x 10"! 6.06 x 10-1 
550.0 3.12 x lo'i 6.65 x 10-1 
600.0 3.12 x 10"^ 7.24 x 10-1 
650.0 3.12 x io"i 7.82 x 10-1 
700.0 3.12 x 10"^ 8.39 x 10-1 
750.0 3.12 x io"i 8.97 x 10-1 
800.0 3.12 x lo'i 9.55 x 10-1 
850.0 3.12 x 10"^ 1.01 x 10° 
900.0 3.12 x io"i 1.07 x 10° 
950.0 3.12 x 10"! 1.12 x 10° 
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Figure 8.9. CSIS unavailability based on data extracted 
from LERs 
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Figure 8.10. Probability of one of more failures to time t 
for CSIS based on data extracted from LERs 
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W = the upper 
Q = the upper 
L = the upper 
bound for Qq(1)^; 
bound for Wgft)^ (per hour); 
bound for ApCt)^ (pher hour); 
WSUM = the upper bound for 
ft 1 
-  0  W o ( t ' )  d t  
FSUM = the upper bound for 
ft 
Agft') dt']l ; 1 - exp[-
8.4.3. Case 3: NUREG/CR-1278 
Having obtained the minimal cut sets from the PREPS, 
KITT-1 was then run to obtain the probability characteris­
tics associated with insufficient fluid flow to the CSIS 
fault tree. The results from KITT-1 are shown in Appendix E. 
Some of the system differential and integral character­
istics resulting from the KITT-1 code run are summarized be­
low in Table 8.11 and plotted in Figs. 8.11 and 8.12, where 
the program output symbols are defined as follows (60): 
T = t, time (in hours); 
Q = the upper bound for Qq(1)^; 
W = the upper bound for W^ft)^ (per hour); 
L = the upper bound for AQ(t)^ per hour); 
WSUM = the upper bound for 
1 Definition of these terms is given in Section 8.4.1. 
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Table 8.11, 
T(hours) 
Some CSIS system characteristics resulting 
from KITT-1 code run using data extracted 
from NUREG/CR-1278 " 
Unavailability (Q) 
(per demand) 
Probability of one 
or more failure to 
time t (FSUM) 
o
 
o
 
0.0 — 
50.0 5.24 x 10-3 6.74 x 10-3 
100.0 1.04 x 10-2 1.34 x 10-2 
150.0 1.56 x 10-2 2.01 x 10-2 
200.0 2.07 x 10-2 2.68 x 10-2 
250.0 2.59 x 10-2 3.35 x 10-2 
300.0 3.10 x 10-2 4.01 x 10-2 
350.0 3.47 x 10-2 4.68 x 10-2 
400.0 3.54 x 10-2 5.34 x 10-2 
450.0 3.54 x 10-2 5.99 x 10-2 
500.0 3.54 x 10-2 6.64 x 10"2 
550.0 3.54 x 10-2 7.29 x 10-2 
600.0 3.54 x 10-2 7.93 x 10-2 
650.0 3.54 x 10-2 8.57 x 10"2 
700.0 3.53 x 10-2 9.20 x 10-2 
750.0 3.53 x 10-2 9.83 x 10-2 
800.0 3.53 x 10-2 1.04 x 10-1 
850.0 3.53 x 10~2 1.11 x 10"^ 
900.0 3.53 x 10-2 1.17 x 10"^ 
950.0 3.53 x 10-2 1.23 x IQ-l 
FSUM = the upper bound for 
1 - exp [- A Q ( t ' ) d t ' ] l  .  
Definition of these terms is given in Section 8.4.1. 
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Figure 8.11. CSIS unavailability based on data extracted 
from NUREG/CR-1278 
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Figure 8.12. Probability of one or more failures to time t 
for CSIS based on data extracted from NUREG/ 
CR-1278 
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8.4.4. Case 4: Sensitivity of CSIS reliability 
to human errors 
As was mentioned earlier in Section 8.3.3 (the fourth 
case), two steps were described for performing the CSIS 
sensitivity analysis. These two steps are: 
(a) Keeping the human error rate for CP-Al constant 
and varying it for CP-A4. The PREP codes were 
then run for each point. 
(b) Keeping human error rate for CP-A4 constant and 
varying it for CP-Al. The PREP codes were then 
run for each point. 
Having obtained the minimal cut sets from the PREPs, KITT-1 
was then run seven times to obtain the probability charac­
teristics associated with insufficient fluid to the CSIS 
fault tree. The whole results from KITT-1 are not shown 
because they are similar to the other cases. 
Some of the system differential and integral charac­
teristics resulting from each KITT-1 code run are presented 
in Table 8.12a for step (a) and in Table 8.12b for step (b) 
and plotted in Figs. 8.13 through 8.16 where the program 
output symbols are defined as follow: 
A = human error rate (hr ; 
Q = the upper bound for Qr,(t)^; 
'0 
FSUM = the upper bound for 
1 - exp [- ^ A (f) dt']l . 
^Definition of these terms is given in Section 8.4.1. 
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Table 8.12a. Some CSIS characteristics 
KITT-1 code runs for step 
(t = 0, to 50 hours) 
resulting from 
(a) at time t 
Human error rate 
for CP-A4 (hr-1) 
Unavailability (Q) 
(per demand) 
Probability of one 
or more failure to 
time t (FSUM) 
10-9 4.63 X 10-3 6.126 X 10-3 
10-8 4.631 X 10-3 6.127 X 10-3 
10-7 4.636 X 10-3 6.132 X 10-3 
10-G 4.681 X 10-3 6.176 X 10-3 
IQ-S 5.127 X 10-3 6.627 X 10-3 
10-4 9.563 X 10-3 1.111 X 10-2 
10-3 5.018 X 10"^ 5.485 X 10-2 
Table 8.12b. Some CSIS characteristics resulting from 
KITT-1 code runs for step (b) at time t 
(t = 0, to 50 hours) 
Human error rate 
for CP-Al (hr-1) 
Unavailability (Q) 
(per demand) 
Probability of one 
or more failure to 
time t (FSUM) 
10-9 
10"® 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
-7 
- 6  
-5 
-4 
-3 
4.636 X 10-3 
-3 4.537 X 10 
4.641 X 10 
4.685 X 10 
5.133 X 10 
9.568 X 10 
5.018 X 10 
-3 
-3 
-3 
-3 
- 2  
6.131 X 10-3 
6.132 X 10"3 
,-3 6.136 X 10 
6.182 X 10 
6.631 X 10 
1.111 X 10 
5.485 X 10 
-3 
-3 
- 2  
- 2  
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Figure 8.13. Unavailability for CSIS as a function of operator error rates 
at time 0 to 50 hours 
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Figure 8.14. Probability of one or more failures to time 50 hours for CSIS as 
a function of operator error rates 
CQ_ CSIS SEN.ANALYSIS 
FOR CP-A4 CONSTANT 
eo. 
? 
..o 
co­
rn 
10"® 
LAMBDA (HOURS"^) 
-8 10-' 
Figure 8.15. Unavailability for CSIS as a function of operator error rates 
at time 0 to 5 0 hours 
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Figure 8.16. Probability of one or more failures to time 50 hours for CSIS as a 
function of operator error rates 
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8.4.5. Discussion of the results 
The CSIS unavailability, Q, and the probability of one 
or more failure at the operation time t, FSUM, for the three 
cases described in section 8.3.3 are presented in Figs. 8.7 
through 8.12. By reviewing these figures, one can notice 
that the unavailability, Q, for the three cases increases 
as the operation time t increases (t = 0 to 950 hours). As 
the operation time reaches 360 hours, the unavailability, 
Q, becomes flat. The reason is that time (i.e., the 360 
hours) corresponds to the average repair time of the com­
ponents which are presented in Tables 8.1 through 8.3. In 
other words, as the operation time t increases (t = 0 to 
360 hours), the unavailability, Q, increases linearly with 
time (Q = At). But, as the operation time t reaches the 
average repair time (360 hours), no significant changes in 
the unavailability takes place (Q = XT^, = repair time) 
and the flat curve is reached. The FSUM increases as the 
operation time, t, increases. 
The results from the KITT-1 code output for the three 
cases described in section 8.3.3 are summarized in Table 
8.13. The results in this table show that the predicted 
unavailability, Q, and the FSUM of the CSIS using LERs are 
lower than those results obtained using WASH-1400 and 
NUREG/CR-1278. 
Tables 8.12a and 8.12b describe the results obtained 
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Table 8.13. KITT-1 output results 
Probability of one 
Source of Unavailability, Q, or more failure at 
the data at time t = 50 hours time t = 50 hours 
WASH-1400 6.26 X 10"^ 7.76 x 10"^ 
NUREG/CR-1278 5.24 X 10"^ 6.74 x 10"^ 
LERs 4.65 x 10"^ 6.14 x lO"^ 
from the sensitivity analysis. This analysis was explained 
in more detail in section 8.3.3. Table 8.12a describes the 
results obtained by keeping the operator error rate for 
CP-Al constant and varying it for CP-A4, while Table 8.12b 
illustrates the results obtained by keeping the error rate 
for CP-A4 constant and varying it for CP-Al. These results 
are also shown in Figs. 8.13 through 8.16. As can be seen 
by inspection of the results shown in these figures, the 
unavailability, Q, and the FSUM increases as the operator 
error increases. This increase or change takes place slowly 
at operator error rate values in the ranges frOiu 10 ® to 
10 ^ (error/hour) and changes very rapidly at the higher 
values (above 10 ^  error/hour). The reason for this is 
that most of the component failure rates lie in the lower 
range (i.e., 10 ^ to 10 ^ failure/hour). At the lower 
part of these curves, the Q and the FSUM are dominated by 
the component failures and at the higher part of the curve 
they are dominated by human failures. 
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8.5. CHRS Unavailability Fault Tree 
8.5.1. CHRS fault tree description 
It is easy to understand the fault tree given in Fig. 
8.17 by examining the simplified flow diagram of the CHRS 
given in Fig. 5.3. 
The top event is considered to be that 3 of 4 heat 
exchangers (HE) do not remove sufficient heat from the 
spray fluid, and this will be due to one of the following 
events (mode events in OR gate); 
(1) Three of four HE systems fail when power failure 
occurs. 
(2) Operator error, all HE air vents left closed. 
(3) Three of four HE systems fail (excluding ELEC 
power failures). 
(4) Insufficient water in leak canal. 
As shown in Fig. 8.17, one out of four events must take 
place in order for the top event to occur. 
It was assumed that each of the above mode events 
takes place due to failure of its particular components. 
To make calculations tractable and to keep the significant 
events consistent with the resolution of the data available, 
the above fault tree is reduced before making any calcula­
tions. The reduced fault tree is shown in Fig. 8.18. The 
fault events code is given in Fig. 8.1. The event shown 
CHRS system unavailable 
3 of 4 heat exchangers do 
not remove sufficient heat 
from spray fluid 
3 of 4 Heat exchanger 
system failed when 
power fail occurred 
^ CP-Tl 
Op. error 
<^^all heat exchangers^ 
air vent left 
closed 
CP-T2 
_ or 4^ 
Heat 
J exchangers! 
(system fail) 
(Exluding ELEC. 
power failures) 
Insufficient 
water in 
leak canal 
M 
o 
a» 
Failure of power (IH & 
lA) and heat exchangers 
{IB & ID) 
Failure of power (IJ & 
IB) and heat exchangers 
HA & ic) 
Figure 8.17. CHRS fault tree 
Loss ^ 
of 
off-site 
power 
Failure 
in MOV 
power 
CKT 
Figure 8.17. (Continued) 
Cp-A2 Cp-A3 
Insufficient 
480V on bus 
24-1 
Canal 
level sensor 
fails 
Single and double failure 
which allow the intake 
canal to drain 
CP-A6 
Power bus failures Failure of H.E. IB or ID 
Insufficient voltage 
(125) V DC) from bus lA 
to control circuit 
Insufficient voltage 
(480 V AC) from bus 
IH to pump 
Heat exchanger 
IB fails 
Heat exchanger 
ID fails 
vo 
<n 
Cp-Bl 
'JK00\ 
Cp-B5 
MOV^ 
SW-105B 
inadvert­
ently 
closed 
MOV 
SW-104B 
inadvert 
ently 
closed 
MOV 
SW-104D 
inadvert­
ently 
closed 
nhibits 
flow thru. 
nhibits 
flow thru. 
Cp-B8 
HOV~ 
SW-105D 
inadvert­
ently 
closed 
Figure 8.17. (Continued) 
AND 
Failure of H.E 
lA or 1C Power bus failures 
Insufficient voltage 
(480 V AC) from bus 
IJ to pump 
Insufficient voltage 
(125 VDC) from bus IB 
to control circuit 
Heat exchanger 
IC fails 
Heat exchanger 
1A fails 
Cp-310 Cp-B9 
JJOO 'JCOO 
Cp-B5 Xp-B6 Cp-B7 Cp-B8 Cp-B3 Cp-B4 
y^MOV^ 
r SW-105A 
inadvert-
, ently 
\ closed 
/^MOV^ 
( SW-104C 
inadvert-
i ently 
\ closed 
MOV > 
SW-105C 
inadvert­
ently 
V closed J 
40 V^ 
r W-104A 
inadvert-
, ently 
\ closed 
'Air vent 
failure 
inhibits 
flow thru. 
' A i r  v e n t >  
failure 
inhibits 
flow thru. 
Figure 8.17. (Continued) 
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in Figs. 8.17 and 8.18 represent the following; 
T1 = operator error, all HE air vents left closed (this 
event assumed as a primary event) = CAVOOOA; 
T2 = 3 of 4 HE systems fail (excluding ELEC power). This 
event also assumed as a primary event = CHEOOOK; 
A1 = loss of off-site power = COOOOON; 
A2 = canal level sensor fails = CSNOOOO; 
A3 = insufficient 480V on BUS 2H-1 = CBS02HP; 
A4 = failure in MOV power CKT = COVOOOK; 
A5 = valve failure to close = CCVOOOI; 
A6 = failure in MOV CONT, CKT = CCCOOOK; 
Bl = insufficient voltage (125V DC) from Bus lA to control 
circuit = CBSOlAP; 
B2 = insufficient voltage (480V AC) from Bus lA to pump = 
CBSOIHP; 
B3 = air vent failure inhibits flow through HE = CAVOOOQ; 
54 = MOV-SW-104B or A inadvertently closed = GOV04AC; 
B5 = MOV-SW-105B or A inadvertently closed = COV05AC; 
B6 = air vent failure inhibits flow through HE = CAVOOOQ; 
B7 = MOV-SW-104D or C inadvertently closed = COV04CC; 
B8 = MOV-SW-105D or C inadvertently closed = COV05CC; 
B9 = insufficient voltage (125V DC) from Bus IB to control 
circuit = CBSOIBP; and 
BIO = insufficient voltage (480V AC) from Bus IJ to pump = 
CBSOIJP. 
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CHRS unavailable, 3 of 4 heat 
exchangers do not remove sufficient 
heat from spray fluid 
O Ô Ô Ô Ô Ô Ô Ô  
T1 T2 A1 A4 A5 A6 A2 A3 
CAVOOOA CHEOOOK COOOOON COVOOOK CCVOOOI CCCOOOK CSNUUUU CBS02HP 
Figure 8.18. The simplified fault tree of the CSIS 
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A 
A ^  r#-0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
B1 32 83 B4 85 .86 87 .88 
CBS01AP CBSOIHP CAVOOOQ C0V04AC C0V05AC CAVOOOQ C0V04CC C0V05CC 
Figure 8.18. (Continued) 
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ô ô ô ô ô ô ô ô  
B9 BIO 
CBSOIBP CBSOlOP 
B3 B4 B5 36 B7 B8 
CAVOOOg C0V04AC C0V05AC CAVOOOQ C0V04CC C0V05CC 
Figure 8.18. (Continued) 
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8.5.2. The PREP run for the CHRS unavailability 
fault tree 
The simplified fault tree shown in Fig. 8.18 repre­
sents the input to the PREP codes. Description of the 
PREP and the KITT codes was previously presented in Sec­
tion 8.3.2. Each unique primary event on the fault tree 
is assigned an arbitrary unique name. Each gate is then 
coded on an input card. This card gives the name of the 
gate and/or primary event attached to the gate. Besides 
the simplified fault tree, the input data necessary to 
use the PREP code are the component failure rate (lambdas) 
and repair times. WASH-1400 is used to estimate the 
values of the failure rate A and the repair time x except 
for human-related events. For those human-related events, 
the calculated human error rates presented in Sections 
7.3.4 and 7.4 were used. The fault tree shown in Fig. 
8.18 was analyzed using the PREP codes three different 
times for three different cases. In the first case, 
WASH-1400 was used to estimate the values of the failure 
rate A and the repair time T. These values are listed 
in Table 8.14. The results of this analysis are shown 
in Fig. 8.19. 
In the second case, WASH-1400 was also used to esti­
mate the values of the failure rate (X) and repair time 
(T) except for human-related events. The calculated human 
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Table 8.14. Estimated values of the failure rates/error 
rates and the repair time/recovery time for the 
components in Fig. 8.18 using data from WASH-1400 
Component Failure rates/ Repair time/ 
symbol error rates (À) recovery time 
(hours"^) (hours) 
CP-Tl 20.0 x 10-G 0 
CP-T2 0.0001 x 10-6 360 
CP-Al 1.25 x 10-G 360 
CP-A2 0.0001 x 10-6 24 
CP-A3 10.3 x 10-6 0 
CP-A4 1.1 x 10-6 30 
CP-A5 12.0 x 10-6 0 
CP-A6 1.3 x 10-6 30 
CP-Bl 1.2 x 10-6 90 
CP-B2 11.0 x 10-6 38 
CP-B3 1.6 x 10-6 40 
CP-B4 0.016 x 10-6 28 
CP-B5 0.26 x 10-6 28 
CP-B6 1.6 x 10-6 40 
CP-B7 0.016 x 10-6 28 
CP-B8 0.26 x 10-6 28 
CP-B9 1.2 x 10~6 90 
CP-BIO 11.0 x 10-6 38 
**************************************************************: 
*TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
NUMBER OF GATES.NG--- 15 
COMBO STARTING VALUE,MIN 1 
COMBO ENDING VALUE.MAX 5 m 
o 
CUT SET - PATH SET SWITCH.IDEXl- 0 
PRINT - PUNCH SWITCH. IDEX2-- — 1 
MONTE CARLO STARTER.MCS 0 
NO. OF RANDOM NUMBERS TO REJECT.NREJEC 0 
NO. OF MONTE CARLO TRIALS.NTR 0 
MIXING PARAMETER SWITCH.IREN-- 0 
MONTE CARLO MIXING PARAMETER.TAA —-—.0 
Figura 8.19. Output of PREP computations 
?TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
THIS IS THE SUBROUTINE GENERATED BY TREBIL 
SUBROUTINE TREE 
LOGICAL TOP.Af 500)«Xt 500) 
COMMON/TREES/A,X,TOP 
( 
OP 
RETURN 
END 
1 )  — X( 1 ).OR.X( 2) .OR .XC 3) 
2) = X( 4).OR.X( 5).OR .XC 6) 
3) Xf 7).0R.X( 8) 
4) = X( D.OR.Xf 2).OR .XC 3) 
5) = x r  4).0R.XC 5).OR .XC 6) 
6) X( 9).0R.X( 10) 
7) = X( 11).0R.X( 12).OR .XC 13) 
8) At 2).OR.AC 1) 
9) = A 'D 5).OR.AC 4) 
101 = At 3).AND.AC 8) 
11 ) A [ 6).AND.AC 9) 
12) = All  7) 
. OR. XC 14).0R.X C 15) 
13) = Ai: 11).OR.AC 10) 
14) 
— At: 
AMD 
12) 
.XC 16) 
15) = AC 14).OR.AC 13) 
• OR. XC 17).0R.X C 18) 
= A< 15) 
K> O 
Ln 
Figure 8.19. (Continued) 
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*TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM » 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
COMPONENT INDICES. NAMES. AND FAILURE RATES (PER HOUR) -
TREE INDEX COMPONENT NAME LAMBDA(FAILURE INTENSITY/HR.) TAU 
1 CP-B6 1.600000-06 4.00000D 01 
2 CP-B7 1.60000D-08 2.80000D 01 
3 CP-B8 2.60000D-07 2.80000D 01 
4 CP-B3 1.60000D-06 4.00000D 01 
5 CP-B4 1.600000-08 2.80000D 01 
6 CP-B5 2.600000-08 2.80000D 01 ^ 
7 CP-B9 1.20000D-06 9.00000D 01 
8 CP-BIO 1.100000-05 3.800000 01 
9 CP-Bl 1.200000-06 9.00000D 01 
10 CP-B2 1.100000-05 3.800000 01 
11 CP-A4 1.100000-06 3.000000 01 
12 CP-A5 1.20000D-05 5.000000-01 
13 CP-A6 1.300000-06 3.00000D 01 
14 CP-A2 l.OOOOOD-10 2.400000 01 
15 CP-A3 1.030000-05 5.00000D-01 
16 CP-Al 1.250000-06 3.600000 02 
17 CP-Tl 2.000000-05 5.000000-01 
18 CP-T2 1.000000-10 3.600000 02 
Figure 8.19. (Continued) 
w w w w wv w w w 
*TRE8IL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
NAME TYPE IIMPUTS-- - -
TOP OR 2 2 ST-A GT-B CP-Tl 
GT-A AND 1 1 3T-AB CP-Al 
GT-B OR 2 0 <5T-BA GT-BB 
GT-AB OR 1 2 GT-AC CP-A2 CP-A3 
GT-AC OR 0 3 CP-A4 CP-A5 CP-A6 
GT-BA AND 2 0 GT-BC GT-BO 
GT-BB AND 2 0 GT-BG GT-BH 
GT-BC OR 0 2 CP-Bl CP-B2 
GT-BO OR 2 0 GT-BE GT-BF 
GT-BE OR 0 3 CP-B3 CP-B4 CP-B5 
GT-BF OR 0 3 CP-B6 CP-B7 CP-B8 
GT-BG OR 0 2 CP-B9 CP-BIO 
GT-BH OR 2 0 GT-BI GT-BJ 
GT-BI OR 0 3 CP-B3 CP-B4 CP-B5 
GT-BJ OR 0 3 CP-B6 CP-B7 CP-B8 
END 0 0 
Figura 8.19. (Continued) 
CTREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
INDEX GATE NAME INPUTS --
1 GT-BJ OR CP-B6 CP-B7 CP-B8 
2 GT-BI OR CP-B3 CP-B4 CP-85 
3 GT-BG OR CP-B9 CP-BIO 
4 GT-BF OR CP-B6 CP-B7 CP-B8 
5 GT-BE OR CP-B3 CP-B4 CP-85 
6 GT-BC OR CP-Bl CP-B2 
7 GT-AC OR CP-A4 CP-A5 CP-A6 
6 GT-BH OR GT-BI GT-BJ 
9 GT-BD OR GT-BE GT-BF 
10 GT-BB AND GT-BG GT-BH 
11 GT-BA AND GT-BC GT-BD 
12 GT-AB OR GT-AC CP-A2 CP-A3 
13 GT-B OR GT-BA GT-BB 
14 GT-A AND GT-AB CP-Al 
15 TOP OR GT-A GT-B CP-Tl 
N) O 
00 
CP-T2 
Figure 8.19. (Continued) 
TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM# 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
TREE INDEX COMPONENT NAME NUMBER OF GATES INPUT GATES INPUT 
1 CP-B6 2 GT-BJ GT-BF 
2 CP-B7 2 GT-BJ GT-BF 
3 CP-B8 2 GT-BJ GT-BF 
4 CP-B3 2 GT-BI GT-BE 
5 CP-B4 2 GT-BI GT-BE 
6 CP-B5 2 GT-BI GT-BE 
7 CP-B9 1 GT-BG 
6 CP-BIO 1 GT-BG 
9 CP-Bl 1 GT-BC 
10 CP-B2 1 GT-BC 
11 CP-A4 1 GT-AC 
12 CP-A5 1 GT-AC 
13 CP-A6 1 GT-AC 
14 CP-A2 1 GT-AB 
15 CP-A3 1 GT-AB 
16 CP-Al 1 GT-A 
17 CP-Tl 1 TOP 
18 CP-T2 1 TOP 
Figure 8.19. (Continued) 
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error rates (using LERs) presented in Section 7.3.3 were 
used. These values are listed in Table 8.15. The fault 
tree shown in Fig. 8.18 was analyzed again using the PREP 
codes, and the results are shown in Fig. 8.20. 
Table 8.15. Estimated values of the failure rates/error 
rates and the repair time/recovery time for 
the components in Pig. 8.18 using data ex­
tracted from LERs 
Component 
symbol 
Failure rates/ 
error rates (X) 
(hours"!) 
Repair time/ 
recovery time 
(hours) 
CP-Tl 20.0 x 10-G 0.5 
CP-T2 0.0001 x 10-6 360.0 
CP-Al 1.25 x 10-6 360.0 
CP-A2 0.0001 x 10-6 24.0 
CP-A3 10.3 x 10-6 0.5 
CP-A4 1.1 x 10-6 30.0 
CP-A5 12.0 x 10-6 0.5 
CP-A6 1.3 x 10-6 30.0 
CP-Bl 1.2 x 10"® 90.0 
CP-B2 11.0 x 10"® 38.0 
CP-B3 1.6 x 10-® 40.0 
CP-B4 1.478 x 10-® 28.0 
CP-B5 1.478 x 10-® 28.0 
CP-B6 1.6 x 10-® 40.0 
CP-B7 1.478 x 10-® 28.0 
CP-B8 1.478 x 10-® 28.0 
CP-B9 1.2 x 10"® 90.0 
CP-BIO 11.0 x 10"® 38.0 
*****»****$$*$*:>******$*#****$**************************** 
*TREBIL FAULT TWEE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
NUMBER OF GATESi N6-------- 15 
COMBO STARTING VALUE.MIN — 1 
COMBO ENDING VALUE .MAX —----------- — ----- 5 ^ 
I-" 
CUT SET - PATH SET SWITCH.IDEXl 0 
PRINT - PUNCH SW ITCH, IDEX2 — 1 
MONTE CARLO STARTER,MCS — --------- — - — -— 0 
NO. OF RANDOM NUMBERS TO REJECT,NREJEC—-— 0 
NO. OF MONTE CARLO TRIALS,NTR « —--- 0 
MIXING PARAMETER SWITCH.IREN 0 
MONTE CARLO MIXING PARAMETER .TAA —---------.0 
Figure 8.20. Output of PREP computation 
«TREBIL FAULT irPEE BUILDING PROGRAM 
^ ^  ^  ^  w V ^  s 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
THIS IS THE SUBROUTINE GENERATED BY TREBIL 
SUBROUTINE TREE 
LOGICAL TOP.A* 500)tXC 500) 
COMMON/TREES/A.X.TOP 
OP 
RETURN 
END 
1 )  r: x c  1 ) .OR.XC 2) .OR .XC 3) 
2) =: x c  4  )  .OR.XC 5) .OR .XC 6) 
3) Xf 7) .OR.XC 8) 
4) =: X( 1 ) .OR.XC 2) .OR .XC 3) 
5) Xf 4) .OR.XC 5).OR .XC 6) 
6) =: x c  9) .OR.XC 10) 
7) =: x c  11) .OR.XC 12).OR .XC 13) 
8) =: AC 2) .OR.A C 1) 
9) = AC 5) .OR.AC 4 )  
10) = AC 3) .AND.AC 8) 
11 ) = AC 6) .AND.AC 9) 
12) = AC 7) 
.OR. XC 14).OR. XC 15) 
13) = AC 11 ) .OR.AC 10) 
14) = AC 12) 
.AND .XC 16) 
15) = AC 14) .OR.AC 13) 
.OR. XC 17).OR. XC 18) 
= A< 15) 
NJ H N> 
Figure 8.20. (Continued) 
*TRE8IL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM * 
***$*************$*********** 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
COMPONENT INDICES. NAMES, AND FAILURE RATES (PER HOUR) -
TREE INDEX COMPONENT NAME LAMBDA(FAILURE INTENSITV/HR.) TAU 
1 CP-B6 1.600000-06 4.000000 01 
2 CP-B7 1.47800D-07 2.800000 01 
3 CP-B8 1.47800D-07 2.800000 01 
4 CP-B3 1.60000D-06 4.000000 01 
5 CP-B4 1.47800D-07 2.800000 01 
6 CP-B5 1.478000-07 2.800000 01 
7 CP-B9 1 .200000-06 9.000000 01 
a CP-BIO 1.100000-05 3.800000 01 
9 CP-Bl 1.200000-06 9.000000 01 
10 CP-82 1.100000-05 3.800000 01 
11 CP-A4 1.100000-06 3.000000 01 
12 CP-A5 1.200000-05 5.000000-01 
13 CP-A6 1 .300000-06 3.000000 01 
14 CP-A2 1.000000-10 2.490000 01 
15 CP-A3 1.03000D-05 5.00000D-01 
16 CP-Al 1.250000-06 3.600000 02 
17 CP-Tl 2.000000-05 5.000000-01 
18 CP-T2 1.000000-10 3.60000D 02 
Figure 8.20. (Continued) 
«TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CHRS SAFTV ANALYSIS 
NAME TYPE INPUTS----
TOP OR 2 2 GT-A GT-B CP-Tl 
GT-A AND 1 1 GT-AB CP-Al 
GT-B OR 2 0 GT-BA GT-BB 
GT-AB OR 1 2 GT-AC CP-A2 CP-A3 
GT-AC OR 0 3 CP-A4 CP-A5 CP-A6 
GT-BA AND 2 0 GT-BC GT-BD 
GT-BB AND 2 0 GT-BG GT-BH 
GT-BC OR 0 2 CP-Bl CP-B2 
GT-BD OR 2 0 GT-BE GT-BF 
GT-BE OR 0 3 CP-B3 CP-B4 CP-B5 
GT-BF OR 0 3 CP-B6 CP-B7 CP-B8 
GT-BG OR 0 2 CP-B9 CP-BIO 
GT-BH OR 2 0 GT-BI GT-BJ 
GT-BI OR 0 3 CP-B3 CP-B4 CP-B5 
GT-BJ OR 0 3 CP-B6 CP-B7 CP-B8 
END 0 0 
Figure 8.20. (Continued) 
*TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
TREE INDEX GATE NAME INPUTS— 
1 GT-BJ OR CP-B6 CP-B7 CP-B8 
2 GT-BI OR CP-B3 CP-B4 CP-B5 
3 GT-BG OR CP-B9 CP-BIO 
4 GT-BF OR CP-B6 CP-B7 CP-B8 
5 GT-BE OR CP-B3 CP-B4 CP-B5 
6 GT-BC OR CP-Bl CP-B2 
7 GT-AC OR CP-A4 CP-AG CP-A6 
8 GT-BH OR GT-BI GT-BJ 
9 GT-BD OR GT-BE GT-BF 
10 GT-BB AND GT-BG GT-BH 
11 GT-BA AND GT-BC GT-BD 
12 GT-AB OR GT-AC CP-A2 CP-A3 
13 GT-B OR GT-BA GT-BB 
14 GT-A AND GT-AB CP-Al 
15 TOP OR GT-A GT-B CP-Tl 
Figure 8.20. (Continued) 
$***********>******************************:>****************** 
TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM* 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
TREE INDEX COMPONENT NAME NUMBER OF GATES INPUT GATES INPUT 
1 CP-B6 2 GT-BJ GT-BF 
2 CP-B7 2 GT-BJ GT-BF 
3 CP-B8 2 GT-BJ GT-BF 
4 CP-B3 2 GT-BI GT-BE 
5 CP-B4 2 GT-BI GT-BE 
6 CP-B5 2 GT-BI GT-BE 
7 CP-B9 1 GT-BG 
8 CP-BIO 1 GT-BG 
9 CP-Bl 1 GT-BC 
10 CP-B2 1 GT-BC 
11 CP-A4 1 GT-AC 
12 CP-A5 1 GT-AC 
13 CP*A6 1 GT-AC 
14 CP-A2 1 GT-AB 
15 CP-A 3 1 GT-AB 
16 CP-Al 1 GT-A 
17 CP-Tl 1 TOP 
18 CP-T2 1 TOP 
Figure 8.20. (Continued) 
217 
In the third case, WASH-1400 again was used to estimate 
the values of the failure rate A and the repair time T. For 
human events (CP-B4, CP-B5, CP-B7 and CP-B8), the calculated 
human error rates using NUREG/CR-1278 (11) presented in Sec­
tion 7.4 were used. These values are listed in Table 8.16. 
The fault tree shown in Fig. 8.18 was analyzed again using 
the PREP codes, and the results are shown in Fig. 8.21. 
Table 8.16, 
Component 
symbol 
Estimated values of the failure rates/error 
rates and the repair time/recovery time for the 
components in Fig. 8.18 using data from NUREG/ 
CR-1278 
Failure rates/ 
error rates (X) 
(hours'^) 
Repair time/ 
recovery time 
(hours) 
CP-Tl 20.0 x 
"1 10-f 
0.5 
CP-T2 0.0001 x 360.0 
CP-Al 1.25 x 360.0 
CP-A2 0.0001 x 10-^ 24.0 
CP-A3 10.3 x 10-6 0.5 
CP-A4 1.1 x 10 Î 30.0 
CP-A5 12.0 x 10"® 0.5 
CP-A6 1.3 x 1 0 "  30.0 
CP-Bl 1.2 x 90.0 
CP-B2 11.0 x 10 1 38.0 
CP-B3 1.686 x 10:^ 40.0 
CP-B4 1.786 x 10 ® 28,0 
CP-B5 2.976 x 10-6 
10-6 
28.0 
CP-B6 1.6 x 40.0 
CP-B7 1.786 x 10-6 28.0 
CP-B8 2.976 x 10^ 28.0 
CP-B9 1.2 x 10-6 90.0 
CP-10 11.0 x 10-6 38.0 
$TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
****< 
CHRS SAFTV ANALYSIS 
NUMBER OF GATES.NG — — -— 15 
COMBO STARTING VALUE.MIN - — — 1 (V 
COMBO ENDING VALUE.MAX 5 œ 
CUT SET - PATH SET SWITCH,IDEXl— — 0 
PRINT - PUNCH SWITCH.IDEX2 — -— 1 
MONTE CARLO STARTER.MCS 0 
NO. OF RANDOM NUMBERS TO REJECT.NREJEC----- 0 
NO. OF MONTE CARLO TRIALS »NTR- 0 
MIXING PARAMETER SWITCH. IREN 0 
MONTE CARLO MIXING PARAMETER .TAA-- —.0 
Figure 8.21. Output of PREP computations 
5TREBIL FAULT TWEE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
THIS :tS THE SUBROUTINE GENERATED BY TREBIL 
SUBROUTINE-: TREE 
LOGICAL TOP.A( 500V*X( 500) 
COMMON/TRE-ES/A • X • TOP 
A( 11 XC D.OR.XC 2).OR .XC 3) 
AC 2) x c  4).0R.XC 5).OP .XC 6) 
A( 3) XC 7).0R.XC 8) 
A( 4) = x c  D.OR.XC 2) .OR .XC 3) 
A( 5) = XC 4 ).OR.XC 5) .OR .XC 6) 
AC 6) x c  9).0R.XC 10) 
AC 7 Ï  x c  11).OR.XC 12).OR .XC 13) 
AC 8) AC 2).OR.AC 1) 
AC 9) = AC 5).OR.AC 4) 
AC 10) AC 3).AND.AC 8) 
AC 11) s AC 6).AND.AC 9) 
AC 12) AC 7) 
. OR. XC 14).OR. XC 15) 
AC 13) AC 11 ).OR.AC 10) 
At 14) AC 12) 
. AND .XC 16) 
AC 15) AC 14).OR.AC 13) 
• OR. XC 17).OR. XC 18) 
TOP = At 15) 
RETURN 
END 
Figure 8.21. (Continued) 
STREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDIN': PROGRAM * 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
COMPONENT INDICES. NAMES. AND FAILURE RATES (PER HOUR) -
TREE INDEX COMPONENT NAME LAMBDA(FAILURE INTENSITY/HR.) TAU 
1 CP-B6 1.60000D-06 4.000000 01 
2 CP-B7 1.78600D-06 2.800000 01 
3 CP-B8 2.98000D-06 2.80000D 01 
4 CP-B3 1 .60000D-06 4.000000 01 
5 CP-B4 1.790000-06 2.800000 01 
6 CP-85 2.97600D-06 2.800000 01 
7 CP-B9 1 .200000-06 9.000000 01 
8 CP-BIO 1.lOOOOD-05 3.800000 01 
9 CP-Bl 1 .200000-06 9.000000 01 
10 CP-B2 1.100000-05 3.800000 01 
11 CP-A4 1.100000-06 3.00000D 01 
12 CP-A5 1 .200000-05 5.000000-01 
13 CP-A6 1 .300000-06 3.00000D 01 
14 CP-A2 1.000000-10 2.400000 01 
15 CP-A3 1.030000-05 5.000000-01 
16 CP-Al 1.250000-06 3.60000D 02 
17 CP-Tl 2.000000-05 5.000000-01 
18 CP-T2 1 .000000-10 3.600000 02 
Figure 8.21. (Continued) 
CTREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
NAME TYPE INPUTS— --
TOP OR 2 2 GT-A GT-B CP-Tl 
6T-A AND 1 1 GT-AB CP-Al 
GT-B OR 2 0 GT-BA GT-BB 
GT-AB OR 1 2 GT-AC CP-A2 CP-A3 
GT-AC OR 0 3 CP-A4 CP-A5 CP-A6 
GT-BA AND 2 0 GT-BC GT-BD 
GT-BB AND 2 0 GT-BG GT-BH 
GT-BC OR 0 2 CP-Bl CP-B2 
GT-BD OR 2 0 GT-BE GT-BF 
GT-BE OR 0 3 CP-B3 CP-B4 CP-B5 
GT-BF OR 0 3 CP-B6 CP-B7 CP-B8 
GT-BG OR 0 2 CP-B9 CP-BIO 
GT-BH OR 2 0 GT-BI GT-BJ 
GT-BI OR 0 3 CP-B3 CP-B4 CP-B5 
GT-BJ OR 0 3 CP-B6 CP-B7 CP-B8 
END 0 0 
Figure 8.21. (Continued) 
•TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
TREE INDEX GATE NAME: INPUTS--
1 GT-BJ OR CP-B6 
2 GT-BI OR CP-B3 
3 GT-BG OR CP-B9 
4 GT-BF OR CP-B6 
5 GT-BE OR CP-B3 
6 GT-BC OR CP-Bl 
7 GT-AC OR CP-A4 
8 GT-BH OR GT-BI 
9 GT-BD OR GT-BE 
10 GT-BB AND GT-BG 
11 GT-BA AND GT-BC 
12 GT-AB OR GT-AC 
13 GT-B OR GT-BA 
14 GT-A AND GT-AB 
15 TOP OR GT-A 
Figure 8.21. (Continued) 
CP-B7 
CP-B4 
CP-BIO 
CP-B7 
CP-B4 
CP-B2 
CP-A5 
GT-BJ 
GT-BF 
GT-BH 
GT-BD 
CP-A2 
GT-BB 
CP-Al 
GT-B 
CP-B8 
CP-B5 
CP-B8 
CP-B5 
CP-A6 
CP-A3 
CP-Tl 
to 
to 
to 
CP~T2 
I* •V v ^ V V V 
TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILDING PROGRAM* 
CHRS SAFTY ANALYSIS 
DEX COMPONENT NAME NUMBER OF GATES INPUT GATES INPUT 
1 CP-B6 2 GT-BJ GT-BF 
2 CP "87 2 GT-BJ GT-BF 
3 CP-B8 2 GT-BJ GT-8F 
4 CP-B3 2 GT-BI GT-BE 
5 CP-B4 2 GT-BI GT-BE 
6 CP "85 2 GT-BI GT-BE 
7 CP-89 1 GT-BG 
8 CP"810 1 GT-BG 
9 CP-Bl 1 GT-BC 
10 CP"B2 1 GT-BC 
11 CP "A4 1 GT-AC 
12 CP"A5 1 GT-AC 
13 CP-A6 1 GT-AC 
14 CP-A2 1 GT-AB 
15 CP-A 3 1 GT-AB 
16 CP-Al 1 GT-A 
17 CP-Tl 1 TOP 
16 CP T2 1 TOP 
Figure 8.21. (Continued) 
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8.5.3. KITT-1 results for CHRS unavailability 
fault tree 
8.5.3.1. Case 1: WASH-1400 Having obtained the 
minimal cut sets from the PREPS, the KITT-1 codes were then 
run to obtain the probability characteristics associated 
with "three of four HE in CHRS removing insufficient heat 
from spray fluid using FTA." The results from the KITT-1 
code include system differential and integral characteris­
tics, the inhibit characteristics of every component, and 
the minimal cut sets characteristics. The results from 
KITT-1 are shown in Appendix F. Some of the component 
inhibit characteristics obtained from the KITT-1 codes run 
are summarized in Table 8.17. 
Table 8.17. Some component characteristics resulting from 
KITT-1 run for CHRS using WASH-1400 data (case 
1) at operation time of 60 hours 
component ,a. 
1 6.4 x 10-5 9.6 x 10-5 
3 7.28 x 10"® 1.55 x 10-5 
5 4.48 x 10"^ 9.6 x io~5 
7 7.2 x 10"^ 7.2 x 10-5 
8 4.18 x 10-'^ 6.59 x 10-^ 
11 3.3 x 10-5 9.89 x 10~5 
12 5,9 x 10"® 7.19 x 10-4 
13 3.89 x 10-5 7.8 x 10-5 
15 5.15 x 10"® 6.18 x 10-4 
16 7.49 x 10-5 7.5 x 10-5 
17 9.9 x 10"^ 1.19 x 10-2 
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The program output symbols are defined as follows: 
T = t, time (in hours); 
Q = ^(t), the component failed probability; 
W = w(t), the component failure rate (per hour); 
L = the (input) component failure intensity (per hour); 
WSUM = the expected number of failures to time t; and 
FSUM = the probability of one or more failures to time t. 
The characteristics of some of the minimal cut sets 
obtained from the KITT-1 codes run are summarized in Table 
8.18, where the program output symbols are defined as 
Table 8.18, 
Minimal 
cut set 
Minimal cut set characteristics resulting from 
KITT-1 code run for CHRS using WASH-1400 data 
(case 1) at operation time of 60 hours 
Unavailability (Q) 
(per hour) 
Probability of one 
or more failure to 
time t (FSUM) 
1 
5 
9 
11 
16 
23 
25 
28 
30 
31 
9.99 X 10-6 
2 .62  X  10 " ^ °  
1.48 x 10"^° 
2.4 X 10 ^ 
,-11 1.61 X 10 
2.4 x 10 
1.48 X 10 
2.25 x 10 
8.9 x 10 
1.93 x 10 
-9 
-10 
-10 
-14 
-10 
5.99 
2.71 
1.53 
2.48 
1.67 
2.48 
1.53 
6 . 8 6  
1.01 
5.89 
X 10 
x 10 
x 10 
x 10 
x 10 
x 10 
x 10 
x 10 
x 10 
-4 
-10 
-10 
-9 
-11 
-9 
-10 
-9 
x 10 
-13 
-9 
follows : 
T = t, time (in hours); 
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Q = 3(t) , the minimal cut set failure probability; 
W = w(t), the minimal cut set failure rate (per hour) 
and 
L = A(t), the minimal cut set failure intensity (per 
hour) . 
Some of the system differential and integral charac­
teristics resulting from the KITT-1 codes run are summar­
ized below in Table 8.19 and plotted in Figs. 8.22 and 8.23 
where the program output symbols are defined in Section 
8.4.1. 
Table 8.19. Some system characteristics resulting from 
KITT-1 code run for CHRS using WASH-1400 
data (case 1) 
. Unavailability (Q) Probability of one or 
unours; failure to time t (FSUM) 
o
 
o
 o
 
o
 
3 0 . 0  1 . 0 0 8  X  1 0 - 5  5 . 9 9  X  1 0 - ^  
6 0 . 0  1 . 0 1 4  X  1 0 - 5  1 . 1 9  X  1 0 - ^  
9 0 . 0  1 . 0 1 6  X  1 0 - 5  1 . 7 9  X  i o " 2  
-  . - 5  2 .  9 9  1 5 0 . 0  1 . 0 1 7  X  l U  X  x u  
2 1 0 . 0  1 . 0 1 8  X  1 0 - 5  4 . 1 9  X  1 0 - ^  
2 7 0 . 0  1 . 0 1 9  X  1 0 - 5  5 . 3 8  X  I Q - ^  
3 0 0 . 0  1 . 0 2 0  X  1 0 - 5  5 . 9 8  X  1 0 - 3  
3 3 0 . 0  1 . 0 2 1  X  1 0 - 5  
- 5  
6 . 5 8  X  i o " 3  
—  3  3 6 0 . 0  1 - 0 2 1  X  1 0  7 . 5 8  X  1 0  
4 2 0 . 0  1 . 0 2 1  X  1 0 " 5  8 . 3 7  X  1 0 - 3  
4 8 0 . 0  1 . 0 2 1  X  1 0 - 5  
- 5  
9 . 5 6  X  1 0 - 3  
- 2  5 4 0 . 0  1 . 0 2 1  X  1 0  1 . 0 8  X  1 0  
5 7 0 . 0  1 . 0 2 1  X  1 0 - 5  1 . 1 4  X  1 0 - 2  
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CHRS 5AF. ANALYSIS 
DUE HUMAN ERRORS 
«0. 
Œ _ 
il 
Su: 
TIME.HOURS 
Figure 8.22. Unavailability of the CHRS using WASH-1400 
data (case 1) 
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«c 
m. 
CHHS SBF. BNBLTSIS 
DUE HUMAN ERRORS 
o 
* 
I" 
X 
t£ 
i/x 
X 
(£ 
m. 
o 
X 
b ' ' b ' k' 'b'W 
TIME.HOURS 
"F^  
Figure 8.23. Probability of failure of one or more com­
ponents at time t for the CHRS using WASH-
1400 (case 1) 
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8.5.3.2. Case 2: LERs Having obtained the mini­
mal cut sets from the PREPS, the KITT-1 codes were then run 
to obtain the probability characteristics associated with 
"three of four HE in the CHRS not removing sufficient spray 
fluid," using the fault tree in Fig. 8.18. The results 
from KITT-1 are shown in Appendix F. 
Some of the system differential and integral charac­
teristics resulted from KITT-1 codes run are summarized 
below in Table 8.20 and plotted in Figs. 8.24 and 8.25, 
where the program output symbols are defined in Section 
8.4.1. 
Table 8.20, 
T(hours) 
Some system characteristics resulted from KITT-
1 code run for CHRS using LER data (case 2) 
Unavailability (Q) 
(per demand) 
Probability of one 
or more failure to 
time t (FSUM) 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 X 10"^ 
30.0 1.008 X 10-5 5.99 X l o - ' ^  
60. 0 1.015 10-5 1 .  1 P V  1 n-^ 
90.0 1.017 X 10-5 1.79 X 10-^ 
150.0 1.018 X 10"5 2.99 X 10"^ 
210.0 1.019 X 10-5 4.19 X 10-^ 
270.0 1.020 X 10"^ 5.39 X 10-3 
300.0 1.021 X 10"^ 5.98 X 10-3 
330.0 1.021 X 10"^ 6.58 X 10-3 
360.0 1.022 X i o " 5  7.18 X 10-3 
420.0 1.022 X 10-5 8.37 X 10-3 
480.0 1.022 X 10-5 9.56 X 10-3 
540.0 1.022 X 10-5 1.07 X 10-2 
570.0 1.022 X 10-5 1.13 X 10-2 
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OQ. CHRS SRF. ANALYSIS 
DUE HUMAN ERAORS 
111. 
to. 
in. 
>-
cr _ 
n. 
TIME.HOURS 
Figure 8.24. Unavailability of the CHRS using LER data on 
human errors (case 2) 
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(£ 
CHHS SAF. flNBLTSIS 
DUE HUMAN ER<^ORS 
Pi. 
I" 
X 
ttC 
i 
o 
X 
«£ 
m. 
X 
«L 
m. 
o 
X 
TIME.HOURS 
Figure 8.25. Probability of failure of one or more com­
ponents at time t using LER data (case 2) 
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8.5.3.3. Case NUREG/CR-1278 Having obtained 
the minimal cut sets from the PREPS, the KITT-1 codes were 
then run to obtain the probability characteristics associ­
ated with, "three of four HE in the CHRS not removing suffi­
cient heat from spray fluid," using the fault tree in Fig. 
8.18. The results from KITT-1 are shown in Appendix F. 
Some of the system differential and integral charac­
teristics resulted from KITT-1 codes run are summarized 
below in Table 8.21 and plotted in Figs. 8.26 and 8.27 where 
the program output symbols are defined in Section 8.4.1. 
Table 8.21. Some system characteristics resulting from KITT-
1 code run for CHRS using data from NUREG/ 
CR-1278 (case 3) 
m Unavailability (Q) Probability of one or 
(per demand) more failure to time t (FSUM) 
o
 
o
 o
 
o
 
--
30.0 1.027 X 10"^ 6.00 X 10-^ 
60.0 1.039 X 10"^ 1.20 X 10-^ 
90.0 1.043 X 10~^ 1.80 X 10"^ 
150.0 1.044 V in-5 2.99 X 10"^ 
210.0 1.045 X 10-5 3.99 X 10-^ 
270.0 1.046 X 10~5 4.19 X 10-^ 
300.0 1.047 X 10~5 5.39 X 10-3 
330.0 1.048 X 10-5 5.98 X 10-3 
360.0 1.048 X 10-5 6.59 X 10-3 
420.0 1.048 X 10-5 8.38 X 10-3 
480.0 1.048 X 10-5 9.37 X 10-3 
540,0 1.048 X 10-5 1.08 X 10-2 
570.0 1.048 X 10-5 1.14 X 10"2 
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CHflS 5AF. ANALYSIS 
DUE HUMAN CRRORS 
in. 
CO. 
ca 
CE _ 
—I 
i 
TIME.HOURS 
Figure 8.26. Unavailability of CHRS using NUREG/CR-1278 
data on human errors (case 3) 
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to. 
inL 
(O. 
I 
in. 
cn. 
CHRS SAF. ANALYSIS 
DUE HUMAN ERRORS 
I 
in. 
è" 
X 
v£ 
in. 
n. 
o 
X 
b ' b" b'W ' T 
TIME.HOURS 
b " b' "ixio" ' rn" 
Figure 8.27. Probability of failure of one or more com­
ponents at time t for the CHRS using human 
error data from NUREG/CR-1278 (case 3) 
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8.5.3.4. Discussion of the results The CHRS un­
availability, Q, and the probability of one or more failure 
at operation time t, FSUM, for the three cases described in 
section 8.3.3 are presented in Figs. 8.22 through 8.27. 
By reviewing these figures, it can be noted that the Q for 
the three cases increases as the operation time t increases 
(t = 0 to 570 hours), but, as the operation time reaches 
approximately 40 hours, the Q becomes flat. The reason, 
as pointed out previously, for that is that this time 
(i.e., 40 hours) corresponds to the average repair time for 
the components presented in Tables 8.14 through 8.16. More 
discussion about this matter is reviewed in section 8.4.5. 
The FSUM increases as the operation time increases. 
The results from the KITT-1 codes output for the three 
cases described in section 8.3.3 are summarized in Table 
8.22. 
Table 8.22. KITT-1 output results 
Source of 
the data 
Unavailability, Q, 
at time t = 60 hours 
Probability of one 
or more failure at 
time t = 60 hours 
WASH-1400 
NUREG/CR-1278 
LERs 
1.01 X lO"^ 
1.04 X 10"^ 
1.01 X lO"^ 
1.19 X lO"^ 
1.20 X 10"^ 
1.19 X 10~^ 
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The results in this table show that the unavailability of 
the CHRS, Q, and the FSUM are higher when the NUREG/CR-1278 
are used as a source of data. For the other two cases 
(i.e., the LERs and WASH-1400), the Q and the FSUM are 
approximately equal. 
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9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Operation history of nuclear power plants (NPPs) shows 
that human errors play an important role in the reliability 
and safety of NPPs. Human reliability analysis is usually 
performed to estimate the influence of human errors on the 
unavailability of various safety systems of NPPs. 
The analysis presented here is the first attempt at 
using gross operator error rates estimated from information 
given in LERs to analyze fault trees developed for those 
systems involved in the SgC accident sequence. Fault tree 
analysis (FTA) is commonly used in probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) and reliability analysis. The S^C sequence 
is selected for this study because this sequence makes a 
significant contribution to risk. The sequence could be 
initiated by a small LOCA (Sg). There are a number of sys­
tems involving it. Those systems are the CSIS, CSRS, CHRS 
and SHAS. 
In earlier reactor safety studies, the operator error 
rates used in FTA have been estimated from other industries. 
Human actions are often not included in FTA. The obvious 
advantage of the analysis performed here is the fact that 
it is based on human failure data from operating reactor 
rather than on the history of other industries. 
The error rates derived from the LERs are estimated for 
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failure modes of valves in those systems involved in the 
S2C sequence. The operator error rates estimated here are 
for a broad class of valves and valve operating environ­
ment. There was no attempt made to calculate specific 
error rates for particular valve classes or sizes, for the 
medium transmitted by the valve (water or steam), or for 
the environment in which the valve operates. 
There are two related areas of concern in using the 
LERs to estimate the operator error rates. The first con­
cern is whether all failures of a given severity are actually 
reported. The second concern is one's ability to reasonably 
estimate the population of valves with which the failures 
are associated. The error rates estimated here should, 
therefore, only be interpreted to order of magnitude preci­
sion. More refined analysis and information are required 
before more precise error rates can be estimated. 
A comparison has been made between data estimates from 
LERs and error rates given in the Handbook of Human Relia­
bility Analysis with Emphasis on NPP Applications (NUREG/ 
CR-1278) and in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). More 
discussion of this comparison is given in Section 7.5. 
The unavailabilities of the systems involved in the 
SgC accident sequence due to human errors were estimated 
using LERs data and the results were compared with the values 
given in WASH-1400 (1). More discussion of the results and 
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the comparison are given in Section 6.2.4. 
From the FTA of the CSIS and the CHRS, the following 
observations are made: 
(1) The unavailability of the CSIS, Q, and the proba­
bility of one or more failures at time t, FSUM, 
are calculated using data from WASH-1400 (case 1), 
the calculated data from LERs (case 2), and the 
calculated data from NUREG/CR-1278 (case 3). 
The results show that the Q and the FSUM are 
lower when the LERs are used as a source of data. 
More discussion of the results was presented in 
Section 8.4.5. 
(2) The CHRS unavailability, Q, and the probability 
of one or more failures at time t, FSUM, are cal­
culated using data from the three cases. The re­
sults show that the Q and the FSUM are higher when 
the NUREG/CR-1278 are used as a source of data. 
But for the other two cases (case 1 and 2), the 
Q and the FSUM are equal. More discussion of the 
results was given in Section 8.5.3.4. 
(3) It is felt that the following reasons are possi­
bly the cause for the results obtained: (a) There 
is a lack of human actions on the CSIS and on the 
CHRS fault trees, and (b) in those fault trees the 
human events/occurrences were treated as a primary 
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event. As was pointed out, a primary event is 
the event which doesn't need further development 
in the fault tree. 
From the sensitivity analysis, the following observa­
tions are made: 
(1) A sensitivity analysis was made here to show how 
sensitive the unavailability, Q, and the proba­
bility of one or more failure, FSUM, to those 
human events found in the CSIS fault tree (CP-Al 
and CP-A4). 
(2) As the operator error rates increase, the Q and 
the FSUM increase and as the operator error rate 
reaches 10~^ error/hour, they increase very 
rapidly. This is because human failures are 
dominant over component failures. More discussion 
on this is presented in Section 8.4.5. 
(3) As can be seen from the sensitivity analysis re­
sults (Figs. 8.13 through 8.16), no significant 
changes in the Q and in the FSUM of the CSIS were 
found by comparing the two cases considered in 
the analysis. These two cases are: (a) Keeping 
the error rate for the human event represented by 
CP-Al in the fault tree constant and slightly 
varying it for the human event represented by 
CP-A4 in the fault tree, and (b) keeping the 
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error rate for the human event represented by 
CP-A4 constant and slightly varying it for 
CP-Al. 
It can be concluded from the analysis that the 
Q and the FSUM are sensitive to the two human 
events represented by CP-Al and CP-A4 in the 
fault tree. 
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10. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER WORK 
The accident at TMI has forced the nuclear industry to 
acknowledge a badly neglected aspect of human equation in 
NPP safety. The industry now appears to recognize the 
importance of operator selection, training, motivation, 
and licensing, and the need to design a system from the 
point of view of communication, information retrieval, 
record keeping, and human factors psychology. It is sug­
gested that perhaps using reactor simulators in training 
could best fulfill the need in these areas. Then error 
rates during training could be carefully documented and 
related to such factors as operator age, experience, train­
ing time, and others. 
From the results of this research, the following re­
marks are made: 
(1) From the foregoing, it is apparent that efforts 
are needed to collect both objective and sub­
jective human performance data applicable to NPP 
tasks. The objective data bank will consist of 
error rates that have been recorded along with 
the best of measures of PSFs associated with the 
errors. An example of this is presented in 
section 2. The subjective data bank will consist 
of expert opinions quantified by psychological 
scaling techniques. 
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(2) The analysis required before more precise operator 
error rates can be estimated using LERs is to 
improve the present methodology used in the calcu­
lation of the error rates and the unavailabili­
ties. It is suggested that perhaps time-dependent 
unavailability analysis could solve part of this 
problem. This will require additional mathe­
matical treatment and data. 
(3) The information needed before more precise oper­
ator error rates can be estimated using LERs is 
the population and the critical hours of valves 
with which the failures are associated in those 
systems involved in the S^C sequence. From the 
foregoing, it is apparent that efforts are needed 
to collect such data and make them available. 
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13. APPENDIX A; CHARACTERIZATION OF OPERATOR "ERRORS" 
FROM ANALYZED LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERs) 
The following tables are based on the analysis of oper­
ator- related Licensee Event Reports (LERs). The information 
matrix is designed to facilitate the characterization of 
operator "errors" and the identification of trends. 
For each event, the following information is provided: 
(1) LER reference number (RN); 
(2) Plant name and docket number; 
(3) Event and report dates; 
(4) Systems and components involved/affected (codes used 
for systems and components identification are given in 
Tables 13.1 and 13.2); 
(5) Failure mode (Tables 13.3 and 13.4 give the code used 
for failure modes); 
(6) Type of personnel involved (Table 13.5 gives the code 
used in identifying personnel and their jobs and 
responsibilities); 
(7) Duration till discovery and means of discovery (Tables 
13.6 and 13.7 provide the code used to identify "the 
method of discovery" and the "cue of discovery"); and 
(8) Plant status (Table 13.8 gives the code used for speci­
fying plant status). 
A summary of a sample of collected data characterizing 
operator-related events is provided in Table 13.9. 
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Table 13.1. Code used for reactor systems matrix 
System description 
Reactor 
RA Reactor Vessel Internals 
RB Reactivity Control Systems 
RC Reactor Core 
Reactor Coolant System & Connected Systems 
CA Reactor Vessels & Appurtenances 
CB Coolant Recirculation Systems & Controls 
CC Main Steam Systems & Controls 
CD Main Steam Isolation Systems & Controls 
CE Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Systems & 
Controls 
CF Residual Heat Removal Systems & Controls 
CG Reactor Coolant Cleanup Systems & Controls 
CH Feedwater Systems & Controls 
CI Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage 
Detection Systems 
CJ Other Coolant Subsystems & Their Controls 
Engineered Safety Features 
SA Reactor Containment Systems 
SB Containment Removal Systems & Controls 
SC Containment Air Purification & Cleanup Sys­
tems & Controls 
SD Containment Isolation Systems & Controls 
SE Containment Combustible Gas Control Systems 
& Controls 
SF Emergency Core Cooling Systems & Controls 
SG Control Room Habitability Systems & Controls 
SH Other Engineered Safety Feature Systems & 
Their Controls 
Instrumentation and Controls 
lA Reactor Trip Systems 
IB Engineered Safety Feature Instrument Systems 
IC Systems Required for Safe Shutdown 
ID Safety Related Display Instrumentation 
IE Other Instrument Systems Required for Safety 
IF Other Instrument Systems Not Required for 
Safety 
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Table 13.1. (Continued) 
System description 
Electric Power Systems 
EA Offsite Power Systems & Controls 
EB AC Onsite Power Systems & Controls 
EC DC Onsite Power Systems & Controls 
ED Onsite Power Systems & Controls (Composite 
AC & DC) 
EE Emergency Generator Systems & Controls 
EF Emergency Lighting Systems & Controls 
EG Other Electric Power Systems & Controls 
Fuel Storage and Handling Systems 
FA New Fuel Storage Facilities 
FB Spent Fuel Storage Facilities 
FC Spent Fuel Pool Cooling & Cleanup Systems 
& Controls 
FD Fuel Handling Systems 
Auxiliary Water Systems 
WA Station Service Water Systems & Controls 
WB Cooling Systems for Reactor Auxiliaries & 
Controls 
WC Demineralized Water Make-up Systems & Controls 
WD Potable & Sanitary Water Systems & Controls 
WE ulLimaLe Heat Sink Facilities 
WF Condensate Storage Facilities 
WG Other Auxiliary Water Systems & Their Controls 
Auxiliary Process Systems 
PA Compressed Air Systems & Controls 
PB Process Sampling Systems 
PC Chemical, Volume Control & Liquid Poison 
Systems & Controls 
PD Failed Fuel Detection Systems 
PE Other Auxiliary Process Systems & Their 
Controls 
Other Auxiliary Systems 
AA Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling & Ventila­
tion Systems & Controls 
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Table 13.1. (Continued) 
geneÏÏc^code System description 
AB Fire Protection Systems & Controls 
AC Communication Systems 
AD Other Auxiliary Systems & Their Controls 
Steam and Power Conversion Systems 
HA Turbine-Generators & Controls 
HB Main Steam Supply System & Controls (Other 
than CC) 
HC Main Condenser Systems & Controls 
HD Turbine Gland Sealing Systems & Controls 
HE Turbine Bypass Systems & Controls 
HF Circulating Water Systems & Controls 
HG Condensate Clean-up Systems & Controls 
HH Condensate and Feedwater Systems & Controls 
(Other than CH) 
HI Steam Generator Slowdown Systems & Controls 
HJ Other Features of Steam & Power Conversion 
Systems (Not included elsewhere) 
Radioactive Waste Management Systems 
MA Liquid Radioactive Waste Management Systems 
MB Gaseous Radioactive Waste Management Systems 
MC Process & Effluent Radiological Monitoring 
Systems 
MD Solid Radioactive waste Management systems 
Radiation Protection Systems 
Area Monitoring Systems 
Airborne Radioactivity Monitoring Systems 
Other Systems 
System Code Not Applicable 
BA 
BB 
XX 
ZZ 
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Table 13.2.a. Code used for "mechanical component" identifi­
cation 
Code Component Code Component 
BL Blower/fan RU Refrigeration unit 
RW Rod worth minimizer 
CT Cabinet 
CM Cam SH Shock absorber/hydraulic 
CL Clamp SB Snubber 
CC Cooler/Chiller SA Sluice gate 
CN Condenser SG Steam generator 
CR Control Rod SN Strainer 
CD Control rod drive unit SE Subtree 
CP Cover plate SU Sump 
CP Damper TR Tank, accumulator 
DZ Demineralizer TJ Tank, boron injection 
DG Diesel generator TB Tank, boric acid storage 
DH Door/hatch TA Tank, chemical addition 
DW Drywell TD Tank, condensate storage 
DI Duct TC Tank, core flood 
TU Tank, fuel 
FS Filter or strainer TG Tank, refueling water stoi 
FT Fitting TS Tank, surge 
FG Flange TX Tank, other 
FE Fuel element/assembly TQ Tendon 
TV Tubing 
GB Gas bottle TI Turbine 
GK Gasket 
VC Valve, check 
HE Heat exchanger VE Valve, explosive operated 
VH Valve, hydraulic operated 
LN Line VM Valve, manual 
LK Linkage VO Valve, motor operated 
VP Valve, operator 
NZ Nozzle VU Valve, pneumatic operated 
VR Valve, relief 
OR Orifice VS Valve, safety 
VF Valve, safety-relief 
PP Pipe VD Valve, solenoid operated 
PJ Pipe gap/joint VK Valve, stop check 
PO Pool VX Valve, unknown 
PV Pressure vessel W Valve, vacuum relief 
PZ Pressurizer VT Vent 
PM Pump 
WO Well, other 
WW Wetwell, Torus 
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Table 13.2.b. Code used for "electrical component" identifi­
cation 
Code Component Code Component 
AL Alarm PR Potentiometer 
AM Amplifier PB Pushbutton 
AZ Analyzer 
AN Annunciator RM Radiation monitor 
RC Recorder 
BY Battery/DC power supply RG Regulator 
BC Battery charger RY Relay 
El Bistable RS Relay or switch contact 
BS Bus RT Resistor, temperature device 
CA Cable SO Signal comparator 
CE Circuit breaker SC Switch, contro1 
CH Clutch SF Switch, flow 
CD Coil SD Switch, ground 
SV Switch, level 
DT Detector SL Switch, limit 
DI Dial SM Switch, manual 
DR Diode or rectifier SP Switch, pressure 
SR Switch, reset 
FD Film badge/dosimeter ST Switch, temperature 
FU Fuse SO Switch, torque 
SX Switch, unknown 
GE Generator 
TZ Terminal board 
HT Heat tracing element TO Thermal overload 
HG Heating element TH Thermostat 
TM Timer 
IP luuOre probe TN Transformer, Current 
IM Input module TP Transformer, potential 
10 Instrumentation (others) TW Transformer, power (or 
IR Inverter (solid state) control) 
TF Transformer, flow 
JP Jumper TL Transformer, level 
TE Transformer, pressure 
LT Light TT Transformer, temperature 
LA Lightening arrestor 
WR Wire 
MN Monitor, other than 
radiation 00 Event 
MO Motor 
MS Motor starter 
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Table 13.3. Code used for "failure mode" 
Category Failure mode 
1 Action Being Omitted 
The action can be a step in the procedure or 
written/oral instruction. 
2 Action Being Committed Incorrectly 
3 Inadvertence 
In this category, the personnel commits an ac­
tion which should not have been taken. 
4 Communication 
If there are more than one personnel involved in 
the event, the failure mode will be under this 
category. Problems with communication may be 
within one shift or between different shifts. 
Also, they may be between two or more crews. 
The failure mode under this category will be 
coded as "4CC". 
5 Personnel/Training 
Under this category we will put all human errors 
that are related to: (i) Lack of experience/ 
training; (ii) Psychometric parameters. Failure 
modes such as; Misidentifications (code 5 MD), 
Misinterpretation (code 5 MT), Misjudgment (code 
5 MJ), Slow/fast response (code 5 CR, 5 FR), 
Procedure unfamiliarity (5 PN), and Lack of 
experience (5 LE) will be under this category. 
6 Procedure Inadequacy/Deficiency 
This will be coded as "6 PD". 
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Table 13.4. "Most repetitive action in operations" events 
Action Code Action Code 
Adjust AD Open OP 
Actuate AC Operate OR 
Add AD Place in service PS 
Align AL Position PN 
Calculate CI Procedure inadequacy PI 
Calibrate CB Misjudge MJ 
Check/verify CH Remove from service RS 
Close CL Record RC 
Connect CN Release RL 
Control CR Report RP 
Deenergize DG Reset RT 
Energize EG Return to service RN 
Fill FL Review RV 
Follow procedure FP Sample SM 
Insert IN Slow response SR 
Inattention lA Start ST 
Lock LO Secure SC 
Log LG Tag TG 
Maintain MT Tighten TN 
Monitor MR Test TS 
No response NR Unlock UL 
Notify NO Verify VF 
Observe OB Withdraw WD 
Table 13.5. Code used for "personnel" (job and responsibility) 
Code Personnel Responsibility 
Operations Staff 
SS Shift Supervisor 
SCO Senior Control 
Operator 
CO Control Operator 
EO Equipment Operator 
EA Equipment Attendant 
Responsible for the station during an assigned work 
shift. 
Instructs, trains, and assigns work to personnel en­
gaged in controlling the operation of reactor-
generator units and associated equipment. 
Actual operation and control of the reactor turbine 
generator units and associated equipment. 
Assists the control operator on shift. His responsi­
bility is operation and inspection of individual equip­
ment and the operation of the radwaste systems on a 
rotating basis during normal plant shutdown. 
Works as directed by operations personnel to operate 
equipment and systems in areas of water treatment, oil 
cleaning, and fuel handling. He works with the relief 
shift supervisor on fuel handling, radwaste, relief 
duties and unusual problems. 
Technical Staff 
RE Reactor Engineer 
PPE Power Plant Engineer 
Responsible for the safe, efficient performance of the 
reactor and performs nuclear physics. Calculations as 
required to assure proper fuel management and that 
thermal limitations are not exceeded. 
Responsible for determining station performance, the 
establishment of efficient operating procedures and, in 
conjunction with the reactor engineers, the most effi­
cient utilization of fuel. 
Table 13.5. (Continued) 
Code Personnel Responsibility 
CE Chemical Engineer 
RPE Radiation Protection 
Engineer 
GC Graduate Chemist 
CT Chemical Technician 
HP Health Physicist 
RPT Radiation Protection 
Technician 
Directs the chemical and radiochemical programs of the 
plant and environs. 
Directs radiation protection programs. 
Has the responsibility for the day-to-day direction of 
the chemical technicians and the assurance that plant 
chemistry is maintained within license limits. 
Prepares and analyzes test specimens, assembles materi­
als and equipment, and makes the necessary analysis of 
data. 
Responsible for daily direction of radiation protection 
technicians and the implementation of the radiation pro 
tection program to plant license standards. 
Measuring and reading through routine radiation surveys 
he implements the plant radiation protection program as 
required by approved procedure. 
Maintenance Staff 
Instrument Foreman 
Instrument Technicians 
Electrical Foremen 
Electricians 
M Mechanical Foremen 
Mechanics 
Welders 
Helpers 
Storekeepers 
Stockmen 
Instrument, electrical, and mechanical foremen are re­
quired to direct and be responsible for the calibration 
maintenance, and operation of equipment in their respec 
tive areas of experience and training, and to oversee 
the efforts of technicians, electricians, and mechanics 
serving under them. 
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Table 13.6. Code used for method of discovery 
Code Discovery method 
A Operational event - any event not included in the 
codes below. 
B Routine test/inspection - surveillance test -
previous maintenance test - annual inspections -
etc. 
C Special test/inspection - nonroutine tests. 
D External source - such as notification from NRC, 
sister licensee, vendor, A/E - etc. 
Z Item not applicable 
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Table 13.7. Code used for "cue of discovery" 
Code Cue description 
OVD 1. Observation of unannunciated displays 
Nonannundated displays include: 
o Meters 
o Digital displays 
o Chart recorders 
o Indicator lights 
o Graphs 
Examples are: 
o Valve position indicators (open-close) 
o Control rod position indicators (in notches) 
o Temperature, pressure, level, volume, concen­
tration, and activity indicators 
AD 2. Annunciated displays 
Examples: 
o Low/high level alarm 
o High activity alarm 
o Low flow alarm 
OWI 3. Observation while walk-in 
Usually this code will be used for walk-in out­
side the control room (e.g. auxiliary building, 
DT building, etc.) 
Examples : 
o Noticing water on the floor of the auxiliary 
building 
o Noticing tank overflowing 
o Hearing sound of air blowing in DG room 
ROL 4. Review operation logs 
Examples ; 
o Operation data 
o Monitor charts 
o Power recorder charts 
o Plant status 
RSL 5. Review survey/test logs 
Examples : 
o Test completion and results 
o Test due and intervals 
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Table 13.7. (Continued) 
Code Cue description 
o Routine log review 
o Jumper log review 
o Sampling schedule (discharge, viz. sampling) 
RI 6. Random inspection 
Examples ; 
o Relays block after survey 
o Routine operator patrol in control room 
o Valve line-up checks 
SD 7. Severe damage 
Examples : 
o Water hammer 
SI 8. Safety injection 
RT 9. Reactor trip 
RPL 10. Review release log 
PI 11. Problem investigation 
CR 12. Calculated results 
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Table 13.8. Code used for "plant status" 
Code Status 
A Under construction 
B Preoperational, S/U or power ascension 
tests (in progress) 
C Routine S/U operations 
D Routine S/D operations 
E Steady state operations 
F Load changes during routine power operation 
G S/D (hot or cold) except refueling 
H Refueling 
X Others (including special tests, emergency S/D 
operations, etc.) 
Z Item not applicable 
Table 13.9. Analyzed information matrix for characterizing operator errors 
reported in the LERs 
Plant S Systen CoNponen 1 
Dis­
covery Plant 
S a ? •P 1 •g 
£ 
S § 
> w g g 
He
th
od
 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 5 1 1 1 He
th
od
 
1 1 Remarks: 
1 002 000009 IPl 003 032573 040573 PC XX vx PH 20P CO 320 OUD B 000 G Improper/Open (opened too rapidly). 
2 003 000939 032874 040574 HA wc VM FS ICL EO 15H OUO A 080 E Left Partially Open. 
3 004 010266 061274 062174 KA wc VK FS ICL EO SN OUD A 090 E Sl£! "St 
4 005 010322 062774 070574 HA XX TX :XX 
1 
3Rl CO Z Ra A 095 E Indavertent Release (without permit). 
S 007 002379 IP2 247 091172 101172 CC XX VM XX 2CL CO z OUD C 0 A lllOrDBer. .Closure .(should he opened). 
6 008 001ISS 051973 052973 SF 
MPI! 
XX 
) 
vo AC IVF CO z OUD C 0 A Old Not Verify (valve position). 
7 009 000078 012574 020874 RB XX CR XX 2CT CO z OUO C 0 A Imorooer Calculation Icrltlcalltv condition). 
a 010 OÏOS2S 0S3074 090974 FC XX TG XX INT CC z OUD A 0 D pid Npt Hanlffr (low level). 
9 Oil 015920 080576 091576 FC SF VM ;PM lOP CO z OUO A 0 H Old Not Open (during test). 
10 012 017273 121276 031677 RB XX 00 ; XX SW CO lOM OUD A 068 C Misunderstanding (requirements when axial & 9 Is outside 
target band). 
11 013 016743 122776 012677 lA ID 61 20 3AC CO 2 R1 A 020 C {pgdyfrteqt KtViVil, 
12 014 019242 082177 092977 PC XX TA 
1 
XX 2AD CO Z OWl A 000 C Imorooer Addition Rate. 
13 015 014604 IP3 286 042976 052576 SB XX VX PM 2AL CO 9 OUO A 000 B Hisallanment (durlna test). 
14 016 010319 KEl 305 070974 071974 CB XX VM XX ICL CO I OUI A 0 G LsfJt .QPflO; 
15 017 010929 092074 100174 HC XX SC RM 2PN Cu z OUD A 0 G Hlsnslttonlng. 
IS 019 015635 013175 031475 PC XX TA , XX IHR CO 0 AD A 073 E P14 Not Hpnitor (high level). 
17 020 013669 110575 111475 EE XX SC 1 
i 
DG 2PM CO t OUO A 008 C HisDositlonlnq (during test). 
Table 13.9. (Continued) 
PUnt & System Conponen 1 
Dis­
covery Plant 
o a 1 ? £ f 1 g 
. E & ? % p ,s S r k u 
« <S at c S < J £ â 3 £ 1 1 Remarks: 
IB 
Cont 021 014240 022076 032176 SA XX vo XX 2CL EO I OUD B 000 H Improper closure (overtorqued to prevent leakage). 
19 022 014672 051876 052876 WO XX 00 XX 5MJ CO I OUO A 099 E Misiudoement (time to automatic regeneration saaipIInQ was 
not performed.) 
20 023 015295 081376 081376 PC XX VH XX ICI CO z QUO A 099 E Left Open (After release). 
21 024 016545 120576 123076 WO XX su XX ISM CT 170 RSI B 098 E Cld.W Sfmplf (oversight). 
22 025 017824 052277 060677 WB XX VM PM lOP EO 3H RI A 100 E Qid Npt Qpfn (Distraction by other duties). 
23 026 013282 070577 071977 CI XX SC RM IPN EO I2H RI A 100 E Left in Wran9.Pgsj.t1fin 'after surveillance.) 
24 027 019064 071677 081577 WC XX vx XX 2AL CO Z OUD B 100 E Misaiianment. 
25 028 012937 HYl 309 061975 062575 SF . XX vo XX IVF CO Z OUO A 000 C Did Not Verify (valve position). 
26 029 002323 120272 121472 CC XX RC vo 2tM CO 0 RT A Z Z (mprçper Connection. 
27 030 002063 120872 121872 SF XX TX XX IHI CO Z OUD A 000 G Hgnitor (low pressure). 
28 031 015731 091676 092076 SA XX vx XX ICL EO z owl A 060 E Left Open (after maintenance). 
29 032 013187 MI 2 336 081275 082075 FC XX VM XX ICL CO z RI B 0 8 Did Np( Ç195C (durino draining). 
30 033 013380 090575 100175 CJ XX oo XX SMT CO z OUO 6 0 8 Misinteroretatlon (infonnation from Chemistry Dept. 
Ojconcentration vis RC temp.) 
31 034 013659 102075 111775 RB XX ZZ XX ITS CO z OUD C 0 6 Did Not Test (reouirements were overlooked In review 
of proc. by operating and test personnel). 
32 035 014164 012876 022476 EE XX DG XX ITS CO 390H RSL B 0 8 Did Not Test (misinterpretation of Test performance on 
out-of-service components). 
33 036 014164 012876 022476 EE XX OG XX ITS CO 3H RSL B 0 8 Did Not Test (misinterpretation of Test performance on 
out-of-service component). 
34 037 015578 080476 090376 SF RB TX XX IFL CO Z OUD B 100 E Did Not Fill (in time). 
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Tab le 13.9. (Continued) 
Plant S Ccfnponen i 
t 
01». 
COVtry Plant 
w 
o 
3 
1 5 '1 s 1 1 •s 
1 1 s 1 1 1 •l 1 5 1 
S 
<3 1 
è 
£ 1 1 Remarks : 
Cont. 038 016721 121976 011877 SF CB vo TJ ICL CO z AO z 0 0 Old Not Close (uDOn recelvino SIT low level). 
36 039 001002 OEl 269 040573 050473 SB XX vo XX 2CL EO z OUO 8 0 G Improper closure (Overtorqued to prevent leakage). 
37 040 001004 050873 051873 SB XX C3 PH IVF CO B2H 000 B 015 B Old Not verify (Jacking out/In). 
38 041 000222 062673 073173 WB XX V3 XX IRN EO Z OUO B 0 B Old Not Return To Service (oln that prevents auto 
operation not removed after test.) 
39 042 C00417 100573 101673 RB XX CI XX 2W0 CO 0 OUO A 095 E Improper withdrawal (withdrawal limits exceeded). 
40 043 000401 100773 101773 SF XX Cll vo IVF CO z RI A 0 G CM Nît.Vîr.lfy (locking close/open). 
41 044 000401 100773 101773 SF XX 01 vo IVF CO z RI A 0 G Q1d_NQt Verify (locklna close/ooen). 
42 045 000621 120873 122073 SB XX Cll vo IVF CO 15M OUO A Z Z Pid-lst Verify (racking out/In). 
43 046 010098 032074 032874 PC XX 01) XX 5H0 CO 9 OUO A 090 E Hisunderstandino (T.S. forbids chanalno boron concentra 
tlon above BOX power.) 
44 047 010052 042574 050674 MA XX Vl< TC 30P EO 19M AO A 075 E Inadvertent OP«n (close oroxinltv). 
45 048 010309 051374 052374 W XX All XX IRN EO 75M OUO A 0 G Did Not Return,M Sfrylff (after calibration). 
46 049 010562 081674 083074 MB XX III TX 108 CO 15M AD A 0 E Ffllurt t» Observe (moisture In sloht glass.) 
47 050 011002 100274 102274 SF XX z:! XX IFP CO Z RSL A 0 E Did Not Follow Procedure (orecrltlcallty checkoff 
procedure performed out of sequence.) 
48 051 011000 101274 102574 SF XX vo PM IVF EO Z OWl A 0 F Old Not verify (valve position). 
49 052 012868 051275 061275 WC XX vo XX 30P UO g OUO A 100 E Inadvertent Ooen (wet label also was contrlbutlna 
cause.) 
50 
51 
053 
054 
013504 
013890 
100775 
112775 
102175 
121175 
PC 
HA 
XX 
XX 
vu 
T); 
TB 
XX 
3FP 
ZRL 
CO 
CO 
2D 
Z 
AD 
2RL 
A 
A 
100 
099 
E 
E 
Wrond Procedure Followed (out-of-date procedure for 
valve Uneup.) " 
Improper Release (misread of the amount on the oermlt.) 
52 055 014805 011076 012776 RC XX 0(1 XX 5H0 CO 225M ROL A 090 E Nisunderstandlna (use of oranh showing limits of 
positive power Imbalance.) 
N) 
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Tab le 13.9. ( Cont inued ) 
PUnt S Systoi Conponen 1 
Dis­
covery PUnt 
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Remarks: 
53 057 000773 0E2 270 012274 022174 SB XI: CB PM 3FP CO 231M ROL A t G Hrono Procedure Followed (out-of-date orocedure for 
minimum operable trains.) 
54 053 010405 062074 062874 RB XI: 00 XX IFP CO 75* ROL A 100 F Did Not Follow Procedure (oower level vis reactivity 
xenon equilibrium.) 
55 059 010389 053174 070174 MC XI RM XX IRN EO 18H ROL A 050 C Did Not Return to Service (after calibration). 
56 060 010974 092874 101174 RB RC 00 XX IFP CO Z ROL A 080 B Old Not Follow Procedure (oower level vis reactivity 
xenon equillbrlu*.j 
57 061 010899 092874 101174 SF Xt VO XX IVF SS 
+M 
5M RSL A Z B Did Not Verify (ooerabllltv of redundant comoonent 
before removing the operable one for Inspection.) 
58 062 011069 111474 121374 SB XX VH PM ICL EO 270 OWI B 100 E Left Ooen (after valve llneuo: Positions and labels 
may be contributing causes.) 
59 063 011208 122374 011074 CG XI VH FS ICL EO Z OUO A 100 E kÇ't Open-
60 06* 012293 011575 013075 RB XX At CR SNR CO Z OUD A 099 E No Resoonse (overlao between two rod orouos below 
limits.) 
61 065 012294 012275 012175 SF XX CB VO 4CN UO Z RI A Z C Old Not Taq (procedure unfanlllarltv) 
Communication (between utility, and control operators). 
62 066 012295 011375 022175 SH XX CB PM 4CH UO IH ROL A Z C Old Not Place In Service (procedure unfamillarlty). 
Comunlcatlon (between utility and control operators). 
63 067 012295 011375 022175 SH XX 00 XX IRV UO IH ROL A/ z C Old Hot Review (white tao log). 
64 068 012456 032275 040875 RB XX 00 XX 5MT CO Z ROL A 080 F Hislnteroretatlon (oower level vis reactivity xenon 
equilibrium calculations.) 
65 069 012632 032675 043075 CB XX AL TX 5MF CO 20H OUO A Z F Hlsldentiflcatlon (oroximlty of the alarm oanel.) 
66 071 013180 080875 082275 SB CB 00 XX SHO CO Z ROL A 005 C Misunderstanding (of the ourpose and usage of the "out 
of normal" checklist.) 
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Table 13.9. (Continued) 
Plant S System Coiiponen 1 
oil-
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Remarks: 
Cont. 
67 072 013080 080875 062275 SB CB 00 00 ICH CO z ROL A 005 C Qid Nttt Copt's (Trainee's performante). 
68 073 013893 111375 120975 CJ XX AL TX 5MF CO 30H OUO A 100 E Hisldentlflcatlon (low level alarm for high pressure 
a1arm.) 
69 074 016739 121576 122076 RB XX CR XX 2UD CO P OUD C 9 8 Improper U<th(|rawf1. 
70 075 016938 010877 022277 CH XX VX PM IVF CO 100 OUO A 030 B Bid-Not Yerjfy (valve lineup). 
71 076 017435 041277 041377 RB zz ZZ XX IFP CO 31M ROl A 025 E Old Not Follow Procedure (oower level> 10% when the 
the plant In 3 loop status.) 
72 077 017700 050677 051077 SF XX PH XX IPS CO 13CIH ROL A 9 D Did Not Place In Service (when unit entered node 3.) 
73 079 015504 SLl 335 070576 080576 FC XX VX TX ICL CO Z OUO A 078 E Lef^.Qpen. 
74 080 015512 072376 082376 CB CF PH VX 3ST CO 9 OUD A 9 0 Inadvertent Start. 
75 oei 016887 112876 122876 EO CB BS PM IVF CO I OUD A 9 B Did Not Verify (oroner Initial conditions at the 
beginning of plant evolutions.) 
76 082 017441 030177 033077 EE XX RY DG IRT EO z OUD 8 081 B Old Not Reset. 
77 084 001141 SUl 280 040373 041873 PC SF VO ZZ 2CL EO 2 OUD A 9 G Improper closure (overtorqued). 
78 085 000532 111573 112373 PC XX TX XX IMR CO Z AO A 095 E Did Not Monitor (hiah pressure). 
79 086 010013 041574 050374 EE XX PB CB IRT CO t OUO B Z Z Old Not Reset (burnt amber lloht was a confusIno factor.) 
80 083 012263 011875 022475 SA XX ÏH XX IVF EO z OUO A 9 C Did Not Verify (valve llneuo: similarity of labels was 
a contributing cause.) 
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Table 13. 9. (Continued) 
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Remarks; 
Cont 1 
81 039 012646 041275 041875 BB !xx SM RM IPN CO 24H R1 8 100 E Left In Wrong Position (after training). 
82 090 012646 041275 041875 88 XX SM RM IRP CO 4S0H RSL 8 100 E Old Not Reoort (discovery and corrective action of the 
previous event.) 
83 091 012455 031375 032075 MC XX TX XX IHR CO 2H OUD A 100 E Mot Wr Ihlqh level). 
84 092 013042 080175 081275 SF XX VO AC 20P CO 24H CUD 8 004 C iMKPgfr Open (opened at Inadequate RC pressure.) 
8S 093 013872 112975 120975 UC XX TX XX IMR CO Z owl A 9 G Dfd Ust Hçnitor (hlqh level.) 
86 034 013874 120575 121675 UC XX TX XX IMR CO Z OUO A 9 G Dj^ Nfft Monitor (hloh level). 
87 095 015548 072776 072776 se XX SP XX IRN CO Z RSL Z 9 G Old not return to service (oversight). 
88 095 015548 072776 072776 s e .  XX 00 XX IRV SS NA RSL Z 9 G Old Not Review (lumer loo not reviewed at the proper 
time.) 
89 096 000519 SU2 >81 111373 112373 SF XX FU PH IRN CO 90 OUD A 000 G Old Not Return to Service (after maintenance). 
90 098 010259 ru 289 061374 062164 CJ XX VO PM IVF CO Z OUD A 000 B Old Not Verify (valve llneuo before test, faulty 
position Indicator was a contributing cause.) 
91 099 010259 061374 062174 CJ XX VO PM IVF CO Z OUO A 000 B Old Not Verify (valve lineup before test, faulty 
position Indicator was a contributing cause.) 
92 100 010321 062574 070574 SF XX PB CB 20R CO 0 OUD A 000 G Imorooer Operation (Interval between oresslna tM> 
pushbuttons was short, design was a contributing 
factor.) 
93 toi 012144 021075 022175 RB ix CO XX 5UU CO 100 PI A 100 E Unawareness (of need of thorouahlv Investloatlno rod 
locations even If It Is not procedural step.) 
94 102 015694 081575 082275 UE (X RC XX IMR CO 30H OUD A 100 E Did Not Monitor (hlohùT.) 
N) 
<T> 
Table 13.9. (Continued) 
PUnt t Systea 
(lompomen 
1 
f 
Dis­
covery Plant 
•M a S À ? 1 § 
1 1 
g 
£ 1 1 1 1 1 5 
o 
c 
£ 
C 
S 3 Me
th
oi
 
Po
we
r 
M
od
e 
Remarks: 
95 104 013492 091875 092675 SO XX VH XX lOP EO z RI 8 100 e teft Clgs^ (after test). 
96 MS 013557 102175 103175 RB XX CR XX 5MT CO z RSL 8 089 E Hlslnteroretatlon (CR Droqram verification oroc.. 
Proc. Inadequacy was a contributing cause.) 
97 106 015698 111375 112075 CF XX RC XX IMR CO 20H OUD A 0 G pid Npt Monitor (hlah T when entering different mode.) 
98 107 013735 111475 112475 R8 XX CD XX IFP CO 0 OUD A 0 G Did Not Follow Procedure (for orooer CD ventlno.) 
99 108 013766 112575 120575 CG CB MN TX 3RD CO 41H OUD A 010 C Misread (confusion between two different level Indicators) 
100 109 013792 121075 121975 SO XX VP VM IPN EO 160 OUD 8 100 E Left In Hronq Position (after backseating to minimize 
leakage.) 
101 110 016264 102176 110476 RB XX FU CR 6PÎ P Z OUD A 054 E Procedure Inadeouacy (regarding monitoring overlao when 
sequence fault signal Is present.) 
102 111 016663 121276 010577 CF XX PM XX 4CH CO Z RSL A 100 E Old Not Test (redundant coooonentl Communication (between operation personnel). 
103 113 013977 TRl 344 121975 011976 CH XX SX EG 6PI P Z OUD A 000 8 Procedure Inadequacy (regarding seguences of operation). 
104 114 014145 011676 012776 CM cc TP PM 2RP CO Z RT A 024 8 Mlsreoort (logging of lifted lead In auto-start 
circuitry In wrong portion of jumper log.) 
105 lis 014252 011876 021876 IB XX n XX 4CM CO 3D OUD A 030 E Did Not Return to Service (after test). Communication (between I & C and control operators). 
106 116 014227 020576 021876 lA XX sc XX IPN CO MA OUD 8 0 G Left in Wrong Position 
107 117 014227 020576 021876 lA XX u. XX SNR CO Z AO B 0 G Up Response (out of order alanl. 
108 117 014227 020576 021876 lA XX sc XX 2RS CO Z RT 8 0 G Improper Removal from Service (for test with the 
redundant train Inoperable.) 
109 118 014599 041676 051476 EA zz IS zz 108 H Z RI A 0 B Failure to Observe (disconnects not completely closed.) 
110 119 015173 050676 062376 PO XX X) XX SPU CO 16H RSL 8 090 B Procedure Unfamlllarlty ( Iodine analysis not done when power was change<t.) 
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242 247 017255 021877 010477 SF 
SIS 
XX VH XX OP EO SH RI A 100 E Inadvertent Open (1 VC855S was closed Instead of 
2VC8555. no tags were attached for Identification 
purpose) 
243 251 019179 070877 100677 CH XX VX XX 3FP CO 20 SI A m G Wrong Procedure Followed (throttle ooiltlon for valves 
had been changed In a newer version of test proc. 
to prevent waterhanner, but not followed) 
244 252 000769 ZI2 304 020774 021674 PC XX VM XX 3CL EO Z OUI A m G Inadvertent Closure (during orevlous ooeratlons resulted 
In system overpressure and diaphragm rupture) 
245 253 000808 021774 922774 EE CH SX PH 2PN EO Z ouo 8 025 8 laorooer Setting (hloh synchrosneed settlnc caused 
the DG to trip) 
246 253 000808 021774 922774 EE CH OG PH IFP EO 162M ouo 8 025 8 Procedure Violation (time to correct OG defects exceed 
the limit allowable to operate without the only 
operable AFWP) 
247 254 010707 071874 171874 SO XX VH XX lOP CO 980 RI A m G Left Closed (after leakage test during the unit outage) 
246 255 010705 0B2274 182874 CC XX VH VR lOP CO 70 RI A m G Left Closed (after maintenance work completion) 
249 256 010705 082274 182874 CC XX VM VR lOP CO 70 RI A m G left Closed (after maintenance work comoletlon) 
250 261 012469 040175 141175 PC XX TB XX 5HJ CO 10 RSA B 084 E Hls.ludgment (failure to Increase boron concentration 
although sample results showed the adverse trend) 
251 263 013453 091875 092675 CB RC 00 XX 6PD P Z OUO A m G Procedure Oeflclencv (lacking of sufficient warning 
of the potential of RCS pressure Increase) 
252 263 013453 091875 992675 BC RC ZZ XX 5SR CO Z ouo A m G Slow Response ( In reducing RCS peak pressure) 
253 264 013539 102275 103175 S8 XX : VH vo lOP CO 6H OUO 8 082 E Old Not Ooen (the valve has been overlooked on the 
realIgnment process 
254 265 014523 041176 151176 SO XX VX XX 2AJ H Z AO A m G Hisadiustment (controller for the Ht pressure control 
valve was set too high after maintenance, resulted In 
depressurliatlon of Zone 1) 
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Remarks: 
255 266 016051 091976 092976 EE CB 83 PM 30G CO 0 RI A 030 C Inadvertent Deeneraizatlon [due to switching error) 
256 267 017407 031077 032477 SO CB Ci PM ICL EO z OUD A 000 G Left Open (resulted in 3 ft. increase in RC level) 
257 268 018393 071277 072577 lA CC »i XX 5MT CO t OUD A 000 G Misinteroretation (of instruction concerning the olaceneit 
of dummy signals; 
258 269 019137 083177 092677 SF 
KC 
XX vx AC 30P CO 1 OUD A 098 E Inadvertent Ooen (during atteoDting to lower ACC level, 
it was lowered below T.S. limits) 
259 270 012611 EHl 321 012775 050575 CF XX sr VO 2PN M 1 OUD A 000 8 Improper Setting 
260 273 012459 032075 040275 HC XX AL XX 5NR CO z OUD A 040 V No Resoonse (off gas H? concentration exceeded limtt. CO did not close discharge valve) 
261 274 013045 072976 101576 CA CD 11 XX 3FP CO 2H RT A 084 C Wrong Procedure Followed (while performing sur*, on ADS resulted In low RPV pressure) 
262 275 013602 101975 102275 HA XX Vi TX 4CP EO Z RI A 086 E Left Ooen (after lineup in previous shift, resulted In discharging wrong tank) 
263 276 013700 110475 112775 IF XX V.l m 3C1. EO 10 RI 8 050 E Inadvertent Close (during operation, resulted In isolating pH instrument) 
264 277 013902 120375 121275 MA XX VX TX 2AL CO z OUD A 000 G Improper Lineup (resulted In unplanned discharge) 
265 278 014106 010276 012876 SF 
CSIS 
XX 03 XX ITS CO 40 RSL 8 050 E Old Not Test (CO was undulv apprehensive to avoid 
unnecessary cycling) 
266 279 015566 072376 080276 CD XX Si» XX ITS CO z RSL A 083 E Did Not Test (oversight) 
267 280 017335 021977 031977 10 XX Ml XX ITS CO 20 RSL A 001 G Did Not Test (oversight) 
268 282 018146 053077 052677 10 XX MH XX ITS CO 690) RSL 8 000 H Did No( Test (oversight) 
269 283 018142 051777 060977 MA XX V3 XX ITS CO 40 RSL A 000 H Old Not Test (oversight) 
N) 
o 
Table 13.9. (Continued) 
PUnt S Syiter Conponen 1 
Dis­
covery Plant 
S 
s 3 S J 1 1 
£ 
e Î g 
Na
me
 
Do
ck
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 
c 
<§ 5 
5 
£ Po
we
r 
M
od
e 
Remarks: 
349 368 014141 020276 030176 SF 
CSS 
XX CB vo ITG EO z RI z m H Old Not Taq (durfna reactor vessel head removal for 
refueling) 
350 369 015448 080576 090376 EE XX DC XX 5M0 EO 130 )0L A 067 E Hisunderstandlna (OG was returned to ooerable status 
without retesting) 
351 370 019474 103077 110977 CF cc VX pp 2AL EO Z SO A m G Iwroper lineup (during manual val vino operation -
water hamner occurred) 
352 371 013015 ARl 368 070775 071675 SF 
icci; 
XX VX PH 4CM CO 177H PI A 093 E left Open (after Dump alignment for ES standby i.e., 
with no suction) Connunications (between operators) 
353 J73 015247 071476 072676 RB XX 00 XX 5MT CO Z 10L A 083 F Hi s interpretation (of computer calculations of xenon 
354 37* 018847 080577 082577 EF XX OG XX ITS EO 60 ISl B 091 E Did Not Test (surv. test on OG not performed on tine) 
355 375 018901 082677 090877 SE XX VX FS 2AL CO Z )UD B 100 E Imoroper lineup (while placing H, ouroe system in service 
resulted in improper flow) 
356 377 017483 PÏ1 334 030177 042177 CF CB VX XX ICL CO Z 3UD A 000 G left Open (after fillino RHRS resulted In hioh boron 
concentration in RCS) 
357 378 017565 033177 042977 CH wc PH TX 2)R CO 3H XJO A 0M G Improper Operation (contlnuina usina AFWP's while make­
up water was unavailable for PPDUST) 
358 379 017694 042777 052077 IE XX OT XX 2CN CO J70H )UD A 100 E Improper Connection (Detector #2 of APOHS was connected 
to thimble C-8 rather than thimble F-9) 
359 ISO »5005 YRl 029 111869 111969 CB KX VM XX 30P EO Z SA A z E Inadvertent Open (EO accidentiv onened a valve fro# LPST) 
Table 13.9. (Continued) 
PUnt S 
5ysten Conpcmen 
1 
f 
Dis­
covery PUnt 
S 
o 
S 
1 ? ? o 
M
et
ho
d 
1 
1 Do
ck
 
1 1 1 
% 
S 1 
ï 3 g 
S 
C 
A 5 M
et
ho
d 
1 
1 Mo
de
 
Remarks: 
360 381 016867 010477 020377 PC XX PH XX SPU CO z ROL A 092 E Procedure Unfanill larltv (one coolant charalnv Duno 
was out of service for maintenance, one was In fixed 
speed mode, and one was In variable speed node) 
361 382 015392 BF2 260 061976 070276 RB XX VX CD IVF CO z 3U0 B 000 H Did Not Verify (valve position: one CRD became Incapable 
of being scramed) 
362 384 010930 CCI 317 103174 111174 SF XX ss XX lïF CO 4M SI A 000 G Did Not Verify (CO trloped the ZD group nodule 
"according as required by test proc. without verifying 
that the ZG module had been tripped for nalnt.) 
363 38S 1112499 04067S 041875 HA XX VH TX ICL EO Z XID A 100 B Left Open 
364 385 D1Z499 040675 041875 MA XX VH TX IVF EO Z )UD A 100 B Old Not Verify (valve position before discharge of RCUHT) 
365 186 012935 061275 061975 SH' XX 10 SS 6PI E Z RI B 080 F Procedure Inadequacy (blocking of two logic cabinets 
negated the responses of all 4 pressurlzer pressure 
sensor channels) 
366 186 912935 061275 061975 SH XX ZI XX 5l£ £0 z RI 8 080 F lack of Experience (no corrective action was taken) 
367 187 913079 071675 072575 MB XX VH XX ICL CT !1H AD A 099 E Left Partially Open (following sampling: release of 
radioactive gas from site boundary; tMi personnel 
slightly contaminated) 
368 388 013056 072175 073175 MA XX TX XX 3RL EO 35M UO A 100 E Inadvertent Release (EO misread valve numbers and 
released wrong RCHMT) 
369 389 315595 073075 080775 RB XX ZZ XX 5MJ CO HJD A 092 F Hlsludaenent (failure to reduce power enough to 
compensate for the reduced sea water condenser flow 
temperature) 
370 390 515594 082875 090475 RB %x ZZ XX 5HJ CO Z HiO A 087 F Hisludgenent (failure to reduce power enough to 
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Remarks: 
423 450 000605 120473 121273 SA XX ¥M XX 2AL X) 9H AD A 091 E Imsrooer Uneuo (valve lineup MS not changed back 
after maintenance Mrk) 
424 4SI 010364 062074 070374 HA XX TX XX 2CT :o Z DUO A 100 E Imorooer Calculation (the factor used in calculating the 
discharge of liquid did effluents fro# the 'A* FDST was 
Increased to 10 without authorization, the operating 
order penalts a maximum factor of 3 without authorization) 
425 452 012217 012575 020375 R8 XX CR XX 2WD :o 90H OUO Z m H InaroDer Withdrawal (of two adjacent control blades 
during rod drive overhaul) 
426 453 012752 052675 060575 SF XX VH XX ICL :0 Z DUO B 029 E Lgft Ongn (two LPCI header vent valves had been left open) 
427 454 012752 052675 060575 LPCI 
il 
XX VH XX 5LE EO Z DUO B 029 E lack of ExperlencefEO fallal ta find valve locatlansl 
42B 455 012752 052675 060575 XX VH XX 30P p z XIO B 029 E iMdYftfPt Ppep (while ventino LPCI header) 
429 456 012845 061575 062565 so XX se vo 2PN EO z RI B m G Hlsoosltlonlna (durtno test, high flow Isolation iP switch was placed In "AUTO" Instead of "CLOSED*, 
this allowed excessive cycling of the valve. Its stem 
was bent) 
4» 457 013459 092975 100975 SE XX VH XX ICL EO z RT A 037 E Left Partially Ooen (resulted In drywell overpressurlza-
431 458 013508 100775 101775 SE' XX AL XX 5NR CO 15H AD B 068 E No Response (failure In heating steam boilers "for 
liquid Ng"; Ng entered the line causing cracking ) 
432 459 013647 103175 110675 SF' 
HPCI 
SA VX WW 2A1. CO Z AD B 087 E Misaiianment (during HPCI surv.; resulting In storage 
tank was being discharged to torus whose level exceed 
T.S. limit) 
433 460 014076 010976 012676 IF XX SX zz 2PN EO 20 RI B 075 E Misoosltioninq (resluted In "B" TIP probe being at 
wrong position In the shield) 
434 461 014333 032276 040676 SP XX CB PM IRN H Z RI B m H Old Not Return to Service (after aulntenance) 
43S (61 014333 032276 040676 SF XX PM XX IVF CO Z RI B m H Did Not Verify (ooerablllty of the pump) 
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44S 475 010399 053074 062874 RB XX CR XX ITS CO SO RSI A 030 E Old Net Test (one steo of CRD oosltlon checks was not 
completed on five occasions) 
446 476 010399 053074 062874 RB XX CR XX ITS CO 40 RSI A 030 E Old Not Test 
447 478 010399 053074 062874 RB XX Œ XX ITS CO 120 RSI A 030 E Old Hot Test 
448 47» 010399 053074 062874 R8 XX (H XX ITS CO 100 RSI A 030 E Did Not Test 
449 480 010399 053074 062874 RB XX (R XX ITS CO 70 RSI A 030 E Did Not Test 
4S0 4S2 010571 081074 081674 lA XX SP lOP EO 220 Rl B m 8 Left Closed (two reactor oressure switch Instrument IV's 
were found closed. One SP provides a high reactor 
pressure signal to RPS channels A and B) 
4SI 483 010599 082074 090574 SA XX 00 XX IVF CO 75M OUI A m 8 Old Hot Verify (CO Initiated the steam condensing mode of 
RHRS without prior assurance that the radwaste system had 
the capability to process excess water from the SC; level 
of SC exceeded T.S. limits) 
452 484 010913 101074 102974 IE XX n XX ITS EO Z RSI A 000 8 Old Hot Test (Rx restarted without oerfomina the 
subject shift Instrument checks) 
453 485 01241B 032475 040375 se XX ai XX SMJ CO 19H OUE A 012 E Mis.ludaenent (CO underestimated the time after which Of 
concentration will decrease to the T.S. limit with Rx 
In 'RUN' mode) 
454 486 012520 041975 042375 SA XX RI: su 2R0 CO Z OUI A 044 F Misread ( the on the level recorders: water volume In 
SC exceeded T.S. limits) 
455 487 013106 072275 073175 SA XX V): SU 2AL CO 28H OUI B 059 E Hisallonnent (durlno surv. test' direct flow oath from 
CSS to SC resulted; SC's level exceeded T.S. limit) 
456 489 013230 080475 082675 M XX OCi XX ITS CO 340 RSI 8 080 E Old Hot Test (surv. test for SDGTS and SBFUO were not 
performed; personnel oversight) 
457 490 015633 111975 112675 HC XX m XX IRC CO 7H ROI A 080 F Did Hot Record (the discharge canal water system temoera-
tures 'must be logged hourly when the process computer 
out of service) 
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Remarks: 
467 4*9 012775 060375 061275 WC KX OZ XX 2PS CO > out A 042 E Imorooer Placement Into Service (the *C" condensate 
deatneralfzer was put Into service before completing the 
final rinse of the dcmlnerallzer; reactor conductivity 
exceeded T.S. limits) 
468 soo 012776 060775 061275 CA XX 00 XX 51A CO Z ouc A 010 E Inattention (temoerature between the upper and lower 
regions of the core exceeded T.S. limits) 
469 502 013136 081075 081875 RC XX 00 XX 4CH CO 2 ROL 0 088 8 Communication (ooor coanunlcatlon between tne ooeratlons 
group and the reactor analyst group resulted In MAPLHGR 
exceeding the T.S. limit) 
470 503 015060 050476 070176 CF xt CB XX 2RS CO Z RSI A 090 E Imorooer Removal From Service (RHR Dumo "C" breaker 
was removed from service for maintenance without 
performing the associated surv.) 
471 SOI 015065 062976 070176 SA x:( VM RM lOP EO Z out 8 093 E Left Closed (2 drvwell RM suction valves found closed; 
Og concentration In the drywell Increased) 
472 SOS 017378 011677 012577 HC x:{ RM XX SIA EO z R] A 088 E Inattention (failure to observe that monitoring svsten 
was not operating following UPS transfer) 
473 506 016977 011477 021177 MC %x RM XX ITS EO 10 RSt B 068 E Old Not Test (off-oas orocess RM functional test not 
completed in * 25: of specified Interval) 
474 507 017370 022877 040177 CB X): PM XX 20R CO z ROl A 061 E Imorooer Ooeratlon (PM "8* started while PM "A* at 
speed higher than required by T.S.) 
475 SOB 017337 030377 040177 SO X): VP vo 20R EO z out 8 060 E Imorooer Ooeratlon (outboard floor drain IV operator 
found overridden in the open direction; the valve failed 
to close on an isolation signal) 
476 509 017579 041977 050377 MC x> PM XX 1ST CO 36H Rl C 065 E Old Not Start (failure to resurt the plant Mack 
monitoring sample pump after it had been tripped on 
UPS transfer) 
477 510 017726 040277 051977 MC XX RM XX 4CM CO 140 RDI A 087 E Communication (CO failed to announce an area RM high 
alarm on the speaker system; one technician received 
greater than necessary radiation exposure) 
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522 019570 111177 112377 MB XX TX XX 2RL CO 3H Rl A m H Improper Release (HGDT-B released with both building 
exhaust units Inoperable) 
4B9 523 002329 RGl 244 061072 020973 MB XX VM TX ICL M Z AD A z Z Old Not Close (resulted In GOT leakage to Dump tank) 
490 524 012938 061175 062575 SF 
SIS 
(X VM PM lOP EO 300 Rl B 090 E Left Closed (during SI. ouao nonthly surv. testing, 
two pump discharge MOV's were left closed) 
491 525 012907 061775 063075 CB (X 00 XX IFP CT Z RSA A 080 E Old Not Follow Procedure (failure to Increase the 
frequency of RC sample test for gross radloictlvlty 
concentration; gross radioactivity concentration 
exceeded T.S. limit) 
49Z 526 013169 081575 082275 FC :(X ¥0 XX 20P CO 3M AD A 100 E Imoraoer Ooen (CO closed N0V-851B. erroneously reooened 
It before the next step to stroke H0V-8508:flow path from 
RWST to containment pump occurred) 
493 527 000176 HNl 213 062173 070373 CG )(X VM XX ZtL CO Z QUO 2 Z Z Imnmner Closure (The valve In the ourflcatlon line was 
overtoroued between the low exchange outlet and RC filter 
Inlet: unplanned release of rad. materials occurred) 
494 528 013767 111875 112575 SB ):x FS XX IPS EA 45M AO A 100 E Did Not Place In Service (CO was told to olice filter B 
In service and Isolate filter A, he Isolated filter A 
only this interrupted SW flow to ill 4 contalnMnt reclr-
culatlon fan coolers) 
495 529 015097 061776 062476 EC CF BS PM IFP CO Z QUO Z Z Z Did Not Follow Procedure (bus 6 was loaded with ill Its 
normal loads; power lost to RHR pump; auxiliary buses 
must not be loaded fully) 
to 
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14. APPENDIX B: DERIVED HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITIES 
AND RELATED PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS 
This appendix presents the estimated human error proba­
bilities (HEPs) and uncertainty bounds related to the opera­
tion of valves. The data given in this appendix were taken 
from Swain and Gultmann's handbook (11). The following two 
types of valves were considered: 
(1) a locally operated valve that is opened or closed by 
manipulating a handle such as a wheel, and 
(2) a motor-operated valve that is remotely controlled by 
a switch in the control room. 
The first type can be designated as a manual valve and 
the second type as an MOV. It is assumed that the changing 
of valves from their normal operating position and their 
subsequent restoration is normally performed by operator 
personnel. Exceptions are operations performed by main­
tenance personnel within some area valved off by operating 
personnel. The meaning of the uncertainty bounds x(y to z) 
is the best estimate of the HEP is x and it is unlikely 
that an HEP would be lower than y or higher than z. 
Manual operation of controls includes the operation 
of all kinds of switches, connectors, and valves. Table 
14.1 applies to control other than valves and lists errors 
of commission only. 
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Table 14.1. Probabilities of errors of commission in oper­
ating manual control 
Task HEP 
Select wrong control in a group of 3 x 10~^ (10~^ - 10~^) 
identical controls identified by 
tables only 
-3 -4 —2 Select wrong control from a func- 10 (5 x 10 - 10 ) 
tionally grouped set of controls 
Select wrong control from a panel 5 x 10 ^^10 ^ - 10 
with clearly drawn mimic lines 
Turn control in wrong direction 5 x 10"^ (10~^ - 10 
(no violation of populational 
stereotypes) 
Turn control in wrong direction 5x10 ^ (5x10 ^ - 10 
(violates a strong populational 
stereotype) 
-1 -1 -1 
Turn control in wrong direction 5 x 10 (10 - 9 x10 ) 
under high stress (design 
violates a strong populational 
stereotype) 
-3 -4 -1 Set a multiposition selector switch 10 (10 - 10 ) 
to an incorrect setting 
Improperly mate a connector 10~^(10 ^ - 5 x 10 ^) 
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Table 14.2. Probabilities of errors of omission by opera­
tors in changing or restoring valves^ 
Task - Failure to HEP 
Initiate task of changing or 
restoring valves 
Change or restore a valve, given 
task begun 
Written procedures used 
Written procedures not used 
One valve 
More than one valve 
Tag a valve, circuit breaker, or 
switch for MOV after changing 
it 
With level 3 tagging, multiply 
all relevant HEPs which assume 
level 2 tagging by 10 Owith 
maximum HEP of .5) 
With first-level tagging, com­
plete dependence is assumed 
between all steps in a task 
Lock a valve after restoration 
(if required) 
With first-level locking, failure 
to lock a valve after restora­
tion (if required) 
0.001(0.0005 - 0.005) 
Use table B.6 
0.001(0.0005 - 0.005) 
Use table B.7 
0.001(0.0005 - 0.005) 
0.001(0.0005 - 0.005) 
0.005(0.002 - 0.02) 
0.001(0.0005 - 0.005) 
^Second level tagging and locking are assumed unless 
otherwise stated. 
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Table 14.3. Probabilities of errors of commission by opera­
tor changing or restoring manual or motor-
operated valves^ 
Task HEP 
Operator selects wrong valve where 5x10 ^(2xl0~^ - 2x10 
the valve is one of the two or 
more adjacent, similar-appearing 
valves, and at least one other 
valve is in the same state as the 
desired valve; or the valves are 
MOVs of a type such that valve 
status cannot be determined at the 
valve itself 
Reversal error: Operator "changes" 
a valve that had already been 
changed and tagged by someone 
else; this error would restore 
the valve to its normal position 
Reversal error if the valve had 
been changed and not tagged 
Operator manipulates wrong MOV 
switch or circuit breaker in a 
group of similar-appearing items 
Failure to complete a change of a 
state of an MOV of the type that 
requires the operator to hold the 
switch until the change is com­
pleted 
Failure to note that there is more 
than one tag on a valve (or MOV 
circuit breaker or switch) that 
he has decided to restore 
Given that a manual valve sticks, 
operator erroneously concludes 
that the valve is fully open (or 
closed): 
Rising-stem valve 
If the valve sticks at about 
3/4 or more of its full travel 
(no position indicators 
present) 
^HEPS below apply to both first and second level tag­
ging. 
10"4(5xl0"5 _ 10-3) 
-1 -2 -1 
10 ^(10 - 5x10 ) 
3xlO"3(lo"3 - 10"^) 
3x10"^(10"^ - 10"^) 
10"*(5xl0"S _ 5x10"*) 
5x10"^(2x10"^ - 2x10"^) 
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Table 14.3. (Continued) 
Task HEP 
If there is an indicator showing 
the full extent of travel. 
All other valves 
If there is a position indi­
cator on the valve 
If there is a position indi­
cator located elsewhere (and 
extra effort is required to 
look at it) 
If there is no position indi­
cator 
-3 -4 -2 
10 (5x10 - 10 ) 
2x10"^(10"^ - lO"^) 
-2 -3 -1 
10 ^(3x10 ^ - 10 ^) 
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Table 14.4. Probabilities of errors by second operator 
checking valve changing or restoration tasks 
by a first operator 
Task HEP 
Failure to initiate checking task 10"3(5x10-4 _ Sxio"^) 
Errors by checker given oral 
instructions 
Use table B . 2  
For other checking errors Use tables B . 2  &  B . 3  
Table 14.5. Probabilities of 
ten procedures 
error in preparation of writ-
Task HEP 
Omitting an item 3x10-3(15x10-4 - 15x10-3) 
Writing an item incorrectly 3x10-3(15x10-4 _ 15x10-3) 
Table 14.6. Probabilities of error of omission in use of 
written procedures in nonpassive tasks 
Task HEP 
Procedures with checkoff provision 
Short list, 10 items 10-3(10"^ - 5x10"-^) 
Long list, 10 items 3x10"^(8xl0~^ - 10 
Procedures with no checkoff provisions 
Short list, 10 items 3x10 (8x10 - 10 ) 
Long list, 10 items 10 ^ (10~^ - 5x10"^) 
Checkoff provision improperly used 5xl0~^(10 ^ - 9x10"^) 
Procedures available but not used 
Maintenance tasks 5x10 (10 - 9x10 ) 
Valve change or restoration 10 ^(5xl0~^ - 5x10 
tasks 
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Table 14.7. Probabilities of errors in recalling special 
instruction items given orally 
Task HEP 
Failure to recall any given item, 
given that these items ; 
1. 
2 .  
3. 
4. 
5. 
10"3(5x10-4 _ 5x10-3) 
3x10"^(15x10"^ - 15x10"^) 
10~^(5xl0"'^ - 5X10~3) 
v-2 -4 ,-3, 3x10 '(15x10 ' - 15x10 •") 
10"^(5xl0"^ - 5x10"^) 
Unrecovered failure to recall 
first item if supervisor 
checks to see that the task 
was done 
Negligible 
If item is written down by 
recipient: 
Failure to recall any item 
(exclusive of errors in 
writing) 
10"3(5X10"4 
- 5x10 ^) 
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15. APPENDIX C: DESCRIPTION OF THE PREP 
CODES AND ITS INPUT DATA 
The PREP program is designed for use as a preprocessor 
for the KITT programs. The PREP programs find the minimal 
cut sets and/or the minimal path sets from the system's 
fault tree and output them in format compatible for use with 
KITT. 
The programs are written in Fortran IV for the IBM 
360/75 computer and are capable of finding the minimal cut 
and path sets for fault trees with up to 2000 components 
and up to 2000 logical gates. The PREP minimal cut sets 
may be obtained by either deterministic testing or Monte 
Carlo simulation. The system's minimal path sets are found 
by Monte Carlo simulation. The code is composed of two sec­
tions; TREBIL which reads the input and generates the logi­
cal equivalent of the fault tree, and MINSET which obtains 
the minimal cut or path sets of the fault tree. 
The TREBIL program is designed to accept a description 
of the system fault tree in a format which is natural for 
the engineer, and to generate a logical equivalent of that 
fault tree. 
One card is read in for each logical gate in the fault 
tree. The card contains the name of the gate, the type of 
the gate ("AND" or "OR"), the number and names of the other 
gates which are attached to it, and the number and names of 
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components which are attached to it. Since TREBIL is de­
signed to accept only "AND" gates and "OR" gates as input, 
other types of gates must be described in terms of these 
simple gate types. 
Fig. 8.4 shows the logical subroutine TREE generated 
by TREBLE. Each component is internally indexed by TREBIL 
and is treated as an element in a FORTRAN logical array 
(called "X"). Similarly, each gate is indexed and treated 
as an element in another FORTRAN logical array (called "A") . 
The MINSET program determines the minimal cut or path 
sets of the fault tree. The MINSET program allows minimal 
cut sets to be found by either deterministic testing or by 
Monte Carlo simulation. Minimal path sets must be found by 
Monte Carlo simulation. 
In deterministic testing (COMBO), each component is 
first failed individually to obtain the one component mini­
mal cut sets. Next, every possible combination of two com­
ponents are failed to obtain the two component minimal cut 
sets. The algorithm proceeds in this manner until minimal 
cut sets are obtained having n components where n is speci­
fied by the user. 
Deterministic testing is the most reliable method for 
obtaining minimal cut sets since it is theoretically possi­
ble to test all possible combinations of components. 
In order to use COMBO, the starting (MIN) and ending 
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(MAX) values for the number of components in the minimal 
cut sets must be specified. If the minimum number speci­
fied is 0 (or left blank), then Monte Carlo simulation is 
used. The maximum number of components allowed by the pro­
gram is 10 (MAX ^  10). 
In the Monte Carlo simulation (FATE), failures of the 
components are chosen according to their failure distribu­
tions and TREE tested for a system failure. If a failure 
has occurred, then the set of components which are failed 
is stored to obtain the minimal cut set. Once the minimal 
cut set has been found, it is checked against all previ­
ously found minimal cut sets to eliminate duplicates. This 
procedure is called a Monte Carlo trial. An input switch 
(INDEXI) is provided which causes the program to search for 
a minimal path set on any trial which does not result in 
system failure. 
The probability of a failure before time t for a com­
ponent is computed by the exponential distribution. If 
this probability of a failure before time T is p(t), then 
p(T) = 1 - exp(-AT) 
where 
X = the failure intensity (per hour) for the particular 
component, and 
T = time in hours. 
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15.1. Input Data Description 
The input to TREBIL consists of the three input groups: 
(1) Control information; 
(2) The fault tree description; and 
(3) The failure and repair data for the components. 
The total input deck has the following format: 
1. TITLE CARD 
2. {COMMENTS CARDS} 
3. * 6 DATA (b = blank column) 
4. {CONTROL PARAMETERS} 
5. END 
6. {COMMENTS CARDS} 
7. * b TREE 
8. {FAULT TREE DESCRIPTION} 
9. END 
10. {COMMENTS CARDS} 
11. * b RATES 
12. {FAILURE AND REPAIR DATA} 
13. END 
15.1.1. Input group 1^ 
Input group 1 consists of the control parameters and 
switches that determine the flow through MINSET, and de­
termine the type of output obtained. The variables for 
input group 1 are input on two cards. Table 15.1 contains 
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a brief description of the contents of input group 1 along 
with its format. 
15.1.2. Input group 2 
Information required for input group 2 is the name of 
each gate in the fault tree, its type, the number of inputs 
to it, and the names of its inputs. The information is 
supplied one gate per card. The input format for input 
group 2 is given in Table 15.2. 
15.1.3. Input group 3 
Information required for input group 3 is a failure 
intensity for each component, repair data for each com­
ponent, and inhibit failure probabilities. Table 15.3. 
tains a brief description of the contents of input group 3. 
Table 15.1. Input group 1 (control information) 
FORTRAN 
variable Description 
Card columns 
format (5110) 
1 
2 
7 
8 
9 
10 
NG Number of gates in the fault tree 
MIN Minimum size of the minimal cut sets to be found 
by deterministic testing (COMBO) 
MAX Maximum size of the minimal cut sets to be found 
by deterministic testing (COMBO) 
IDEXl Switch which determines if minimal cut sets or 
minimal path sets are obtained from FATE 
IDEX2 Switch which determines whether minimal sets are 
to be printed or punched, or both 
MCS Minimum size of the minimal cut sets to be stored 
by Monte Carlo (FATE) 
NREJEC Random number starter 
NTR Number of Monte Carlo trials to run 
I REN Monte Carlo mixing parameters switch 
TAA Monte Carlo mixing parameters 
1-10 
11-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
Card columns 
format 
(4110, 1F20.3) 
1-10 
11-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
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Table 15.2. Input group 2 (format for each input card) 
Inputs Card columns 
1 Gate name (any 8 alphanumeric characters) 1-8 
2 Blank 9 
3 Gate type ("AND" or "OR") 10-12 
4 Blank 13 
5 Number of gate inputs 14-15 
6 Number of component inputs 16-17 
7 First input name 19-26 
8 Blank 27 
etc. etc. 
Table 15.3. Input group 3 (failure and repair data) 
FORTRAN 
variable Description 
Card 
columns 
NAM (I) 
Blank 
LMDA (I) 
TAU (I) 
Blank 
NAM (J) 
Blank 
LMDA (J) 
TAU (J) 
Ith component name 
Ith component failure intensity (per 10^ 
hour) or inhibit, switch indicator 
Ith component repair time 
Jth component name 
Jth component failure intensity (per 10* 
hour) or inhibit, switch indicator 
Jth component repair time or inhibit 
failure probability 
1-8 
9-10 
11-20 
21-30 
31 
32-39 
40-41 
42-51 
The format for input group 3 is (2[AS,2x,F10.6, FlO.3, Ix]) 
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16. APPENDIX D; DESCRIPTION OF THE KITT CODES 
AND ITS INPUT DATA 
The KITT codes consist of two sections: KITT-1 and 
KITT-2. KITT-1 can handle components which are non-
repairable or which have a constant repair time t. The 
failure intensity (X) of each component is assumed to be 
constant with respect to time (i.e., exponential failure 
distributions are only considered). As in kinetic Tree 
Theory, the components are assumed independent. Further, 
all the components are assumed to be in their operating 
state at t = 0. KITT-1 is a single phase component code; each 
component may have only one failure intensity X and one re­
pair time t for all operation time. 
Besides the X and t for each component, KITT-1 requires 
as input either the unique minimal cut sets of the fault 
tree or the unique minimal path sets of the fault tree. 
For each component of the fault tree, KITT-1 obtains 
the following reliability characteristics : 
q (t): the probability that the component is in its 
failed state at time t; 
w(t): the expected number of failures the component 
will suffer per unit time at time t; 
•t 
w(t)dt: the expected number of failures the component 
0 
will suffer during the time interval from 0 to t; 
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l-exp(-At): the probability that the component will suffer 
one or more failures during the time intervals 
from 0 to 5. 
KITT-2 is essentially identical to KITT-1 with regard 
to input and output. The difference between KITT-1 and 
KITT-2 is the type of component failure and repair distribu­
tions which can be handled. KITT-1 can handle components 
which have constant repair time (t) or which are non-
repairable and which have constant failure intensities (X). 
Moreover, KITT-1 is a single phase code; each component must 
have only one value of t and one value of A for all time (or 
the component must be nonrepairable for all time). KITT-2 
can also handle components which have constant repair time, 
or which are nonrepairable, and which have constant failure 
intensities. However, KITT-2 is a multiphase code. The 
component during different time intervals, called "phase", 
may have different reliability properties. 
The input data for KITT-1 and KITT-2 are given in 
Tables 16.1 and 16.2, respectively. 
Table 16.1. Input for KITT-1 
Input Number of Input 
Group Cards i^ormat: o^ta 
10A8 Title Card 
2 1 110 NPROB (NPR0B7>1) 
3 1 110 NCOMP 
(l£NCOMP<400) 
4 Varies 8 FIO.O x LMDACI; 
1=1, NCOMP 
5 Varies 8 FIO.O TAU (I); 1=1, 
NCOMP 
6 1 110 ISTOP 
Description 
Problem description (any alpha­
numeric characters in the 80 
columns of the cards) 
Number of parameter runs 
Total number of unique component 
plus unique inhibit conditions 
Failure intensity X  (per hour) 
for the component of index I 
A nonpositive X ,  X; denoted that 
component t is an inhibit condition 
Constant repair time t (hours) for 
the component of index I. A non-
positive repair time (t^O) denotes 
a nonrepairable component. For un-
inhibit condition (X^O), T, is the 
occurrence probability 
Bracket flag. If IST0P=2, system 
reliability characteristics are 
obtained by means of bracketing 
procedure. If IST0P=1, bracketing 
procedure is not used 
Table 16.1. (Continued) 
Input Number of „ . Input 
Group Cards i^ormat; [,ata 
2I10,F10.0 NTPT,NOUT, DELTA 
2_<NTPT£50 
K0UT>1 
8 Varies 8F10.0 TOT(t); t=l 
NTPT 
2110 NBMAX, IFAG2 
{1<NBMAX<400) 
10 Varies BUG NB2(N);N=1, 
NBMAX (1_<NB2CN) 
<100) 
11 110 I PATH 
12 1 110 NCUT 
(1<NCUT<500) 
Description 
NTPT total number of time points at 
which reliability characteristics 
are obtained, NOUT print out multiple 
and DELTA spacing between the time 
points. If DELTA 0.0, the time 
points are read in (Input Group 8) 
Time points at which the components, 
set, and system characteristics are 
obtained. If DELTA 0.0, this input 
group is skipped 
Number of outer brackets to obtain, 
system failure rate correction 
flag. If IFAG 2=2, the system 
failure rate correction term is 
bracketed. If IFAG2=1 or if ISTOP 
=1 this group is skipped 
Number of inner brackets to obtain 
for each outer bracket N. If IFAG= 
1, or if IST0P=1 this group is 
skipped 
A flag. If IPATH=1, minimal cut 
sets are read in. If IPATH=2 
minimal path sets are read in 
Total number of unique minimal cut 
sets 
Table 16.1. (Continued) 
Input 
Group 
Number of 
Cards Format 
Input 
Data 
13 Varies 8110 IMJiX, ICUT (k,I) 
1=1, IMAX 
(1<:IMAX<19) 
14 110 NLZiM 
ISA Varies 8F10.0 xLKlDAd) 1=1, 
NCCiMP 
15B Varies 4(110, IND(K), xLMDA 
FIO.O) (IND (K); K=l, 
NLAM) 
Description 
Total number of components plus in­
hibit conditions in the minimal cut 
or path set, indices of the components 
and inhibit conditions in the set 
For NPR0B=1 (Input Group 2), there are 
no more cards to read in. If NPR0B>1, 
read in input groups 14, 15, 16 and 
17 
Number of components and inhibit condi­
tions which have different failure 
intensities A for the new parameter 
run. 
If NLAM=0.0, skip Input Group 15 
If NLAM<NCOMP, read in Group 15-B 
New failure intensities X (per hour) 
for the parameter run. If NLAM=0.0, 
or <NCOMP, this group is skipped 
Index of the component on inhibit con­
dition having a new failure in­
tensity, corresponding new failure 
intensity (per hour). If NLAM=0.0, 
or NCOMP this group is skipped. 
Table 16.1. (Continued) 
Input 
Group 
Number of 
Cards 
Format Input Data Description 
16 
17A 
17B 
110 
Varies 
Varies 
8F10.0 
4 (110, 
FIO.O) 
NTAN 
TAU(I); 
1=1, NCOMP 
IND(K), TAU 
(IND [k]); 
K-1, NTAU) 
Number of components and inhibit con­
ditions having different repair 
times for the new parameter run. If 
NTAN=0.0, no further data to input. 
If NTAN=NCOMP, read in group 17A 
If NTAN<NCOMP„ read in Input Group 17B 
New repair times t (hours) for the 
parameter run. If NATU=0.0, or <NCOMP 
this group is skipped 
Index of the component or inhibit 
condition having a new repair time, 
corresponding new repair time 
(hours) 
If NTAU-0.0 or = NCOMP this group is 
skipped 
Table 16.2. Input for KITT-2 
Input Number Input 
Group of Cards format Data 
10A8 Title Card 
2 1 110 1 NCOMP<350 
3 1 2110, FIO.O NTpT, NOUT, 
DELTA 2<NTpT 
50<NOUT 1 
4 Varies 8F10.0 TOT (t); t=l, 
NTpT 
5 1 110 ISTOP 
Description 
Problem description (any alpha­
numeric characters in the 80 columns 
of the card) 
Total number of unique components 
plus unique inhibit conditions 
Total number of time points at 
which reliability characteristics 
are obtained, print out multiple, 
and spacing between the time points. 
If DELTA<0.0, the time points are 
read (Input Group 4) 
Time points at which the components, 
set, and system characteristics are 
obtained 
If DELTA>0, this group is skipped 
Bracket flag. If IST0P=2, system 
reliability characteristics are ob­
tained by means of bracketing pro­
cedure. If IST0P=1; bracketing 
procedure not used 
Table 16.2. (Continued) 
Input Number 
Group of Cards Format 
Input 
Data 
2110 NBMAX, IFAG2 
1<NBMAX<100 
Varies 8110 NE2(N); N=1 
8 
9 Varies 
2110 IDEX, NPHASE 
NPHASE<50 
8F10.0 Tp{L); L=l, 
NPHASE 
10 110 IBPHA 
11 Varies 8110 IBPOS (K), 
K=l, IBPHA 
Description 
Number of outer brackets to obtain, 
system failure rate correction flag. 
If IFAG2=2, the system failure rate 
correction term is bracketed. If 
IFAG2=1, this correction is not 
computed. If IST0P=1 this group is 
skipped 
Number of inner brackets for each 
outer bracket (NB2(N)<30). If 
IFAG2=1, this group is skipped 
The component index, the number of 
phases for the component 
The end-times (hours) for each phase 
in order of increasing phase num­
ber. Phase 1 is always assumed to 
begin at t=0 
Boundary index (IBPHA^SO). If 
IBPHA=0, there are no boundary 
conditions imposed on the phase 
boundaries. If IBPHA>0, IBPHA is 
the number of such boundary 
conditions. 
Phase numbers for which there are im­
posed failure probabilities at the 
phase beginning time. If IBPHA<0, 
this group is skipped 
Table 16.2. (Continued) 
Input 
group 
Number 
of cards Format 
Input 
data Description 
12 Varies 8F10. 0 QBPOS (K), 
K=l, IBPHA 
Corresponding imposed failure probability 
for phase IBPOS(K). If IBPHA ^ 0, this 
group is skipped 
13 Varies 8F10. 0 XLMDA(L), 
TAU(L); L=l, 
NPHASE 
The component failure intensity XL (per 
hour) and repair time tj, (hours) for phase 
L 
14 1 FIO.O 000 The initial failed probability at t=0, q(0) 
15 1 2110 IDEX, NPHASE 
NPHASE<50 
The negative of the inhibit condition index, 
the numbers of phases for the inhibit condi­
tion. If there are no inhibit conditions, 
this group is skipped 
16 Varies 8F10. 0 TP(L); L=l, 
NPHASE 
The end times (hours) for each phase 
17 Varies 8F10. 0 PROB(L); L=l, 
NPHASE 
Occurrence probabilities for each phase 
18 1 110 I PATH Set flag. If IPATH=1, minimal cut sets are 
used; if IPATH=2, minimal path sets are used 
19 . 1 110 NCUT (NCUT< 
50) 
Number of minimal cut or path sets 
20 Varies 8110 IMAX, ICUT 
(K,I); 1=1, 
IMAX 
Number of components plus inhibit conditions 
in the set (IMAX^19), list of components and 
inhibit indices in the set. For more than 7 
indices, continue on the next card with the 
same format (8110) 
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17. APPENDIX E; KITT-1 OUTPUT RESULTS 
FOR THE CSIS FAULT TREE 
Because of the similarities of the KITT-1 output for 
the three cases (WASH-1400, LERs and NUREG), only a sample 
from the KITT-1 output results for the first case is given 
here. 
Tables are given here for quick translation of the KITT-1 
output. Table 17.1 gives information concerning the component. 
Table 17.2 gives information concerning the minimal cut set. 
Table 17. 3 gives information concerning the system-upper 
bound. In addition to that, KITT-1 output results for the 
CSIS fault tree are given (see pages 303-316). 
Table 17.1. Key to component and inhibit information 
Program output Information 
T (hours) t ,  time (in hours) 
Q q(t), the component failed probability 
W w(t), the component failure rate (per hour) 
L X ,  the (input) component failure intensity 
(per hour) 
•t 
w(t')dt*, the expected number of failures 
• 0 to time t 
FSUM l-exp(-At), the probability of one or more 
failures to time t 
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Table 17.2. Key to minimal cut sets information 
Program output Information 
T (hours) 
Q 
W 
t, time (in hours) 
Q'(t), the minimal cut set failed 
probability 
W'(t), the minimal cut set failure rate 
(per hour) 
X(t), the minimal cut set failure intensity 
(per hour) 
WSUM W'(t)dt', the expected number of failures 
. to time t 
FSUM 1-exp[- A*(t')dt']f the probability of one 
or more failures to time 
t 
Table 17.3. Key to system information - upper bounds 
Program 
output Information 
T (hours) t, time (in hours) 
N 
W 
WSUM 
FSUM 
1- n [l-Q!(t)], the upper bound for Q.ft) 
i=l ^ " 
Z W!(t), the upper bound for W_(t) (per hour) 
i=l ^ " 
N 
, the upper bound for AQ(t) (per hour) 
Z W.(t) 
i=l ^ 
Nc 
n [1-0!(t)] 
i=l ^ 
t 
Z W!(t')]dt', the upper bound for 
0 i=l 
Wo(t')d^ 
l-exp{-
.  n  w!  ( f  ) 
^ i=l ^ 
0 
i=l 
-]dt'}, the upper bound for 1-exp A^ft' )dt'] 
[1-Q|(t)] 
4 PRQBL6M IITLC FOR THIS ANALYSIS BY KITT-U SAFTV ANALYSIS PROBLEM FOR CONVERSION CHECKING 
NO. OF PARAMETER RUNS INPROB) » 1 
NO. OF COMPONENTS AND INHIBIT CONDITIONS INCOMPI % 21 
COMPONENT DATA ILANBDA AND TAUl 
INOH-POSITIVE TAU DENOTES NON-REPAiR) 
CNON-POStTlYE LAMBDA DENOTES INHIBIT COHOlTlOMI 
COMPONENT INDfiX LAMBDA TAU 
1 2*iOOOOOOOD*OB 3.600000000 02 
2 2«BDOOOOOOO*OB 3.600000000 02 
3 7*60000000D-07 *.000000000 02 
A 1*300000000-08 3.600000000 02 
B 2.B0000000D~0B 3.600000000 02 
6 3.0BOOO0OOO*O6 3.600000000 02 
7 3.0OOO00OOD-OB 3.600000000 02 
B 3.000000000-0* 3.600000000 02 
9 3.000000000-09 3.600000000 02 
10 3.000000000-0B B.000000000-01 
11 2.BO0000O0O-06 3.000000000 02 
12 3«OOQQOQQOO-OB A.AOOOOOOOO 03 
13 3.000000000-0* 3.600000000 02 
U 3.000000000-10 1.000000000 01 
IS 2.B00O0000D-O7 3.600000000 02 
16 3.000000000-06 3.600000000 02 
IT 3.000000000-07 4.000000000 02 
18 B . 000000000-07 A . 000000000 02 
19 i«ooodooooo-io 2.400000000 01 
20 I.OOOOOOOOO-IO 2.400000000 01 
21 1.000000000-10 4.400000000 03 
BRACKET FLAG IISTOPI. IF ISTOP=2 SYSTEM IM'ORMATION IS OBTAINED FROM BRACKETING. IF ISTOP=l IT IS NOT. 
FOR 1H1S PROBLEM ISTOP a 2 
NO. OF TIME POINTS INTPT) = 20 
PRIM OUT MULTIPLE INOUT) = I 
MESH SIZE (DELIA) s S.OOOOOOOOO 01 HOURS 
NUMBER OF OUTER BRACKETS INBNAX) = 10 
FAILURE RATE CORRECTION FLAG C1FAG2) = 2 
INNER BRACKETS FOR IFAG2=2 
OUTER BRACKET KO. CM) NO. OF INNER BRACKETS CNB2CNI) 
1 
2 
9 
4 
e 
6 
# 
9 2 
10 1 
SET FLAf CIPATH). IF :PATH=# ttlUIMAt CUT SETS ARE USED. 
FOR THIS PROBLEM IPATH = 1 
NO. OF SETS (NCUTI = 19 
SET INFORMATION 
SET NO. 1. WITH COMPONENTS - S 
SET NO. 2. VITK COMPONENTS - 6 
SET NO. 3. MITH COMPONENTS - 7 
SET NO. 4. WITH COMPONENTS - 8 
SET NO. Q. WITH COMPONENTS - 9 
SET NO* a. WITH COMPONENTS - 10 
SET NO. 7» WITH COMPONENTS - 11 
SET NO. 0» WITH COMPONENTS - 12 
SET NO. 9» WITH COMPONENTS - 19 
SET NO. 10» WITH COMPONENTS - 14 
SET NO. 11. WITH COMPONENTS - 19 
SET NO. 12, WITH COMPONENTS - 16 
SET NO. 13» WITH COMPONENTS * 17 
SET NO. 14. WITH COMPONENTS • 18 
SET NO. 19. WITH COMPONENTS - 19 
SET NO. 16, WITH COMPONENTS - 20 
SET NO. 17. WITH COMPONENTS - 21 
SET NO. 18, WITH COMPONENTS - 2 1 
SET NO. 19, WITH COMPONENTS 4 3 
S ARE USED. 
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1 ggg O g o  o  o  o  O o  o  O a O g O o  o  o  o  o  e  O e o o  o  s o  o  o  o  o  o  e  o  o  o  o  o  o  
g  o  g  e  o  e  o  o  o  e o o  o  
o  e  e  o  o  o  o  o  O o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
o  o  o  e o o  o  o  o  o  e  o  o  e o o  
o  o  o  o  o  o  e o o  
e o o  o  e  o  o  o  o  o  e  o  o  o  o  o  
• • « 
o  ^  w  m m c c o  o  r »  p »  
T (HOURS) Q M L 
0 .0 0 .0 1 .00000000* 10 1 «00000000-10 
6 .00000000 01 2 .40000000 *0 9 1 .00000000* 10 1 .00000000-10 
1 .00000000 02 2 .40000000 -09 1 .00000000-10 1 .00000000-10 
1 .90000000 02 2 .40000000 -09 1 .06000000-10 1 .00000000* 10 
2 .00000000 02 2 .40000000 *09 1 .00000000* 10 1 .00000000* 10 
2 .60000000 02 2 .40000000 -09 1 .00000060* 10 1 .00000000* 10 
9 .00000000 02 2 .40000000 -09 1 .00000000* 10 1 .00000000* 10 
3 •90000000 02 2 .40000000 -09 1 .00000000* 10 1 .00000000* 10 
4 .00000000 02 2 .40000000 *09 1 .00000000* 10 1 #00000000-10 
4 .90000000 02 2 .40000000 *09 1 .00060000* 10 1 .00000000* 10 
6 .00000000 02 2 .40000000 *09 1 .00000060-10 1 .00000000-10 
6 .60000000 02 2 .40000000 *09 1 .00000060* 10 1 .00000000* 10 
6 •00000000 02 2 •40000000 -09 1 .00000000* 10 1 .00000000* 10 
6 .90000000 02 2 .40000000 *09 1 .00000000* 10 1 •oooooooor lo 
7 .00000000 02 2 .40000000 *09 1 .06000000-10 1 .00000000* 10 
7 .90000000 02 2 .40000000 -09 1 .06000000* 10 t  .00000000* 10 
6 .00000000 02 2 .40000000 -09 1 .00000000* 10 1 .00000000* 10 
8 .90000000 02 2 .40000000 *09 1 .00000000* io 1 .00000000* 10 
9 .00000000 02 2 .40000000 *09 1 .00000000* 10 1 .00000000-10 
9 .90000000 02 2 .40000000 *09 1 .06000000* io 1 .00600000* 10 
CHARACfCRlSriCS FOR COMPONENT NO. s 21 
T (HOURS) Q « L 
0 • 0 0.0 1.00000000* 10 1 .06000000-10 
6 .00000000 01 4.99999940-09 1.00000000-10 1 .00000060-10 
1 .00000000 02 9.99999690*09 9.99999990* 11 1 .06000000-to 
1 •90000000 02 1.49999960*08 9.99999990-M 1 .00000000-lo 
2 .00000000 02 1.99999980-08 9.9*999960-11 1 .06000000-10 
2 .90000000 02 2.49999970-08 9.99999980* 11 1 .00000000-10 
2 .60000000 02 2.99999970-06 9.99999970* 11 1 .00600000-10 
3 •90000000 02 9.49999960-06 9.99999970-li 1 .00000000-lo 
4 .00000000 02 9.99999960*06 9.99999960* 11 1 .00000000-10 
4 .90000000 02 4.49999964*4# 9.99999960* ti 1 .00000000* 10 
6 .00000000 02 4.99999940-06 9.99999960-11 i .00000000* lo 
6 .90000000 02 6.49999940*06 9.99999960* 11 1 .00000000* 10 
6 .00000000 02 6.99999990-08 9.99999940-11 1 .00000000-10 
6 .90000000 02 6.49999990-06 9.99999940-11 1 .00000000* io 
7 .00000000 02 6.99999920-08 9.999999*90* 11 1 .00000000-10 
7 .90000000 02 7.49999920-08 9.99999990-11 1 .00000000* 10 
8 .00000000 02 7.99999910-08 9.99999920* 11 1 .00000000-10 
8 •90000000 02 8.49999910-06 9.99999920-11 1 .00000000-10 
9 .00000000 02 8.99999900-06 9.99999910* 11 1 .00000000* 10 
9 •90000000 02 9.49999900*08 9.99999910-11 1 .00000000-10 
«SUM 
0*0 
6.00000000-09 
1.00000000*00 
1.80000000*00 
2.00000000*00 
2.60000000*00 
3.00000000*00 
9.60000000*00 
4.00000000-00 
4.60000000*00 
6.00000000*08 
6.60000000*00 
6.00000000*00 
6.60000000*00 
7.00000000*00 
7.60000000*00 
6.00000000-00 
6.60000000*00 
9.00000000-06 
9.60000000-06 
FSUN 
0.0 
6.00000000-09 
1.00000000*06 
1.60000000-06 
2.00000000-00 
2.60000000-00 
9.00000000-00 
9.49999990-06 
9.99999990-06 
4.49999990-06 
4.99999990-00 
6.49999990-06 
6.99999960*06 
6.49999960*06 
6.99999960-06 
7.49999970-06 
7.99999970:06 
6.49999960*06 
6.99999960-06 
9.4999996D-06 
«SUM 
0.0 
6.00000000*09 
1.00000000*06 
1.60000000*00 
2.00000000-00 
2.60000000-06 
9.00000000-06 
9.49999990-00 
9.99999990-06 
4.49999990*00 
4.99999990-00 
6.49999960*06 
6.999999*0-00 
6.49999960*06 
6.99999960-08 
7.49999970-08 
7.99999970-06 
6.49999960-08 
6.99999960-08 
9.49999960*08 
FSUM 
0 .0  
6.00000000*09 
1.00000000*06 
1.60000000-06 
2.00000000-06 
2.60000000*08 
9.00000000-06 
9.49999990-06 
9.99999990-08 
4.49999990-06 
4.99999990-08 
6.49999990-08 
6.99999980-08 
6.49999980-06 
6.99999960-06 
7.49999970*06 
7.99999970-08 
8.49999960-08 
6.99999960-06 
9.49999960-08 
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18. APPENDIX F: KITT-1 OUTPUT RESULTS 
FOR CHRS FAULT TREE 
Because of the similarities of the KITT-1 output for 
the three cases (WASH-1400, LERs and NUREG), only a sample 
from the KITT-1 output results for the first case is given 
here (see pages 318-336). 
Tables for quick translation of the KITT-1 output are 
not given here, but those tables given in Appendix E could 
be used. 
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SET FLAG IIPATHI. IF !PATH=1 MINIMAL CUT SETS ARE USED. IF IPATH=2 MINIMAL PATH SETS ARE USED. 
FOR THIS PROBLEM IPATH s 1 
NO. OF SETS INCUT) = 31 
SET INFORMATION 
SET NO. !• WITH COMPONENTS " 17 
SET NO. 2, WITH COMPONENTS - 10 
SET NO. 3. WITH COMPONENTS - 7 1 
SET NO. 4, WITH COMPONENTS - t Z 
SET NO. 5, WITH COMPONENTS - '7 3 
SET NO. 6. WITH COMPONENTS -74 
SET NO. 7» WITH COMPONENTS - 7 5 
SET NO. S. WITH COMPONENTS «>7 6 
SET NO. 9* WITH COMPONENTS - $ I 
SET NO. 10» WITH COMPONENTS "92 
SET NO. : I. WITH COMPONENTS -83 
SET NO. 12» WITH COMPONENTS - # 4 
SET NO. 13. WITH COMPONENTS -65 
SET NO. 14. WITH COMPONENTS - 0 0 
SET NO. 13, WITH COMPONENTS - 9 1 
SET NO. 16* WITH COMPONENTS -92 
SET NO. 17» WITH COMPONENTS -93 
SET NO. 10» WITH COMPONENTS -94 
SET NO. 19» WITH COMPONENTS -95 
SET NO. 20. WITH COMPONENTS -90 
SET NO. 21» WITH COMPONENTS 10 1 
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V D  
SET NO. 22, WITH COMPONENTS - 10 
SET NO. 23. WITH COMPONENTS - 10 
SET NO. 24, WITH COMPONENTS - 10 
SET NO. 25, WITH COMPONENTS - 10 
SET NO. 26, WITH COMPONENTS - 10 
SET NO. 27, WITH COMPONENTS - 16 
SET NO. 2 8, WITH COMPONENTS - 16 
SET NO. 2 P. WITH COMPONENTS - 16 
SET NO. 30, WITH COMPONENTS - 16 
SET NO. 3%, WITH COMPONENTS - 16 
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2.6090000D-07 
2.60000000-07 
3. 11996010-05 
3.89997440-05 
4.67996880-05 
5.45996310-05 
6.23995740-05 
7.01995170-05 
7.79994610-05 
8.57994040-05 
9.35993470-05 
1.0139929D-04 
I .09199230-04 
1.16999180-04 
1.24799120-04 
1.32599060-04 
1.4039901D-04 
1.48198950-04 
3.11995130-05 
3.89992400-05 
4.67989050-05 
5.45985090-05 
6.23980530-05 
7.01975360-05 
7.79969580-05 
8.57963190-05 
9.35956200-05 
1.01394860-04 
1.09194040-04 
1.16993160-04 
1.24792210-04 
1.32591210-04 
1 .40390140-04 
I .46189020-04 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR COMPONENT NO. = 4 
0 .0 0 • 0 1 .60000000-06 1 .60000000 -06 0.0 0 .0 
3 .00000000 01 4 •79987%0D-05 1 .59992320-06 1 .60000000 4.79986480-05 4 .79988480-05 
6 .00000000 01 6 .39964160-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 9.5996I600-05 9 .59953920-05 
9 .00000000 01 6 .39959040-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 1.43993090-04 1 .43989630-04 
1 .20000000 02 6 .39959(140-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 1.91990020-.04 1 .91981570-04 
1 .50000000 02 6 .39959(140- 05 1 .59989760- 06 1 .60000000 -06 2.39986940-04 2 .39971200- 04 
1 .80000000 02 6 .39959040-05 1 .59989760-06 1 •60000000 -06 2.87983870-04 2 .87958530-04 
2 .10000000 02 6 .39959040-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 -06 3.35980800-04 3 .35943560-04 
2 .40000000 02 6 .39959040-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 -06 3.83977730-04 3 .83926280-04 
2 .700000 00 02 6 .39959040-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 4.31974660-04 4 .31906700-04 
3 .00000000 02 6 .39959040-05 1 .59989760-06 1 •60000000 4.79971590-04 4 .79884820-04 
3 .30000000 02 6 .39959(40* 05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 -06 5.27968510-04 5 .27860630-04 
3 .60000000 02 6 .39959040-05 1 •59989760-06 1 .60000000 -06 5.75965440-04 5 .75834140-04 
3 .90000000 02 6 .39959C40-05 1 •59989760-06 1 .60000000 *06 6.23962370-04 6 .23805350-04 
4 .20000000 02 6 .39959C40-05 1 •59989760-06 1 .6000000D -06 6.71959300-04 6 .71774260-04 
4 .50000000 02 6 .39959C40-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 -06 7.19956230-04 7 .19740860-04 
4 .80000000 02 6 .39959040-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 -06 7.67953150-04 7 .67705160-04 
5 .10000000 02 6 .39959040-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 -06 8.15950080-04 8 .15667160-04 
5 .40000000 02 6 .39959040-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 -06 8.63947010-04 8 .63626860-04 
5 •70000000 02 6 •39959040-05 1 .59989760-06 1 .60000000 -06 9.11943940-04 9 .11584250-04 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR COMPONENT NO. = 5 
T (HOURS I 
3.00000000 01 
6.00000000 01 
9.00000000 01 
1.20000000 02 
1.50000000 02 
1.80000000 02 
2.10000000 02 
2.40000000 02 
2.70000000 02 
3.00000000 02 
3.30000000 02 
3.60000000 02 
3.90000000 02 
0 
0 . 0  
4.47999890-07 
4.47999800-07 
4.479998 00-07 
4.47999800-07 
4.47999800-07 
4.47999800-07 
4.47999890-07 
4.47999800-07 
4.47999800-07 
4.47999830-07 
4.47999870-07 
4.479998)0-07 
4.47999870-07 
W 
1.60000000-08 
1.59999930-08 
1*59999930-08 
1.59999930-08 
1 .59999930-08 
1.59999930-08 
1 •59999930-08 
1 .59999930-08 
1 .59999930-08 
1 .59999930*08 
1 .59999930-08 
1 .59999930-08 
1.59999930-08 
1 .59999930-08 
L 
1.60000000-08 
1 .60000000-08 
1.60000000-08 
1.60000000-08 
1 .60000000-08 
1 .60000000-08 
1.60000000-08 
1.60000000-08 1.60000000-08 
1 .60000000-08 
1.60000000-08 
1.60000000-08 
I .60000000-08 
1.60000000-08 
MSUH 
0.0 
4.79999890-07 
9.59999680-07 
I .43999950-06 
1.91999920-06 
2.39999900-06 
2.87999880-06 
3.35999860-06 
3.83999840-06 
4.31999820-06 
4.79999800-06 
5.27999770-06 
5.75999750-06 
6.23999730-06 
FSUH 
0 . 0  
4.79999880-07 
9.59999540-07 
I .43999900-06 
1.91999820-06 
2.39999710-06 
2.87999590-06 
3.35999440-06 
3.83999260-06 
4.31999070-06 
4.79998850-06 
5.27998610-06 
5.75998340-06 
6.23998050-06 
4.20000000 02 
4.50000000 02 
4.80000000 02 
5.10000000 02 
5.40000000 02 
5.700D000D 02 
4.47999800-07 
4.47999800-07 
4.47999800-07 
4.47999800-07 
4.47999800-07 
4.4799980D-07 
1 .59999930-08 
S.59909930-08 
I .59999930-08 
1.59909930-08 
1.59999930-08 
1 .99909930-08 
1.60000000-08 
1 .60000000-08 
I .60000000-08 
I «60000000-08 
1.60000000-08 
1 .60000000-08 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR COMPONENT NO. = 6 
T (HOURS) Q V L 
0 .0 0 .0 2 .60000000- 08 2 .60000000 -08 
3 •00000000 01 7 .27999710 -07 2 .59999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
6 .00000000 01 7 .27999470 -07 2 .59999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
9 .00000000 01 7 .27999*70 -07 2 •59999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
1 .20000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 .59999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
1 .(>0000000 02 7 .27999470 -07 2 .59999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
1 .80000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 .99999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
2 . 10000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 .99999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
2 .40000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 .99999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
2 •70000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 .59999810- 2 .60000000 -08 
3 .00000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 •99999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
3 •30000000 02 7 .27999*70 •07 2 .99999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
3 .60000000 02 7 •27999*70 -07 2 •99999810-08 2 .60000000' -08 
3 .90000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 .99999810-08 2 .60000000 • 08 
4 .20000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 .5999981D-08 2 •6000000D -08 
4 •50000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 .59999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
4 .80000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 .59999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
5 .10000000 02 7 .27999*70 -07 2 .59999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
5 .40000000 02 7 .27999*170 -07 2 •99999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
5 •70000000 02 7 •27999<i70 -07 2 .99999810-08 2 .60000000 -08 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR COMPONENT (40. = 7 
T «HOURS 1 0 W L 
0 .0 0 .0 1 .20000000-06 1 .20000000 -06 
3 .00000000 01 3 .599901*80-05 1 •19995680-06 1 .20000000 -06 
6 .00000000 01 7 • 19970(140-05 1 .19991360- 06 1 .20000000 -06 
9 .00000000 01 1 •07994 :i70-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
1 .20000000 02 1 .07991^90-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
1 .90000000 02 1 .07989:110-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
1 .80000000 02 1 .07988:140-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
2 • lOOOOOOO 02 1 #07908%40-04 1 •19987040-06 1 •20000000 -06 
2 .40000000 02 1 .07988340-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
2 .70000000 02 1 •07988340-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
3 .00000000 02 1 •07988340-04 1 .19987040-06 1 •20000000 -06 
3 .30000000 02 1 •07988340-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
3 .60000000 02 1 .07988340-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
3 .90000000 02 1 .07988340-04 1 .19987040-06 1 •2000000D -06 
4 .20000000 02 1 #07988340-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
4 .50000000 02 1 .07988240-04 1 •19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
4 .80000000 02 1 .07988340-04 1 . 19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
9 .10000000 02 1 •07988340-04 1 .1998704 0-06 1 .20000000 -06 
5, .40000000 02 1 .07988340-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
9. .70000000 02 1 .07988240-04 1 .19987040-06 1 .20000000 -06 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR COMPONENT NO. = 8 
6.71999710-06 
7. :9999690-06 
7.67999670-06 
8.15999650-06 
8.63999620-06 
9. 11999600-06 
6.71997740-06 
7.19997410-06 
7.67997050-06 
8.15996670-06 
8.63996270-06 
9.1 1995840-06 
M SUM 
0 . 0  
7.79999720-57 
1.55999910-06 
2.33999860-06 
3.11999600-06 
3.89999740-06 
4.67999690-06 
5.45999630-06 
6.23999570-06 
7.01999520-06 
7.79999460-06 
8.57999400-06 
9.35999350-06 
1.01399930-05 
1.09199920-05 
1. 16999920-05 
1.24799910-05 
1.32599910-05 
I .40399900-05 
1.48199890-05 
FSUM 
0 . 0  
7.79999700-07 
1.55999880-06 
2.33999730-06 
3.11999510-06 
3.89999240-06 
4.67998900-06 
5.4599B510-06 
6.23998050-06 
7.01997540-06 
7.79996960-06 
8.57996320-06 
9.35995620-06 
1.01399490-05 
1.09199400-05 
1.16999320-05 
1.24799220-05 
1 .32599120-05 
1.40399010-05 
1.48198900-05 W 
to 
w 
H SUM 
0.0 
3.59993520-05 
7.19974080-05 
1 .07994170-04 
I .43990280-04 
I.79986390-04 
2. 15982510-04 
2.51978620-04 
2.87974730-04 
3.23970840-04 
3.59966950-04 
3.95963070-04 
4.31959180-04 
4.67955290-04 
5.03951400-04 
5.39947520-04 
5.75943630-04 
6.11939740-04 
6.47935850-04 
6.83931970-04 
FSUM 
0.0 
3.59993520-05 
7.19974080-05 
1.07994170-04 
1.43989630-04 
1.7998380D-04 
2.15976670-04 
2.91968250-04 
2.87958530-04 
3.23947520-04 
3.99935210-04 
3.95921600-04 
4 .31906700-04 
4.6789051D-04 
5.03873010-04 
5.39854230-04 
5.75834140-04 
6.11812770-04 
6.47790090-04 
6.83766130-04 
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5.7000000D 02 5 .9999^400-06 1 •I9999280- 05 1 .20000000-05 6*83996000-03 6 •81666040-03 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR COMPONENT NO. = 13 
T"(HOURS# Q W L WSUH FSUM 
0.0 0 .0 1 .30000000-06 1 .30000000- 06 0.0 0 • 0 
3*00000000 01 3 .8999r400-05 1 .29994930-06 1 .30000000" 06 3^89992400-05 3 •89992400- 05 
6*00000000 01 3 .8998^790-05 1 *29994930-06 1 .30000000-06 7.79977190*05 7 •79969580- 05 
9.00000000 01 3 .8998^790-05 1 *29994930-06 1 •30000000-06 1.16996200*04 1 •16993160-04 
1*20000000 02 3 .8998^790-05 1 *29994930-06 1 .30000000-06 1«55994680*04 1 •55987830-04 
1.50000000 02 3 .8998*790-05 1 *29994930-06 1 .30000000" 06 1.94993160*04 1 •94980990-04 
1.60000000 02 3 .89984790-05 1 *29994930-06 1 .30000000-06 2^33991630*04 2 •33972620-04 
2. lOOOOOOO 02 3 .8998*790-05 1 *29994930-06 1 .30000000-06 2.72990110-04 2 .72962740-04 
2.40000000 02 3 .89984790-05 1 .29994930-06 1 .30000000-06 3.11988590*04 3 •11951330* 04 
2.70000000 02 3 .89984790-05 1 .29994930-06 1 .30000000-06 3.50987070-04 3 .50938410-04 
3*00000000 02 3 *89984 790-05 I .29994930-06 1 *30000000-06 3.89985550*04 3 .89923960-04 
3.30000000 02 3 .89984790-05 1 .29994930-06 1 .30000000-06 4«289d4030*04 4 •28907990-04 
3.60000000 02 3 •89984790*05 1 .29994930-06 1 .30000000* 06 4.67982510*04 4 •67890510-04 
3.90000000 02 3 .89984790-05 1 .29994930-06 1 .30000000-06 5.06980990*04 5 .06871500- 04 
4.20000000 02 3 .89984790-05 1 .29994930-06 1 .30000000-06 5.45979470-04 5 .45850970-04 
4.90000000 02 3 .89984790-05 1 *29994930-06 1 •30000000* 06 5*84977950*04 5 •84828920-04 
4.60000000 02 3 .89984790-05 1 .29994930-06 1 .30000000-06 6.23976430-04 6 •23805350-04 
5.10000000 02 3 .89984790-05 1 .29994930-06 1 •30000000-06 6.62974900*04 6 •62780260-04 
5.40000000 02 3 .89984 790-05 1 .29994930-06 1 .30000000* 06 7^dl973380*04 7 •01753660-04 
5.70000000 02 3 •89984790-05 1 •29994930-06 I  •30000000* 06 7.40971860*04 7 •40725530-04 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR COMPONENT NO. = 14 
r  (HOURS 1 0 W L WSUM FSUH 
0 .0 1 *00000000-10 1 .00000000-10 0.0 0 .0 
3.00000000 01 2 .40000000-09 1 .00000000-10 1 .00000000* 10 3.00000000*09 3 .00000000-09 
6.00000000 01 2 .40000000-09 1 .OOOOOOOO-10 1 •OOOOOOOO* 10 6.00000000-09 6 .00000000-09 
9.00000000 01 2 .40000000-09 1 •OOOOOOOO* 10 1 .OOOOOOOO* 10 9.00000000*09 8 .99999990-09 
1.20000000 02 2 .40000000-09 1 .OOOOOOOO- 10 1 •OOOOOOOO* 10 1.20000000*06 1 .20000000-08 
1.50000000 02 2 .40000000-09 1 .00000000-10 1 .00000000-10 1.50000000*08 1 .50000000-08 
1.60000000 02 2 *40000000-09 1 .00000000-10 1 •00000000-10 1 .80000000*08 1 .80000000-08 
2.10000000 02 2 .40000 000-09 1 .oooooooo-10 1 .00000000* 10 2.10000000-08 2 .10000000-08 
2.40000000 02 2 .40000000-09 1 .00000000* 10 1 .OOOOOOOO* 10 2.40000000*08 2 .40000000-08 
2.70000000 02 2 .40000000-09 1 .00000000* 10 •OOOOOOOO* 10 2^70000000*08 2 •70000000-08 
3.00000000 02 2 *40000000-09 1 •OOOOOOOO* 10 1 •OOOOOOOO* 10 3^0000000D*08 3 •00000000* 08 
3*30000000 02 2 *40000000-09 1 .00000000-10 1 •OOOOOOOO* 10 3.30000000*08 3 .29999990-08 
3.60000000 02 2 •40000000-09 I  .00000000-10 1 •OOOOOOOO* 10 3.60000000-08 3 •59999990-08 
3.90000000 02 2 *40000000-09 1 .00000000* 10 1 •OOOOOOOO* 10 3.90000000*08 3 •89999990-08 
4.20000000 02 2 .40000000-09 1 .00000000-10 1 .00000000-10 4 .20000000-08 4  •19999990-08 
4 .50000000 02 2 .40000000-09 1 .00000000-10 1 .00000000-10 4 .50000000-08 4  •49999990-08 
4 .8000000D 02 2 *40000000-09 1 .00000000* 10 I .00000000* 10 4 .80000000*08 4  •79999990-08 
5.10000000 02 2 *40000000-09 1 .OOOOOOOO* 10 1 .00000000-10 5. 10000000-08 5 •09999990-08 
5.40000000 02 2 .40000000-09 1 .00000000-10 1 •00000000* 10 5.40000000-08 5 •39999980-08 
5.70000000 02 2 .40000000-09 1 .00000000* 10 1 •OOOOOOOO-10 5*70000000-08 5 .69999980-08 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR COMPONENT NO. = 15 
T (HOURS 1 O w L WSUM FSUM 
0.0 0 .0 1 .03000000-05 1 •03000000-05 0.0 0 .0 
3.0000000D 01 5 .14997350-06 1 .02999470* 05 1 .03000000-05 3.08999200-04 3 .08952260-04 
6.00000000 01 5 .14997550-06 1 .02999470* 05 1 •03000000-05 6.17997610-04 6 .17809080-04 
9.00000000 01 5 . I49973SO-06 1 .02999470-05 1 .03000000-OS 9*26996020-04 9 .26570470-04 
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MINIMAL SET INFORMATION 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. = 1 
T (HOURS) 0 W L 
0 • 0 0 • 0 2 •00000000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
3 .00000000 01 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2* 00000000 -05 
6 • OOOjOOOOO 01 9 •9999UOOO -06 1 •99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
9 .00000000 01 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2, oooooooo -05 
1 •20000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
1 .50000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
1 .80000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
2 .10000000 02 9 .99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
2 .40000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -•0 5 2. oooooooo -05 
2 .70000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
3 .00000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 •99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
3 .30000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .9999800D -05 2. oooooooo -05 
3 .60000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
3 .90000000 02 9 .99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
4 .20000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
4 .50000000 02 9 •9999O000 -06 1 •99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
4 .80000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
5 •10000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
5. .40000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 1 .99998000 -05 2. oooooooo -05 
5 .70000000 02 9 •99990000 -06 I .99998000 -05 2. 00000000*05 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. = 2 
T (HOURS) 0 W L 
0 .0 0»0 1 .00000000-10 1 .00000000-10 
3 •OOOOOOOO 01 3.0000COOD- 09 1 .00000000-10 1 .oooooooo-10 
6 •OOOOOOOO 01 5.9999^990-09 9 •99999990-11 1 •00000000-10 
9 .OOOOOOOO 01 8.9999*990-09 9 .99999990-11 1 •00000000-10 
1 .20000000 02 I.2000COOO-08 9 .99999990-11 1 .00000000-10 
1 .50000000 02 1 .SOOOtOOO-08 9 .99999990-11 1 •00000000- to 
1 .80000000 02 1 .8000COOO-08 9 .99999980-11 1 •00000000-10 
2 • 10000000 02 2.lOOOCOOO-08 9 .99999980-11 1 .00000000-10 
2 .40000000 02 2.4000C00D-06 9 .99999960-11 1 •00000000-10 
2 .70000000 02 2.7000COOO-08 9 .99999970-11 1 .00000000* 10 
3 .oooooooo 02 3.0000COOO-08 9 .99999970-11 1 •OOOOOOOD-10 
3 .30000000 02 3.2999(990-08 9 .99999970* 11 1 .00000000-10 
3 .60000000 02 3.59999990-08 9 .99999960-11 1 •00000000-10 
3 .90000000 02 3.59995990-08 9 .99999960-11 1 .00000000-10 
4 .20000000 02 3.5999(990-06 9 .99999960-11 1 .00000000-10 
4 •50000000 02 3.5999S990-08 9 .99999960-11 1 •oooooooo-10 
4 .60000000 02 3.5999(990-08 9 .99999960-11 1 .00000000-10 
5 .10000000 02 3.59999990-08 9 .99999960-11 1 .00000000-10 
5 .40000000 02 3.59999990-08 9 .99999960-11 1 .00000000-10 
5 .70000000 02 3.59999990-08 9 .99999960-11 I •oooooooo-10 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. = 
T (HOURS) 
0 . 0  
3.00000000 01 
6.00000000 01 
9.00000000 01 
0 . 0  
I.72790730-09 
4.60755540-09 
6.91116440-09 
0 . 0  
1.15192070-10 
1.91976130-10 
2.49566400-10 
1.15192070-10 
1 .91976130-10 
2.49566400-10 
0 • 0 0 • 0 
5 .99997000 -04 5 •99820040-04 
1 .19999100 -03 1 •19928030-03 
1 •79998500 -03 1 •79838100-03 
2 •39997900 -03 2 •39712230-03 
2 •99997300 -03 2 .99550450-03 
3 •59996700 -03 3 •59352780-03 
4 .19996100 -03 4 •19119230-03 
4 .79995500 -03 4 •78849840-03 
5 .39994900 -03 5 •36544620-03 
5 .99994300 -03 5 .98203590-03 
6 .59993700 -03 6 .57626780-03 
7 .19993100 -03 7 .17414210-03 
7 •79992500 -03 7 •76965890-03 
8 •39991900 -03 8 .36481860-03 
8 •99991300 -03 8 .95962120-03 
9 •59990700 -03 9 .55406710-03 
1 •01999010 -02 1 •01481560-02 
t •07998950 •02 1 •07418890-02 
1 •13998890 -02 1 •13352660-02 
WSUH 
0.0 
3.00000000-09 
6.00000000-09 
9.00000000-09 
1.20000000-08 
1.50000000-08 
t.80000000-06 
2. 10000000-06 
2.40000000-08 
2.7000000D-08 
3.00000000-08 
3.29999990-06 
3.59999990-08 
3.89999990-08 
4.19999990-08 
4.49999990-08 
4.79999990-08 
5.09999990-08 
5.39999990-08 
5.6999999O-08 
FSUH 
0.0 
3.00000000-09 
6.00000000-09 
9.00000000-09 
1 .20000000-08 
1.50000000-08 
1.80000000-08 
2.10000000-08 
2.40000000-08 
2.70000000-08 
3.00000000-08 
3.29999990-08 
3.59999990-08 
3.89999990-08 
4 .19999990-08 
4.49999990-08 
4.79999990-08 
5.09999990-08 
5.39999990-08 
5.69999980-08 
LJ 
K) 
WSUM 
0.0 
1.72788110-09 
6.33543410-09 
1.29586020-08 
FSUH 
0 . 0  
1.72788110-09 
6.33543410-09 
1.29566020-08 
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4.2000000D 02 
4*50000000 02 
4*80000000 02 
5*10000000 02 
5*40000000 02 
5*70000000 02 
7.8614«>37D-10 
7»86l4<>370'l0 
7.86:49370-10 
7.S6I4('370-10 
7*6614(370-10 
7.86:49 370-10 
3*68117560-1 
3*681:7560-: 
3*68:17560-: 
3*681:7560-: 
3*68:17560-1 
3*68:17560-: 
3*66117560-11 
3*68117560-11 
3*68117560-11 
3*68117560-11 
3*68117560-11 
3*68117560-11 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. = 6 
T  ( H O U R S #  O W L  
0 *0 0* 0 0 .0 0*0 
3 *00000000 01 1.72790 730-09 : *15192070-10 1*15192070-10 
6 *00000000 01 4.6075554 0-09 t *91978130-10 1*91978130-10 
9 *00000000 01 6.91:18440-09 2 .49566400-10 2*49566400-10 
1 *20000000 02 6.9:09(790-09 2 *49541740-10 2*49561740-10 
1 *50000000 02 6.9:087350-09 2 *49558630-10 2*49558630-10 
1 *80000000 02 6.9:o8::3o- 09 2 *49557070-10 2*49557080-10 
2 *10000000 02 6.91081130-09 2 .49557070- to 2.49557060-10 
2 *40000000 02 6*91081130-09 2 .49567070-10 2.49557060-10 
2 *70000000 02 6*91081130-09 2 .49557070-10 2*49557080-10 
3 *00000000 02 6.91081130-09 2 .49557070-10 2*49557080-10 
3 * 30000000 02 6.91081130-09 2 .49557070-10 2*49557080-10 
3 *60000000 02 6.9:081:30-09 2 *49597070-10 2*49557080-10 
3 .90000000 02 6*9:o8::3o-o9 • 2 .49557070-10 2*49557060-10 
4 .20000000 02 6.9:oe::3o-09 2 •49557070-10 2*49557080-10 
4 *50000000 02 6.9:061:30-09 2 .49567070-lo 2.49557080-10 
4. *80000000 02 6.9108::30-09 2 .49557070-10 2.4955706O-10 
5 * 10000000 02 6.9:08::3o-09 2 *49557070-10 2*49557080-10 
5 .40000000 02 6.9:o8::3o-09 2 *49557070-10 2*49557080-10 
5 *70000000 02 6.9:06::30" 09 2 .49557070-10 2*49557080-10 
CHARACTERIST:CS FOR SET NO* = 
T (HOURS I 
0*0 
3.00000000 o: 
6*00000000 01 
9*00000000 01 
1*20000000 02 
1*50000000 02 
1*80000000 02 
2* 10000000 02 
2*40000000 02 
2*70000000 02 
3*00000000 02 
3*30000000 02 
3*60000000 02 
3*90000000 02 
4*20000000 02 
4*50000000 02 
4*80000000 02 
5*10000000 02 
5*40000000 02 
5*70000000 02 
1*61275510-11 
3*22546790-11 
4*83813)60-11 
4*830OO!J9O-11 
4*a379:(l90-ll 
4*83787!i30-l 1 
4 •B3787!i30-:  
4*83787H3D-:: 
4.83787H30-11 
4*83787^30-11 
4.83787W30-11 
4.83787&30-1: 
4.63787S>30-I : 
4*83787(>30-: : 
4.83787&30-11 
4*63787S>3D-11 
4*83787^30-1 I 
4.83787S.30-11 
4.83787S30-11 
:.l:35647D-:2 
1*66951390-12 
2.26544760-12 
2.26540:00-:2 
2*26536990-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
0.0 
1.11356470-12 
1.68951390-12 
2.26544760-12 
2*26540100-12 
2.26536990-:2 
2*26535430-:2 
2*26535430-:2 
2*26535430-:2 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-:2 
2.2653543D-:2 
2.26535*30-12 
2.26535430-:2 
2*26535430-:2 
2*26535430-:2 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
2*26535430-12 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO* = 6 
\*40666240-06 
1*5:709770-08 
: *62753290-06 
1 *73796620-08 
1 *84840350-08 
1*95863870-08 
1*40666240-09 
1*51709770-08 
1*62753290-08 
1*73796920-09 
I*84840350-08 
1.95863870-08 
WSUM 
0*0 
1.7278811009 
6*33543410-09 
1*29586020-08 
2*04455240-08 
2*79323300-08 
3.54190650-08 
4.29057760-08 
5*03924900-08 
5*76792020-08 
6*53659140-08 
7*28526260-08 
8*03393390-06 
6.76260510-00 
9*53:27630-08 
1*02799480-07 
t.i02B6l90-07 
1.17772900-07 
1 .25259610-07 
1*32746320-07 
F5UM 
0*0 
1*72788110-09 
6*33543410-09 
1*29566020-08 
2*04455240-08 
2*79323300-08 
3*54190650-08 
4*29057770-08 
5*03924890-08 
5*78792010-08 
6*53659130-08 
7.28526240-06 
8*03393360-08 
8*76260480-06 
9*53127590-08 
1*02799470-07 
1 *10266180-07 
1 * 17772890-07 
1*25259610-07 
1*32746320-07 
UJ 
ro 
WSUH 
o.o 
1*67034710-11 
5*67496490-1 : 
:.:8074070-:0 
:.8603680D-:0 
2.53998360-:0 
3.21959230-10 
3.89919860-10 
4*57880490-10 
5.25841120-10 
5.93801750-10 
6*61762380-10 
7.29723000-10 
7*97683630-10 
8*656*4260-10 
9.33604600-10 
1.00156550-09 
1*06952620-09 
1*13746660-09 
1 *20544740-09 
FSUH 
0*0 
1*67034710-1 1 
5.67496490-:: 
I.1807406D-10 
:*86036800*10 
2*53998350-10 
3*2:959220-10 
3*89919850-10 
4*57660480-10 
5*25841110-10 
5*93801740-10 
6*61762370-10 
7.29723000-10 
7*97683630-10 
8*65644250-:0 
9.33604690-10 
1 *00156550^09 
1.06952610-09 
1 * 13746680-09 
1.20544740-09 
T fHOURS I 
0.0  
3.0000000D 01 
6.00000000 01 
9.00000000 01 
1.2000000D 02 
1.50000000 02 
1.6000000D 02 
2.1000000D 02 
2.40000000 02 
2.70000000 02 
9.0000000D 02 
3.3000000D 02 
3.6000000D 02 
3.9CdOOOOO 02 
4.2000000D 02 
4.50000000 02 
4.0000000D 02 
5.10000000 02 
5.4000000D 02 
5.70000000 02 
O 
0.0 
2.62072820-1 I 
5.241383)0-11 
7.86196970-11 
7.861757:$0*11 
7.86161630-11 
7.861545:20-11 
7.861545*0-11 
7.86154 5:*0-ll 
7*86t545;!0-ll 
7.861545:!0-1 1 
7.861545;!D-11 
7.861545:>0-tl 
7.861 54 5:!D-11 
7.861545:!D-11 
7.86 1 545:20-11 
7.861545:20-11 
7.861545:!0-11 
7.861545:!D-11 
7.861545:>D-11 
W 
0 .0  
1.80954220-12 
2.74545930-12 
3.68135130-12 
3.68127550-12 
3.68122500-12 
3.68119970-12 
3.68119970-12 
3.68119970-12 
3.68119980-12 
3.68119980-12 
3.68119980-12 
3.68119980-12 
3.68119980-12 
3.68119980-12 
3.68119980-12 
3.68119980-12 
3.68119980-12 
3.68119980-12 
3.68119980-12 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR 
T I HOURS) 
0 . 0  
3.00000000 01 
6.00000000 01 
9.00000000 01 
1.20000000 02 
1.50000000 02 
1.80000000 02 
2.10000000 02 
2.40000000 02 
2.70000000 02 
3.00000000 02 
3.30000000 02 
3.60000000 02 
3.90000000 02 
4.20000000 02 
4.50000000 02 
4.80000000 02 
5. 10000000 02 
5.40000000 02 
5.70000000 02 
0.0 
1.583670VD-08 
2.67405000-08 
2.6739111 0-08 
2.673911]0-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.673911LD-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.6739111O-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.6739111 0-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.67391110-08 
2.67391110-08 
0 . 0  
1 .05569080-09 
1.37217360-09 
1 .37213060-09 
1.37213860^09 
1.37213860-09 
1.3721386D-09 
1.37213060-09 
1 
.37213860-09 
1.37213860-09 
1.37213860-09 
I .37213960-09 
1.37213960-09 
1.37213960-09 
1.37213860-09 
1 
.37213860-09 
1.37213860-09 
1.37213960-09 
I.37213960-09 
1.37213960-09 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR 
T (HOURS) 
0 . 0  
3.00000000 01 
6.00000000 01 
9.00000000 01 
1.20000000 02 
1.50000000 02 1.8000000D 02 
2.10000000 02 
2.40000000 02 
0 
0 .0  
1.478131(0-10 
1.871939CO-10 
1.87185670-10 
1.87185610-10 
1.87185670-10 
1.87185670-10 
1.87185670-10 
1.87185670-10 
W 
0 .0  
I .02054140-1 I 
1 .16114350-11 
1.16111410-11 
1.16111410-11 
1.16111410-11 
1.16111410-11 
1.16111410-11 
1.16111410-11 
L W5UH FSUH 
0.0 0 .0 0 .0 
1.80954220-12 2 .71431340-11 2 .71431340-11 
2.74545930-12 9 .54681570-11 9 .54681570-11 
3.68135140- 12 1 .91870320-10 1 .91870310-10 
3.68127550-12 3 .02309720-10 3 .02309720-10 
3.68122500-12 4 . 12747230-10 4 .12747230-10 
3.68119970- 12 5 .23183600- 10 5 .23183590-10 
3.68119970-12 6 .33619590-10 6 .33619590-10 
3.68119980*12 7 .44055580-10 7 .44055580-10 
3.68119980- 12 8 .54491580-10 8 .54491570-10 
3.68119980-12 9 .64927570-10 9 .64927570-10 
3.68119980- 12 1 .07536360-09 1 .07536350-09 
3.68119980- 12 1 .18579960-09 1 .18579950-09 
3.68119980-12 1 .29623550-09 1 .2962^550- 09 
3.68119980-12 1 .40667150- 09 1 •40667130- 09 
3.68119980- 12 1 .51710750-09 1 .51710750-09 
3.68119980- 12 1 .62754 350-09 1 .62754350-09 
3.68119980-12 1 .73797950- 09 1 .73797950-09 
3.68119980- 12 1 •84841550-•09 1 .84841550-09 
3.68119980- 12 1 .95885150-09 1 .95885150-09 
r NO. = 9 
L WSUM FSUH 
0.0 0 .0 0 .0 
1.05569080-09 1 .58353610-08 1 .58353610-08 
1.37217360-09 5 .22533260-08 5 .22533260-08 
1.37213860-09 9 .34180090-08 9 .34180070-08 
1.37213860-09 1 .34582170-07 1 .34582160-07 
1.37213860-09 1 .75746320-07 1 .75746310-07 
1.37213860-09 2 .16910480-07 2 .169^0460-07 
1.37213860-09 2 .58074640-07 2 .58074610-07 
1.37213860-09 2 .99238800-07 2 .99238760- 07 
1.37213860-09 3 .40402960-07 3 .40402910-07 
1.37213860-09 3 .81567110-07 3 .81567050-07 
1 .37213860-09 4 .22731270-07 .22731190-07 
1.37213860-09 4 .63895430-07 4 .63895330-07 
1.37213860-09 5 .05059590-07 5 .05059470-07 
1.37213860-09 5 .46223740-07 S .46223610-07 
1.37213860-09 5 .87387900-07 6 .87387740-07 
1.37213860-09 6 .29552060-07 6 .28651880-07 
1/37213860-09 6 .69716220-07 6 .69716010-07 
1.37213860-09 7 .10880380-07 7 .10880140-07 
1.37213860-09 7 .52044530-07 7 .52044270-07 
NO. = 10 
L WSUH FSUM 
0.0 0 .0 0 .0 
1 .02054140-1 1 1 .53081210-10 1 .53081200-10 
1.16114350-11 4 .80333950-10 4 .80333940-10 
1.16111410-11 9, .28672600-10 8 .28672590-10 
1.16111410-1 1 1 .17700680-09 1 .17700680-09 
1.16111410-11 1, .52534110-09 1 .52534110-09 
1.16111410-11 1 .87367530-09 1 .87367530-09 
1.16111410-1 1 2 .22200960-09 2 .22200950-09 
1.16111410-11 2 .57034380-09 2 .57034380-09 
2.70000000 02 l.67166670-10 1.16111410-11 1 .16111410-11 2.918678 00-09 2 •91867800-09 
3.00000000 02 1.87)85670-10 1.16111410-11 1 .16111410-11 3.26701230-09 3 •26701230-09 
3.30000000 02 1 .87185670-10 ).)61)1410-11 1 .16111410-11 3.61934650-09 3 .61534650-09 
3.60000000 02 1.87186670-10 1.16111410-11 1 .16111410-11 3.96368080-09 3 .96368070-09 
3.90000000 02 1.87185670-10 1.16111410-11 1 .161114 10 11 4.31201500-09 4  .31201500-09 
4 .20000000 02 1.87185670-10 1 .1611)410-11 1 .16111410-11 4 .66034920-09 4 .66034920-09 
4 .50000000 02 1.87185670-10 1.16111410-11 1 .16111410-11 5.00868350-09 5 .00868350-09 
4*80000000 02 1.87183670-10 1.16111410-11 1 .161114 10-11 5.35701770-09 5 .35701770-09 
S. 10000000 02 1.87185670-10 1. 16111410-11 1 .16111410 11 5.70535200-09 5 .70535190-09 
5.40000000 02 #.87185670-10 1.16111410-11 1 .161114 10-11 6.05368620-09 6 .05368620-09 
5.70000000 02 1.87185670-10 1.16111410-11 1 •16111410-11 6.40202040-09 6 .40202040-09 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. s 11 
T (HOURS) G W L WSUH FSUM 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 0 .0 
3.00000000 01 2.4019^520-09 ).69837090-10 1 .65837090-10 2.48755640-09 2 .48755640-09 
6.00000000 01 3.04181)0)0-09 1.88684530-10 1 .88684530-10 7.80538070-09 7 .80538070-09 
9.00000000 oi  3.0417^640-09 1.88679760-10 1 •88679760-10 1.34658450-08 1 .34658450-08 
1.20000000 02 3.0417^640-09 1.88679760-10 1 .88679760-10 1.91262380-08 1 .91262380-08 
1.50000000 02 3.0417^640-09 1.88679760-10 1 •88679760-10 2.47*66300-08 2 .47866300-08 
1.60000000 02 3.0417^840-09 1.6867976D-10 1  .86679760-10 3.04470230-08 3 .04470230-08 
2.lOOOOOOD 02 3,0417^640-09 1•80679760-10 1 •O067976D-)O 3.61074160-08 3 .61074150-08 
2.40000000 02 3.0417^640-09 1.88679760-10 1 •88679760-)0 4 .17678090-08 4 .17678080-08 
2.70000000 02 3.04)7^640-09 1.88679760-10 1 .88679760-10 4.74282010-08 4 •74282000-08 
3.00000000 02 3.0417^640-09 1.88679760-10 1 •88679760-)0 5.3088594D-08 5 •30885930-08 
3.3000000D 02 3.0417&64D-09 1.88679760-10 1 .88679760-10 5.87489870-08 5 •87489650-08 
3.60000000 02 3.0417^640-09 1.88679760-10 1 .88679760-10 6.44093800-08 6 •44093780-08 
3.90000000 02 3.04174640-09 1 .88679760-10 1 .88679760-10 7.00697720-08 7 .00697700-08 
4.20000000 02 3.0417*640-09 1.88679760-10 1 .88679760-10 7.57301650-Ce 7 .57301620-08 
4 .SOOOOOOO 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1 .88670760-10 8. 13905580-08 8 •13905550-08 
4.80000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1 .08679760-10 8.70509500-08 8 •70909470-08 
5.10000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1 .88679760-10 9*27113430-08 9 •27113390-08 
5.40000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1 .88679760-10 9.83717360-08 9 .83717310-08 
5.70000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1 .88679760-10 1.04032130-07 •04032120-07 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. = 12 
r  (HOURS) 0 W L WSUH FSUM 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 0 .0 
3.00000000 01 1.58367090-08 1.05569080-09 1 .05569080-09 1.58353610-08 1 .58353610-08 
6.00000000 01 2.67405)00-08 1.37217360-09 1 •37217360-09 5.22533260-08 5 .22533260-08 
9.00000000 01 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 9.34180090-08 9 .34180070-08 
1 .20000000 02 2.67391110-00 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 1.34582170-07 1 •34582160-07 
1 .50000000 02 2,67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 1.75746320-07 1 .75746310-07 
t . eooooooo  02 2.67391l10-08 1.372 13860-09 1 .37213860-09 2.16910480-07 2 .16910460-07 
2.10000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 2.58074640-07 2 .58074610-07 
2.40000000 02 2.67391l10-08 1*37213660-09 1 .37213860-09 2*99238600-07 2 .99238760-07 
2.70000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 3.40402960-07 3 .40402910-07 
3.00000000 02 2.67391110-08 1 .37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 3.81567110-07 3 .81567050-07 
3.30000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 4.22731270-07 4 .22731I90-07 
3.60000000 02 2.67391 l 10-08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 4.638 95430-07 4 .63895330-07 
3.90000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1  .37213860-09 5.05099590-07 5 .05059470-07 
4 .20000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 5.4622374D-07 5 •46223610-07 
4 .50000000 02 2.67391 :t 10-08 1.37213860-09 1 •37213860-09 5.87387900-07 5 .87387740-07 
4.60000000 02 2.6739 r .  lO-08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 6.2859206D-07 6 •28551880-07 
5.lOOOOOOD 02 2.67391)10-08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 6.69716220-07 6 •69716010-07 
5.40000000 02 2.67391)10-08 1.37213860-09 1 •37213860-09 7. 10880380-07 7 • 10880140-07 
4.2000000D 02 
4*50000000 02 
4.60000000 02 
5*10000000 02 
5*40000000 02 
5*70000000 02 
7.06149370-10 
7.66:49370-10 
7.86:49370-10 
7.66I4937D-10 
7.66149370-10 
7*66149370-10 
3.66117560-1 
3.66117560-t 
3.66117560-1 
3.68117560-1 
3.66117560-1 
3.68117560-1 
3.66117560-1 
3.661 I 7560-1 
3.66117560-1 
3.66117560-1 
3*66117560-1 
3.68117560-1 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. = 
T (HOURS) 
0 .0  
3.00000000 01 
6.00000000 01 
9.00000000 01 
1.20000000 02 
1 .50000000 02 
1.80000000 02 
2.10000000 02 
2.40000000 02 
2.70000000 02 
3.00000000 02 
3.30000000 02 
3.60000000 02 
3.90000000 02 
4.20000000 02 
4.50000000 02 
4.60000000 02 
5.10000000 02 
5.40000000 02 
S.70000000 02 
0 . 0  
1.72790730-09 
4.607555*0-09 
6.911164*0-09 
6.91099790-09 
6.91067350-09 
6.91061130-09 
6.91061130-09 
6.91061110-09 
6.9:0611)0-09 
6.910811)0-09 
6.910811 )0-09 
6.9l081i:)D-09 
6.91081i:i0-09 
6.91061 i:iD-09 
6.910611^0-09 
6«910611:JD-09 
6.91061 i:i0-09 
6.91081 i:iD-09 
6.91081i:iD-09 
0 .0  
1.15192070-10 
I .91976130-10 
2.49566400-10 
2.49561740-10 
2.49556630-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49S57070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
2.49557070-10 
0 . 0  
1.15192070-10 
1.91978130-10 
2.49566400-10 
2.49561740-10 
2.49558630-10 
2.49557060-10 
2.4955708D-10 
2.49557060-10 
2.49557060-10 
2.49557080-10 
2.49557080-10 
2.49557080-10 
2.49557060-10 
2.4955708D-10 
2.49557080-10 
2.49557060-10 
2.49557080-10 
2.49557060-10 
2.49557080-10 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. 
T (HOURS) 
0.0 
3.00000000 01 
6.00000000 01 
9.00000000 01 1.20000000 02 
1.50000000 02 
:.80000000 02 
2.10000000 02 
2.40000000 02 
2.70000000 02 
3.00000000 02 
3*30000000 02 
3.6000000D 02 
3.90000000 02 
4.20000000 02 
4.50000000 02 
4.00000000 02 
5.lOOOOOOD 02 
5.40000000 02 
5.70000000 02 
0 .0  
1.61275610-11 
3.225467ÇD-11 
4.63813660-11 
4.8360059D-1I 
4.037918ÇO-II 
4.83767530-1 1 
4.03767530-1 I 
4.63787530-1 I 
4.83767530-11 
4.03787530-11 
4.83767530-1 I 
4.83767530-11 
4.83787530-11 
4.63787530-11 
4.83787530-11 
4.63767530-1 I 
4.83767530-11 
4.63767530-11 
4.83767530-11 
0.0 
1.11356470-12 
1.68951390-12 
2.26544760-I2 
2.26540100-12 
2.26538990-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.2653543D-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.265354 30-12 
2.265354 30-12 
2.265354 30-12 
0 .0  
1.11356470-12 
1.68951390-12 
2.26544760-12 
2.26540100-12 
2.28536990-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.26535430-12 
2.28535430-12 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. = 20 
1 .40666240-08 
1 .51709770-06 
I.62753290-08 
1.73796620-08 
1 .84840350-06 
1.9588367O-0B 
1 .40666240-08 
I.51709770-08 
1.627532 90-06 
1.73796620-06 
1 .84640350-06 
1.95683870-08 
0 .0 0 .0 
1 .72788110-09 1 .72766110- 09 
6 .335434ID- 09 6 .33543410* 09 
1 .29588020" 06 1 .29586020-06 
2 .04455240- 06 2 .04455240- 08 
2 .79323300-08 2 .79323300- 08 
3 .54190850- 08 3 .54190650-08 
4 .29057760-06 4 .29057770-08 
5 .03924900-06 5 .03924690-08 
5 .78792020-06 5 .78792010-08 
6 .53659140-08 6 .53659130-08 
7 .26526260-06 7 *26526240-06 
6 .03393390-08 8 .03393360-08 
8 .76260510-08 a .76260460-06 
9 .53127830-08 9 .53127590-08 
1 .02799480-07 1 .02799470-07 
1 .10268190-07 1 .10286160-07 
1 .17772900-07 1 .17772890-07 
1 .25259610-07 1 .25259610-07 
1 •32746320-07 1 .32746320-07 
W 
t fSUM 
0.0  
1.67034710-11 
5.67496490-11 
1 .18074070-10 
1.86036800-10 
2.53996380-10 
3.21959230-10 
3.89919860-10 
4 
.57880490-10 
5.25841120-10 
5.93601750-10 
6.61782380-10 
7.29723000-10 
7.97883830-10 
8.65644260-10 
9.33604690-10 
1 .00156550-09 
1 .06952820-09 
1.13746680-09 
1 .20544740-09 
FSUH 
0 . 0  
1.67034710-11 
5.67496490-11 
I.16074060-10 
1.66036600-10 
2.53996350-10 
3.21959220-10 
3.09919850-10 
4.57660480-10 
5.2564 1110-10 
5.93801740-10 
6.61762370-10 
7.29723000-10 
7.97683630-10 
6.65644250-10 
9.33604890-10 
1.00156550-09 
1 .06952610*09 
1.13746660-09 
1.20544740-09 
2.70000000 02 1.871956VD-10 1.16111410-11 1.16111410-11 2.91867600-09 2.91667800-09 
3*00000000 02 1.871856 70-10 1.16111410-11 1.161114:0 11 3.26701230-09 3.26701230-09 
3.30000000 02 1.87185670-10 1.16111410-11 1.16111410-11 3.61534650-09 3.61534650-09 
3.60000000 02 1.87195670-10 1.16111410-11 1.161114 10-11 3.9636909D-09 3.96368070-09 
3.9000000D 02 1.9719567D-10 1. 161 11410-11 1.161114 10 11 4.31201500-09 4*31201500-09 
4.2000000D 02 1.8718567D-I0 1.16111410-11 1.16111410-11 4.66034920-09 4.66034920-09 
4.50000000 02 1.871856^0-10 1.16111410-11 1.16111410-11 5.00969350-09 5.00866350-09 
4*60000000 02 I.871856VD-10 1.16111410-11 1.16111410-11 5.35701770-09 5.35701770-09 
5.1000000D 02 1.871856?D-;o 1.16111410-11 1.16111410-11 5.70535200-09 5.70535190-09 
5.40000000 02 1.671856VD-10 1.16111410-1 I I.16111410 11 6.05369620-09 6.05368620-09 
5.70000000 02 1.871856VO-10 1.16111410-11 1.16111410-11 6.40202040-09 6.40202040-09 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. = 23 
T fHOURS 1 0 W L wsuw F SUM 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3.00000000 01 2.40195520-09 1.65837090-I0 1.65837090-10 2.48755640-09 2.46755640-09 
6.00000000 01 3.04186010-09 1.88684530-10 1.08684530-10 7.6053B07D-09 7.80538070-09 
9.00000000 01 3.04174640-09 1.8B67976D-10 1.88679760-10 1 .34658450-06 1.34658460-06 
1.20000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1.88679760-10 1.91262380-06 1.91262380-08 
1.500000001 02 3.0417464 0-09 1.68679760-10 1.88679760-10 2.47666300-08 2.47866300-08 
1 .90000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1.88679760-10 3.04470230-08 3.04470230-06 
S.'IOOOOOOD 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1.86679760-10 3.61074160-08 3.61074150-08 
2.40000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1.68679760-10 4.17678090-08 4.17678080-08 
2*70000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1.88679760-10 4.74282010-08 4 .74282000-08 
3,00000000 02 3.04174643-09 1.88679760-10 1 .86679760-10 5.30885940-08 5.30865930-06 
3.3000000D 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1.88679760-10 5.87489870-06 5.87489850*08 
3.60000000 02 3.0417464)-09 1.98679760-10 1.88679760-10 6.44093800-06 6.44093760-08 
3.90000000 02 3.04174643-09 1.88679760-10 1 .88679760-10 7.00697720-08 7.00697700-08 
4 .2000000D 02 3.04174640-09 1 .88679760-10 1.88679760-10 7.57301650-06 7.57301620-08 
4 .5000000D 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1,88679760-10 8. 13905580-08 8.13905550-08 
4.90000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.68679760-10 1.68679760-10 8.70509500-08 8.70509470-06 
5.10000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1.88679760-10 9.27113430-08 9.27113390-06 
5.40000000 02 3.04174640-09 1.88679760-10 1.86679760-10 9.83717360-08 9.63717310-06 
5.70000000 02 3.Ô417464D-09 1.88679760-10 1.68679760-10 1.04032130-07 1.04032120-07 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. s 24 
T (HOURS) Q W L WSUM FSUM 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 O.O 0.0 
3.00000000 01 1.5836709D-08 1.05569090-09 1 .05569060-09 1.58353610-08 1.58353610-08 
6.00000000 01 2.6740500C'-08 1 .37217360-09 1.37217360-09 5.22533260-08 5.22533260-08 
9.00000000 01 2.67391I1C-06 1.37213S60-09 1.3721386D-09 9.34180090-08 9.34180070-06 
1 .20000000 02 2.6739111C-08 1.37213860-09 1.37213860-09 1.34582170-07 1.34582160-07 
1.50000000 02 2.673911IC-08 1.37213860-09 1.37213860-09 1.75746320-07 1.75746310-07 
1 .80000000 02 2.67391110-08 >.37213660-09 1.37213860-09 2.16910460-07 2.16910460-07 
2. 10000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1.37213860-09 2.59074640-07 2.58074610-07 
2.40000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213660-09 1.37213860-09 2.99239800-07 2.99238760-07 
2.70000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1.37213860-09 3.40402960-07 3.40402910-07 
3.00000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1.37213860-09 3.81567110-07 3.81567050-07 
3.30000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1.37213860-09 4 .22731270-07 4.22731190-07 
3.6000000D 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1.37213860-09 4 .63895430-07 4 .63895330-07 
3.90000000 02 2.67391110-08 J.37213660-09 1.37213660-09 5.05059590-07 5*05059470-07 
4.20000000 02 2.67391110-08 1 .37213660-09 1.37213660-09 5.46223740-07 5.46223610-07 
4.50000000 02 2.67391110*08 1 .37213660-09 1.37213860-09 5.87387900-07 5.87387740-07 
4 .80000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1.37213860-09 6.28552060-07 6.28551880-07 
5. 10000000 02 2.67391110-08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213860-09 6.69716220-07 6.69716010-07 
5.40000000 02 2.67391110*08 1.37213860-09 1 .37213960-09 7.10680390-07 7 .  10880140-07 
1 .20000000 02 4 •94927980 -09 2,06216450-10 2.0*216450- 10 1 •42293160-08 1.42293160-08 
1«SOOOOOOD 02 6 .18659980 -09 2.47460900-10 2.47460900- 10 2 ,10345060-06 2,10345060-08 
1 .aooooooD 02 7  .4239*980 2,68703350" 10 2,66703350- 10 2 .90769700-08 2.90769700-08 
2.  lOOOOOOO 02 S .66096:40 3.29936520-10 3,29936530- 10 3 .83565680-06 3.83565680-06 
2 .^0000000 02 9  .89800290 -09 3.71169700- 10 3,71169700" 10 4 •66731610-08 4,88731600-08 
2.7000000D 02 1 .1  1350450 -08 4.12402870-10 4.12402680- 10 6 ,06267500-06 6,06267490-06 
3*00000000 02 1 •23720660 -08 4,53636040- 10 4 ,53636050- 10 7 .36173340-06 7,36173320-06 
3*30000000 02 1 •36091280 -06 4.94869220- 10 4,94669230- 10 6 .76449130-06 8.76449100- 06 
3.60000000 02 1 •46461690 -06 5.36102390-10 5,36102400- 10 t  ,03309490-07 1•03309460-07 
3.90000000 02 1 •48457520 -08 5.36088460-10 5.36068460- 10 1 •19392350-07 1.19392340- 07 
4.2000000D 02 1 .46453340 -06 5.36074560- 10 5,36074570-10 1 •35474800-07 1,35474790- 07 
4.  50000000 02 L .48449170 -06 5.36060650- 10 5.36060650-10 1 ,51556620-07 1,51556810-07 
4.  ,60000000 02 1 •46444990 -06 5.36046730-10 5.36046740-10 1 .67638430-07 1.67638420-07 
S.  lOOOCOOD 02 1 •46440820 -08 5.36032620-10 5.36032620-10 1 .63719630-07 1•63719610-07 
5.40000000 02 1  •48436640 -08 5.36018900- 10 5,36016910- 10 1 •99800400-07 1,99600390-07 
5.70000000 02 1  •46435250 -06 5.36014270- 10 5,36014270- 10 2 •15680900-07 2.15660880-07 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. = 26 
T (HOURS# Q V L WSUH FSUM 
0.0 0 .0 0.0 0 .0  0.0 
3.  ,00000000 01 2 .24973340 -10 4,5744635b- 10 4 .57446350- 10 6 •86169530-09 6,86169530-09 
6.00000000 01 4 ,49946660 •10 9.07392750- 10 9.07392750- 10 2 .73342820-08 2.73342610- 08 
9.00000000 Ot 6 •74920020 -10 1.35733910" 09 1.35733910- 09 6 .13052600-08 6.13052560- 08 
I .  ,20000000 02 a .99693360 -10 1  .60728550- 09 1.60728550-09 1 .08774630-07 1.06774620-07 
1. 50000000 02 1 .12466670 -09 2.25723190-09 2.25723190- 09 t  .69742390-07 1.69742360- 07 
t .  60000000 02 I  .34984000 •09 2.70717830-09 2^70717630-09 2 .44206550-07 2.44208520- 07 
2. lOOOOOOO 02 t  .57476260 -09 3.15702350-09 3.15702350-09 3  .32171580-07 3.32171520- 07 
2. 40000000 02 1 •79966550 3.60686870-09 3^60666670-09 4 .33629960-07 4.33629660- 07 
2. 70000000 02 2 •02460820 4.05671390-09 4.05671390-09 5  .*8583700-07 5.46583550- 07 
3 .  00000000 02 2 •24953090 4.50655900-09 4.50655900-09 6 •77032790-07 6.77032560-07 
3 .  30000000 02 2 •47445370 4.95640420-09 4.95640420" 09 6 •16977240-07 6.16976900- 07 
3 .  60000000 02 2 •69937640 5,40624940-09 5.40624940-09 9  •74417040-07 9.74416570- 07 
3. 90000000 02 2 •69930050 5.40609760-09 5.40609760-09 1 •  13660220-06 1.13660160- 06 
4.  20000000 02 2 .69922460 5.40594570-09 5.40594580-09 1 •29876290-06 1.29678210- 06 
4.  50000000 02 2 •69914870 5.40579390-09 5.40579390-09 1 .46095900-06 1 .46095790-06 
4.  80000000 02 2 .69907280 5.4056421D-09 5.40564210-09 1 •623I3050-06 1,62312920- 06 
5.  lOOOOOOO 02 2 .Ô9699690 5.40549030-09 5.40549030-09 1 .78529750-06 1.78529590-06 
5.  40000000 02 2 .69692100 5.40533690-09 5.40533650-09 1 .94745990-06 1.94745610-06 
5.  70000000 02 2 •69689570 •09 5.40526790-09 5.40526790-09 2 •  10961930-06 2.10961710-06 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SET NO. s 29 
T (HOURS) 0 M L WSUH FSUH 
0. 0 0 .0  0 .0 0.0 0 •  0 0.0 
3.  00000000 01 1 •46230700 •  09 9.74696370-1 1 9 .74898370-11 1 .46234750-09 1.46234750-09 
6 .  00000000 0  1 2 •92455690 1 .46229670-10 1.46229670-10 5  ,  1 1814020-09 5 .  1 1814020-09 
9 .  00000000 01 4 •3668354D 1.94970460-10 1 ,94970460-10 1  ,02361420-08 1.02361420-06 
1 •  20000000 02 5  ,84911380 2.43711250-10 2,43711250-10 1  .68163680-06 1.68163680-08 
I .  50000000 02 7 .31139230- 2 .92452030-10 2.92452040-10 2.  .48566170-08 2.48568170-08 
I .  80000000 02 8 . 77367070-•09 3 .41192820-10 3.41192830- 20 3 .43634900-06 3.43634900-08 
2 .  lOOOOOOO 02 1 .02356200 • 06 3.89922640-10 3.89922650-10 4 .53302220-08 4.53302210-06 
2 .  40000000 02 1 , .16975700 •06 4 .36652470- 10 4.38652470-10 5  .77566490-06 5.77568470-08 
2 .  70000000 02 1 .  31595*90 •08 4 .87362290-10 4 ,873b2290-10 7 ,  16493700-08 7 .  16493680- 08 
3. 00000000 02 1 , .46214690 •08 5 .36112110- 1 0  5 .36112120-1 0  8 .70017860-06 8.70017830-06 
3 .  30000000 02 1 , 60834160 •08 5 .84841930-10 5.8464 1940-1 0  1 .03816:00-07 1.03816090-07 
3 .  60000000 02 1 , .75453680 6.33571750- 1 0  6.33571760- to 1 ,22002300-07 1.22092300- 07 
3 .  90000000 0 2  1 , 7 5 4 4 8 7 4 0  6 . 3 3 5 5 5 3 1 0 - 1 0  6 . 3 3 5 5 5 3 2 0 -1 0  1 . 4 1 0 9 9 2 1 0 - 0 7  1 . 4  1 0 9 9 2 0 D - 0 7  
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SYSTEM INFORMATION-UPPER BOUNDS 
DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTER!ST1CS*UPPER BOUNDS 
T (HOURS ; Q W L 
0*0 W.O 2.000010000-05 2.000010000-05 
3.000000000 01 :i.008279210-05 2.000606350-05 2 .000626530-05 
0.000000000 01 ].014624930-05 2.000864150-05 2.000884450-05 
9.000000000 01 1.016221660-05 2.000982080-05 2.001002410-05 
1.200000000 02 ).016833350-05 2.001074690-05 2.001095040-05 
1 .500000000 02 1.017445070-05 2.001167300-05 2.001187660-05 
t.eOOOOOOOD 02 1.018056810-05 2.001259910-05 2.001280290-05 
2.100000000 02 1.018668510-05 2.001352510-05 2.001372890-05 
2.400000000 02 t .019200210-05 2.001445100-05 2.001465500-05 
2.700000000 02 1.019891910-05 2.001937690-05 2.001558110-05 
3.000000000 02 1.020503610-05 2.001630290-05 2.001650710-05 
3.300000000 02 1.021115310-05 2.001722880-05 2.001743320-05 
3.600000000 02 1.021727010-05 2.001815470-05 2.00183592D-05 
3.900000000 02 1.021726900-05 2.001815440-05 2.001835890-05 
4 .200000000 02 1.021726800-05 2.001815410-05 2.001835860-05 
4 .900000000 02 1.021726690-05 2.001815380-05 2.001835830-05 
4 .800000000 02 1.021726590-05 2.001815350-05 2.001835800-05 
5.100000000 02 1.021726480-05 2.001815310-05 2.001835770-05 
5.400000000 02 1 .021726380-05 2.001815280-09 2.001835740-05 
5.700000000 02 1.021726340-05 2.0018I527D-05 2.001835730-05 
INTEGRAL CHARACTERISTICS -UPPER BOUNDS 
T 1 HOURS 1 WSUM FSUM 
3.000000000 01 6.000924530-04 5.999154580-04 
6.000000000 01 1.200313030-03 1.199602030-03 
9.000000000 01 1.800589960-03 1.798985040-03 
1.200000000 02 2.400898480-03 2.398039870-03 
1.500000000 02 3.001234780-03 2.996762890-03 
1.800000000 02 3.601598860-03 3.595154270*03 
2.100000000 02 4.201990720-03 4.193214170-03 
2.400000000 02 4.802410360-03 4.790942750-03 
2.700000000 02 5.402857780-03 5.388340180-03 
3.000000000 02 6.003332980-03 5.985406630-03 
3.300000000 02 6.603835950-03 6.582142250-03 
3.600000000 02 7.204366700-03 7.178547220-03 
3.900000000 02 7.804911340-03 7.774607910-03 
4.200000000 02 8.405455970-03 8*370310730-03 
4.500000000 02 9.006000590-03 8.965655900-03 
4.800000000 02 9.606545200-03 9.560643640-03 
5.10000000D 02 1.020708980*02 1.015527410-02 
5.400000000 02 1.080763440-02 1.074954770-02 
5.700000000 02 1.1*0817900-02 I.134346440-02 
